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ARTICLE
RETHINKING LIABILITY FOR VACCINE INJURY
Joanna B. Apolinsky* and Jeffrey A. Van Detta**
In April 2009, the first cases of the novel influenza A (HIN1) virus
were detected in humans in the United States. As of June 2009, there
had been 27,717 confirmed or probable cases of HIN1 infection and 127
deaths in the United States alone. By the end of August 2009, the num-
ber of deaths had risen to 593. More than seventy countries have now
confirmed human infection with novel HIN1 flu. On June 11, 2009, the
World Health Organization (WHO) raised the worldwide pandemic alert
level to Phase Six. At this time, since HIN1 is a new virus, there is little
human immunity to it. And while the government has been encouraging
the public to be vaccinated, fear of vaccine injury persists.
Congress has created a variety of statutory systems for adjudicating
vaccine injury claims. These systems are undoubtedly flawed, however,
because they provide virtual immunity for vaccine manufacturers and
arguably modest, if any, compensation to injured vaccine recipients. Yet,
they provide at least a potential method for acknowledging and provid-
ing some compensation to those injured by vaccines. Notwithstanding
such administrative adjudication, plaintiffs in some instances rely on
state-law tort claims against vaccine manufacturers. Yet state law tort
suits are an expensive, inefficient, and inconsistent means of compensat-
ing vaccine injuries or regulating vaccine manufacturers. Moreover,
lawyers for pharmaceutical manufacturers have lobbed an assault
against the availability of tort recovery by arguing that state law tort
claims are preempted by approval by the Food and Drug Administration.
Therefore, the time is ripe for a re-examination of the distribution of
tort liability for vaccine-related injuries. Our rethinking comes at a time
when diseases that were supposedly eradicated by twentieth century vac-
cines-such as smallpox and polio-are rearing their heads again, the
former as a terroristic weapon and the latter as the product of an anti-
vaccine movement in the United States and continuing socio-economic
problems abroad. Moreover, twenty-first century society is confronting
new, continually changing, and potentially devastating strains of pan-
demic flu virus threatening not only the public health but also the very
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fabric of our economic system and social order. Thus, the legal ques-
tions surrounding vaccines and injury compensation have left the realm
of academic speculation and been thrust into the spotlight of an immi-
nent, looming crisis. When should there be liability for vaccine-related
injuries? What kind of liability should there be? How should liability be
allocated for vaccine-related injuries? And might that inquiry be made
more meaningful by considering the liability-compensation question
within a holistic framework of strategic planning and policy for vaccina-
tion as a cornerstone of societal stability and progress, rather than as an
isolated pocket of tort or administrative law?
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INTRODUCTION
"A Pandemic is Declared"1
In April 2009, the first cases of the novel influenza A (H1N1) virus
(earlier called "swine flu") were detected in humans in the United
States. 2 As of June 2009, there were 27,717 confirmed or probable cases
I Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Novel HINI Flu: Background on the Situa-
tion, http://www.cdc.gov/hlnlflu/backgroundhtm [hereinafter Novel H1NI Flu: Background
on the Situation] (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
2 Id. The virus originated in Mexico. Id. It has genes similar to those found in swine
flu viruses in Europe and Asia, as well as avian genes and human genes. See Ctrs. for Disease
Control & Prevention, 2009 H1NI Flu ("Swine Flu") and You, http://www.cdc.gov/hlnlflu/
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of HiN1 infection and 127 deaths in the United States alone.3 By the
end of August 2009, the number of deaths rose to 593.4 More than sev-
enty countries have now confirmed human infection with the novel
H1NI flu. 5 On June 11, 2009, the World Health Organization (WHO)
raised the worldwide pandemic alert level to Phase Six. 6 The alert level
is based on the spread of the virus, as opposed to the severity of the
illness.7 However, at this time, since HINI is a new virus, there is little
qa.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010). Scientists refer to this as a "quadruple reassortant" virus.
Id.
3 See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Novel H1N1 Flu Situation Update, http://
www.cdc.gov/hlnlflu/updates/062609.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
4 See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Novel H1N1 Flu Situation Update, http://
www.cdc.gov/hlnlflu/updates/090409.htm [hereinafter Novel H1Nl Flu Situation Update]
(last visited Mar. 28, 2010). On July 24, 2009, the CDC ceased tracking and reporting con-
firmed and probable H1N1 flu cases. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Monitoring
Influenza Activity, Including 2009 HlN1, http://www.cdc.gov/hlnlflu/reportingqa.htm (last
visited Mar. 28, 2010). As the outbreak expanded, case counts became increasingly more
difficult because only a small number of those with respiratory illnesses were being tested for
H1N1. Id. Moreover, case counting was extremely resource intensive. Id. Instead, the CDC
has been reporting hospitalizations and deaths (either confirmed or probable) resulting from all
types of influenza, including H1N1. Id. The CDC estimates that as of January 16, 2010, the
number of cases of H1N1 in the United States to range between 41 million and 84 million; the
number of hospitalizations in the United States from H1NI to range between 183,000 and
378,000; and the number of deaths in the United States from H1N1 to range between 8,330
and 17,160. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, CDC Estimates of 2009 H1NI Influenza
Cases, Hospitalizations and Deaths in the United States, April 2009 to January 16, 2010, Mar.
12, 2010, http://www.cdc.gov/hlnlflu/estimates_2009_hlnl.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
5 See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Novel HINI Flu Situation Update, June
12, 2009, http://www.cdc.gov/hlnlflu/updates/061209.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
6 See id.
In nature, influenza viruses circulate continuously among animals, especially birds.
Even though such viruses might theoretically develop into pandemic viruses, in
Phase 1 no viruses circulating among animals have been reported to cause infections
in humans. In Phase 2 an animal influenza virus circulating among domesticated or
wild animals is known to have caused infection in humans, and is therefore consid-
ered a potential pandemic threat. In Phase 3, an animal or human-animal influenza
reassortant virus has caused sporadic cases or small clusters of disease in people, but
has not resulted in human-to-human transmission sufficient to sustain community-
level outbreaks.... Phase 4 is characterized by verified human-to-human transmis-
sion of an animal or human-animal influenza reassortant virus able to cause 'com-
munity-level outbreaks.' . . . Phase 5 is characterized by human-to-human spread of
the virus into at least two countries in one WHO region. While most countries will
not be affected at this stage, the declaration of Phase 5 is a strong signal that a
pandemic is imminent and that the time to finalize the organization, communication,
and implementation of the planned mitigation measures is short. Phase 6, the pan-
demic phase, is characterized by community level outbreaks in at least one other
country in a different WHO region in addition to the criteria defined in Phase 5.
Designation of this phase will indicate that a global pandemic is under way.
Current WHO phase of pandemic alert, http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian-influenza/phase/
en (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
7 See Novel H1NI Flu: Background on the Situation, supra note 1.
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human immunity to it.8 The Centers for Disease Control's (CDC) earlier
warnings that the virus could cause significant illness and death during
the 2009-2010 flu season were correct. 9
The government is working aggressively to continue manufacturing
the HINI vaccine. 10 The vaccine undoubtedly helped millions ward off
a potential threat of significant illness due to the virus. But what of
others who suffer significant adverse consequences from a vaccine? The
safety and efficacy of the HiN1 vaccine is at the center of a growing
debate. Many are skeptical of the vaccine's safety and have criticized
the way in which it has been produced, as well as its rushed distribu-
tion.11 The uncertainty is not merely being channeled from the usual
"anti-vaccinators." 12 Rather, many who have historically supported vac-
cination are wary of the HIN1 vaccine. 13 This skepticism has even re-
sulted in a lawsuit against the State of New York filed by three nurses
who claim the State has violated their civil rights by requiring that all
state health employees be vaccinated against the HIN1 virus by Novem-
ber 30, 2009 or face fines. 14
Currently, atypical, but possible, side effects from the "generic" flu
vaccine include severe allergic reactions or Guillian-Barr6 syndrome, a
rare and occasionally fatal paralytic condition. 15 All too often, signifi-
cantly debilitating and sometimes deadly side effects result from other
8 See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Interim Guidance on Infection Control
Measures for 2009 H IN I Influenza, http://www.cdc.gov/h l n I flu/guidelines-infectioncontrol.
htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
9 See Novel HINI Flu Situation Update, supra note 4. See also Richard P. Wenzel, Op-
Ed., What We Learned from HINi 's First Year, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2010, at A25, available
at http://www.nytimes.con2010/04/13/opinion/13wenzel.html (positing that although the
2009-2010 HINI epidemic was not as deadly as initially feared, it was more serious than
many have suggested).
10 See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Key Facts About 2009 H1N1 Flu Vac-
cine, http://www.cdc.gov/hlnlflu/vaccination/vaccine-keyfacts.htm (last visited Mar. 28,
2010).
11 See Jennifer Steinhauer, Swine Flu Shots Revive a Debate About Vaccines, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 2009, at Al.
12 See id. at A19; Sewell Chan & Anemona Hartocollis, Judge Halts Mandatory Flu
Vaccines for Health Care Workers, NYTutsas.coM, http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/
10/16/judge-halts-mandatory-flu-vaccines-for-health-care-workers, (Oct. 16, 2009, 12:58 PM).
13 See Steinhauer, supra note 11, at A19.
14 See Chan & Hartocollis, supra note 12. The mandate was subsequently dropped, with
the State citing a shortage in availability of the vaccine as the reason. See Rick Karlin & Scott
Waldman, New York Drops Mandatory Swine Flu Shots for Health Workers After Lawsuit
Filed, THE FLU CASE, Oct.23, 2009, http://www.theflucase.com/index.php?option=com-con-
tent&view=article&id= 1339%3Anew-york-drops-mandatory-swine-flu-shots-for-health-work-
ers-after-lawsuit-filed&catid=41%3Ahighlighted-news&Itemid=105&lang=en.
15 See James M. Wood et al., Product Liability Protection for Stem Cell Research and
Therapies - A Proposal, 18 HEALTH LAWYER 1, 8 (2005); Ctrs. for Disease Control & Preven-
tion, General Questions and Answers on 2009 H1N1 Influenza Vaccine Safety, http://www.
cdc.gov/hlnlflu/vaccination/vaccine-safety-qa.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
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vaccines that are routinely administered to the population. 16 In an effort
to prevent an avalanche of state law tort claims against manufacturers of
those vaccines, Congress has created a variety of statutory systems in an
attempt to protect manufacturers, while sometimes also providing for a
compensation model for victims of vaccine-related injury. Most notable
of these is the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (NCVIA) and its
attendant Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund. 17 As discussed be-
low, these types of systems undeniably are flawed. Yet, they at least
provide a potential method for acknowledging and providing some com-
pensation to those injured by vaccines.
In other contexts when victims are injured by drugs and medical
devices, no statutory compensation scheme exists; rather, plaintiffs must
rely on state law tort claims against manufacturers of such products. 18
The "unavoidably unsafe" product concept makes state law products lia-
bility claims against manufacturers a very tough road for the injured; and
even when the injured can find another state law theory (such as inade-
quate patient warnings), state law tort suits are an expensive, inefficient,
and inconsistent means of compensating vaccine injuries or regulating
vaccine manufacturers. 19
Not surprisingly, the pharmaceutical industry-and their share-
holder investors-would prefer no transactional costs for litigation. Yet
with NCVIA-style programs allowing claimants to opt for a regular tort
lawsuit after prior vaccine court adjudication, state tort lawsuits remain a
potential problem. In pursuit of a r6gime in which pharmaceutical com-
panies would enjoy virtually absolute immunity from legal claims, law-
yers for pharmaceutical manufacturers have lobbed an assault against the
availability of tort recovery by arguing that state law tort claims are pre-
empted by approval of the drug or device in question by the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA).20 Now that an H1Nl vaccine exists, the
federal government could attempt to protect manufacturers of the vaccine
by statutorily preempting any tort claims which otherwise could be
brought by an injured recipient of the vaccine. 21 Even if Congress did
16 See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Possible Side-effects from Vaccines,
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vac-gen/side-effects.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
17 See infra I.B.
18 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S.
Ct. 999 (2008); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
19 See Okianer Christian Dark, Is the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 the
Solution for the DTP Controversy?, 19 U. TOL. L. REv. 799, 817-34 (1988); Mary Beth Ner-
aas, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: A Solution to the Vaccine Liability
Crisis?, 63 WASH. L. REv. 149, 151-56, 159 (1988).
20 See generally Lawrence 0. Gostin, Regulating the Safety of Pharmaceuticals: The
FDA, Preemption and the Public's Health, 301 JAMA 2036-37 (2009).
21 Currently, the HIN1 vaccine is considered a "covered countermeasure" under the
Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program which administers the compensation fund uti-
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not act, preemption due to FDA approval of the vaccine, undoubtedly,
would be argued aggressively in defense of the claim. If preemption was
found to exist, the vast majority of those injured by the vaccine over time
would have little to no compensation for injuries that may be disabling
for life. The time is ripe, therefore, for a re-examination of the distribu-
tion of tort liability for vaccine-related injuries. This Article proposes in
the first instance that FDA preemption of state law tort claims against
manufacturers of vaccines is inappropriate, for it would leave vaccine
injury victims who fall outside the NCVIA or other statutory program
with no compensation at all. It then proposes a more appropriate com-
pensation model for injured victims that borrows from the NCVIA that
takes into consideration the unique role of vaccines within the pharma-
ceutical industry, medicine, and society as a whole. We propose that
Congress re-examine vaccine liability, not in isolation, but as part of a
broader review of vaccines as a holistic social phenomenon-i.e.,
programmatic planning for vaccine research, development, testing, distri-
bution, monitoring, and injury compensation. Various elements of
programmatic planning currently exist in isolation. Congress has the op-
portunity to take this foundation of modem public health out of the parti-
san arena where it is treated as a manufacturer's liability problem and
pits the perceived self-interests of "trial lawyers" against the pro-industry
lobby of "tort reformists." Congress could develop comprehensive legis-
lation to shift the paradigm to one of holistic strategic planning that as-
sures the maintenance of current vaccines and the development of new
vaccines, incentivizes the expensive research required for vaccine devel-
opment and renewal, and protects the public which undertakes substan-
tial risks yet reaps unprecedented benefits from no longer having to
suffer the costs, casualties, and catastrophic calamities that infectious
disease wrought for thousands of years.
Our rethinking of vaccine-injury liability comes at a time when dis-
eases, like smallpox and polio, that were supposedly eradicated by twen-
tieth century vaccines, are rearing their heads again, the former as a
terroristic weapon22 and the latter as the product of an anti-vaccine
movement in the United States,23 and continuing socio-economic
lized by the Prep Act. See U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services Health Resources and
Services Administration, Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program, http://www.hrsa.
gov/countermeasurescomp/default.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2010). For more information on
the Prep Act, see infra Part I.D.
22 See Remarks Announcing the Smallpox Vaccination Plan, 1 PUB. PAPERS 2191 (Dec.
13, 2002) (discussing the possibility of smallpox as a bioterrorist weapon); see also Alan W.
Dove & Vincent R. Racaniello, The Polio Eradication Effort: Should Vaccine Eradication Be
Next?, 277 Sci. 779-80, Aug. 8, 1997.
23 The anti-vaccine movement consists both of those parents who oppose compulsory
vaccination on grounds of personal autonomy as well as fear of injury and parents who do not
vaccinate children because they are home schooled and therefore the state school-registration
2010]
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problems abroad.24 Moreover, twenty-first century society has been con-
fronted with new, continually changing, and potentially devastating
strains of pandemic flu viruses, threatening not only the public health,
but also the very fabric of our economic system and social order. Thus,
the legal questions surrounding vaccines and injury compensation have
left the realm of academic speculation and been thrust into the spotlight
of an imminent, looming crisis. When should there be liability for vac-
cine-related injuries? What kind of liability should there be? How
should liability be allocated for vaccine-related injuries? And might that
inquiry be made more meaningful by considering the liability-compensa-
tion question within a holistic framework of strategic planning and policy
for vaccination, rather than as an isolated pocket of tort or administrative
law? These are the fundamental questions that drive our rethinking of
vaccine-injury liability.
The time has come for such an examination, not only practically, as
noted in this introduction, but also legally. Between 1976 and the pre-
sent, Congress has enacted several vaccine-injury liability control pro-
grams. 25 Current world events have changed the potential role and scope
of mandatory vaccine programs in America. Since September 11, 2001,
the world has been recognized as a far more dangerous place than most
had realized in the 1990s, due to the threat of bio-terrorism. 26 Similarly,
globalization has increased the opportunities for global pandemics-with
HINI virus the most serious recent and continuing concern-against
which some governments and pharmaceutical companies are racing to
develop a new generation of rapidly manufactured and widely distributed
vaccines. 27 Moreover, conditions in some countries have led to the re-
surgence of disease, such as polio, against which existing vaccines and
system for enforcing vaccinations is not engaged. See, e.g., Donya Khalili & Arthur Caplan,
Off the Grid: Vaccinations Among Homeschooled Children, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 471, 471
(2007). See also Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts 197 U.S. 11, 31 n.1 (1905)
(reciting the history of compulsory vaccination around the world since creation of England's
National Vaccine Establishment in 1808).
24 See, e.g., LEAH EISENSTEIN ET AL., FLA. DEFT. OF HEALTH, EPIDEMIOLOGY OF VAC-
CINE- PREVENTABLE DISEASES PART 4: SMALLPOX, POLIO AND VARICELLA (July 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.doh.state.fl.us/disease-ctr/epi/epi-updates/2009/July2OO9EpiUpdate.pdf
(stating that at least in the Polio context vaccination refusal as well as socio-economic factors,
including displaced populations, migration, act as barriers complete irradication of the virus).
25 See infra Part I.
26 See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Emergency Preparedness and Response, Counterter-
rorism-Related Legislation, www.fda.gov/emergencypreparedness/counterterrorism/bioterror-
ismact/default.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
27 See, e.g., Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Clinical Trials for Flu Vaccine Are to Begin Soon,
N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2009, at A4. The tenor of this news story should make any member of
the public nervous about corner-cutting and risk-imposition in the scramble for roll-out with
only limited field testing. Id. (quoting leading federal vaccine official stating that because the
trials are so small-2,400 participants-"researchers will be able to pick up only obvious
problems").
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vaccination programs in America may be vulnerable.28 Thus, public
health authorities are confronted with calls for new and broad vaccina-
tion programs, some using new vaccines. And with these efforts to meet
new-and renewed-biological threats to the public comes the age-old
question of the risks posed by vaccines and how the risks ought to dis-
tributed among the public, individuals, manufacturers, and governments.
Part I of this Article describes the congressional vaccination pro-
grams to date and highlights the major differences among them. In Part
II, we explore various criticisms of these congressional programs and
analyze how the goals associated with each of these programs, although
born of arguably well-placed intentions, may be better served in the con-
text of fairness, without an oversimplified emphasis on a risk-utility anal-
ysis or the overall benefit to society as a whole. Part II opens with a
close look at the more aggressive program of "tort reform" through pre-
emption: that federal regulation, especially federal approval and labeling
processes promulgated by the FDA, "preempts" any claims by injured
persons, thereby effectively eliminating remedies and compensation for
injuries that arise during post-approval actual experience. In Part III, we
suggest that the time has come for Congress to review vaccine liability.
We provide a paradigm in which future congressional consideration of
legislation regulating vaccine liability can proceed from a principled,
rather than purely instrumentalist, basis. Building upon Professor
George Fletcher's nonreciprocal risk theory of corrective justice,29 as
further refined by Professor Gregory C. Keating in what we call "the
distribution of nonreciprocal harms,' '30 we set out a new perspective
from which Congress can perceive the intersecting legal principles impli-
cated by the competing interests along a vast spectrum. The interests
implicated by vaccine injury range from strict liability, as argued suc-
cessfully by attorney Melvin Belli fifty years ago in Gottsdanker v. Cut-
ter Laboratories3 1 (that the process of vaccine manufacture "should and
28 See, e.g., Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Polio: New Outbreak of Polio in Africa Prompts
Appeal for Vaccine Financing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2009, at D6.
29 See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537
(1972).
30 See Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of Acci-
dents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 195 (2000).
31 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960); see PAUL A. OFFITrr, M.D., THE CurrER INCI-
DENT: How AMERICA'S FIRST POLIO VACCINE LED TO THE GROWING VACCINE CRISIS 132-53
(2005). This case involved one of the seven laboratories that had made the original issue of
the Salk killed-virus polio vaccine, Cutter Laboratories, and its failure to ensure that all live
polio viruses had been killed in the vaccine, resulting in Cutter-produced lots of the vaccine
causing the very disease in children it was supposed to prevent. Id. at 3, 133. In the worlds of
vaccinology and law, this event quickly acquired the moniker, "The Cutter Incident." Id. at 3;
see, e.g., Neal Nathanson & Alexander D. Langmuir, The Cutter Incident: Pliomyelitis Follow-
ing Formaldehyde-inactivated Piliovirus Vaccination in the United States During the Spring of
1955, 11: Relationship of Poliomyelitis to Cutter Vaccine, 78 AM. J. OF HYGIENE 29-60 (1963).
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could be perfect"), 32 to government immunity from tort liability, the re-
sponsibility of the public in preventing preventable disease, the role of
the pharmaceutical industry in modern life, and the social responsibilities
that must attend the profits33 reaped for shareholders. These substantial
profits pharmaceutical companies enjoy include those acquired from nec-
essary vaccines, "designer" or convenience pharmaceuticals such as
Viagra, "me-too" drugs that are but prosaic variations of currently mar-
keted drugs, and drugs that are the product of "promot[ing] diseases to fit
their drugs" rather than "promot[ing] drugs to treat diseases." 34
I. CONGRESSIONAL VACCINATION PROGRAMS
A. The National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976
When four cases of swine flu were discovered at Fort Dix, New
Jersey in January 1976, fear of a flu pandemic prompted the federal gov-
ernment to pass the Swine Flu Act.35 The swine flu virus was the same
virus that caused the 1918-1919 flu pandemic, which reportedly infected
32 OFFIrr, THE CUTTER INCIDENT, supra note 31, at 141-42. Dr. Offit quotes attorney
Belli in his closing argument from the Gottsdanker trial transcript:
Belli concluded that if medicine was a process of evolution, Anne Gottsdanker
shouldn't have to pay for the process. '[T]here is, as a matter of law [the notion] that
you cannot assume a risk in a case like this. Maybe only a few got [paralyzed].
Maybe science advanced. Maybe science must advance over the bodies of the young
and old and the twisted and the lame, [but] there is no doubt in my mind-and there
should be none in yours-that the process could and should be perfect.'
Id. at 142 (quoting the reporter's transcript, Gottsdadanker v. Cutter Labs, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320
(Cal. Ct. App. 1960) (Civ. 18413-14).
33 For example, Congressman Waxman complied a table of leading drug company profit
increases from 2005 to 2006 that showed, among other things:
The ten largest pharmaceutical companies enjoyed substantial profit increases in the
first six months of the new Medicare drug program. In the first half of 2006, profits
for these companies increased by over $8 billion, a 27% increase.
Overall, profits have increased for eight of the world's ten largest pharmaceutical
companies. Pfizer, the largest pharmaceutical company, had the largest increase in
profits. The company's profits over this six-month period increased by $2.7 billion,
a 73% increase. Merck's profits have increased by almost $1 billion (44%); Sanofi-
Aventis's profits have increased by more than $1.3 billion (35%); and AstraZeneca's
profits have increased by more than $750 million (33%).
See REP. HENRY A. WAXMAN, ANALYSIS: PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFITS INCREASE BY
OVER $8 BILLION AFTER MEDICARE DRUG PLAN GOES Irro EFFECT 2 (Sept. 2006), available
at http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/documents/20060919115623-70677.pdf.
34 MARCIA ANGEL, THE TRUTH ABOUT DRUG COMPANIES XV-XVi, 12, 74-85, 86, 87-94
(2004). Angel notes that drug companies are spending 2.5 times as much on "marketing and
administration" as they are on "research and development." Id. at 12. She also notes that a
common pharmaceutical business strategy is "treat[ing] the normal accompaniments of aging
... as diseases" for which drugs must be developed. Id. at 86.
35 See Michael Greenberger, The 800 Pound Gorilla Sleeps: The Federal Government's
Lackadaisical Liability and Compensation Polices in the Context of Pre-Event Vaccine Immu-
nization Programs, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 7, 11 (2005); Charles F. Hagan, Vaccine
Compensation Schemes, 45 FooD DRUG COSM. L.J. 477, 477 (1990).
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two billion people and killed twenty million worldwide.36 In an attempt
to avoid a similar pandemic, the administration of President Gerald Ford
requested that Congress appropriate emergency funds to support a na-
tionwide vaccination initiative. 37 The need for liability protection in the
Act for vaccine manufacturers was not a concern until insurance compa-
nies declined to provide liability coverage for vaccine manufacturers for
any liability this particular vaccine allegedly caused. 38 This refusal was
largely because of the 5th Circuit's decision in Reyes v. Wyeth Laborato-
ries,39 holding polio vaccine manufacturers liable for failing to provide
adequate product warnings directly to vaccinees even if they had pro-
vided them in package inserts.40 The Reyes court recognized the practi-
cal problems of vaccine-injury liability; pediatricians and
epidemiologists, for example, argued that "the holding [the court]
reached is 'dangerous' to the nation's preventive medicine programs and
contravenes a strong public policy favoring large-scale participation in
immunization efforts to combat infectious disease."'41 Moreover, these
problems raise "public health policy questions [that] cut across the
law" 42 and:
[u]ntil Americans have a comprehensive scheme of so-
cial insurance, courts must resolve by a balancing pro-
cess the head-on collision between the need for adequate
recovery and viable enterprises .... This balancing task
should be approached with a realization that the basic
consideration involves a determination of the most just
allocation of the risk of loss between the members of the
marketing chain.
Statistically predictable as are these rare cases of vac-
cine-induced polio, a strong argument can be advanced
that the loss ought not lie where it falls (on the victim),
36 See Hagan, supra note 35, at 477.
37 Id.
38 Id.; Greenberger, supra note 35, at 11.
39 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974)
40 See id. at 1295; see also Greenberger, supra note 35, at 11. Reyes dealt with the
manufacturer's failure to provide a direct warning of the risks associated with the vaccine
directly to the vaccine recipient. See Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1270. The manufacturer, Wyeth
Laboratories, argued that it had provided an adequate warning in a package insert to the nurse
who administered the vaccine, id. at 1275, claiming that the nurse was a "learned intermedi-
ary." Id. The learned intermediary doctrine allows a manufacturer to rely on the warnings
provided to the prescribing physician, as the physician is in a better position than the manufac-
turer to balance the risks posed by the vaccine against its utility. Id. at 1277-78. The Fifth
Circuit rejected this argument, however, largely because the vaccine was administered in a
county health clinic, as opposed to by a private physician. Id. at 1277.
41 Id. at 1295.
42 Id. at 1293.
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but should be borne by the manufacturer as a foreseeable
cost of doing business, and passed on to the public in the
form of price increases to his customers.
43
Thus, a bill was introduced in Congress in June 1976, providing for
government indemnification for swine flu vaccine manufacturers.
44
Congress did not act on the bill immediately, however, because the fed-
eral government did not want to accept financial responsibility on behalf
of the manufacturers. 45 As a result, manufacturers ceased producing the
swine flu vaccine. 46 Had a pandemic actually occurred (which ulti-
mately did not happen), there would have been no vaccine for the poten-
tially millions of Americans who would have contracted this flu. 47 Yet
later that summer, the fear created by an outbreak of Legionnaire's dis-
ease, another infectious disease which is a type of pneumonia, 48
prompted Congress to finally pass the Swine Flu Act.49 To encourage
the development of the vaccine without any resulting liability, the Act
provided protection for manufacturers against liability for other than
their own negligence and thus provided plaintiffs a cause of action exclu-
sively under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).50
The Swine Flu Act provided that the exclusive remedy against the
United States was necessary due to the government's "unique role in the
initiation, planning, and administration of the swine flu program. 51
Thus, the Act provided protection for not only manufacturers, but also
distributors and administrators of the vaccine (collectively, defined in the
Act as "program participants"). 52 The plaintiff would sue the United
States instead of the actual program participant under any theory of lia-
bility the plaintiff could have otherwise brought against the participant,
"including negligence, strict liability in tort, and breach of warranty." 53
The courts interpreted the language allowing such a suit to effectively
create a no-fault compensation system, whereby the United States would
be liable to any plaintiff who could show that his injuries were caused by
43 Id. at 1293-94 & n.57 (citations & footnotes omitted). Judge Wisdom also observed
that "[ilt can also be argued, of course, that since all society benefits from universal immuni-
zation against infectious disease, the loss should be borne by the local, state or federal govern-
ment." Id. (emphasis added).
44 See Greenberger, supra note 35, at 11.
45 See id. at 11-12.
46 See id. at 12.
47 See id.
48 See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Patient Facts: Learn More About Legion-
naires' Disease, http://www.cdc.govlegionella/patientfacts.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
49 See Greenberg, supra note 35, at 12.
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the vaccine. 54 However, if the United States was held liable due to a
program participant's negligence or failure to carry out any obligation
under the program, it could seek indemnification from that participant
because of that negligence or failure. 55 Further, the Act did not place
any limits on the amount of compensation that could be awarded to any
particular plaintiff.56
Under the program, roughly forty million Americans were vacci-
nated in a two-month period.57 And although the program achieved the
goals of broad manufacturer and doctor participation, 58 and high vaccina-
tion levels around the country, it has been criticized for being too hasty a
reaction to a pandemic that never transpired.59 Further, the government
abruptly halted the program because the vaccine itself increased the risk
to those who had been vaccinated from developing Guillain-Barr6 syn-
drome, a rare and occasionally fatal paralytic condition. 60  Research
showed that those who received the swine flu vaccination developed
Guillain-Barr6 at seven times the rate of those who had not been vacci-
nated.61 Vaccine recipients filed suit after contracting Guillain-Barr6,
which was ultimately attributed to the vaccine. 62 By 1985, the federal
government had paid over $90 million in damages to these injured plain-
tiffs who had contracted Guillian-Barr6. 63
B. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
Vaccines administered in childhood have been the most pervasive
vaccine programs, originating with childhood vaccines against smallpox
in colonial times,64 and currently encompassing diphtheria, tetanus, per-
tussis, haemophilus influenzae type b, hepatitis A, hepatitis B, human
papillomavirus, seasonal influenza, measles, mumps, rubella, meningo-
coccal, polio, pneumococcal conjugate, rotavirus, varicella, and "[a]ny
54 See Greenberger, supra note 35, at 12.
55 § 274b(k)(5)(C)(ii).
56 42 U.S.C. § 274b (1976).
57 See Greenberger, supra note 35, at 13.
58 See Michael H. LeRoy, Pox Americana? Vaccinating More Emergency Doctors for
Smallpox: A Law and Economics Approach to Work Conditions, 54 EMORY L.J. 597, 626
(2005).
59 See, e.g., Sharon L. Begley, The Failure of the 1976 Swine Influenza Immunization
Program, 50 YALE J. BIOLOGY & MED. 645, 645, 655 (1977).
60 See Wood et al., supra note 15, at 8.
61 See id.
62 See Greenberger, supra note 35, at 13.
63 See id.
64 See Alvin Powell, The Beginning of the End of Smallpox, HARV. UNIV. GAZErrE, May
20, 1999, available at http://www.news.harvard,edulgazette/1999/05.20/waterhouse.html.
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combination of the vaccines above."'65 Sales of such vaccines generated
$16.3 billion for pharmaceutical companies in 2007.66 Yet manufactur-
ers of childhood vaccines have also incurred liability for injuries and
death allegedly caused by vaccines that were administered to a previ-
ously healthy child.67 In the preceding twenty years, a number of child-
hood vaccine manufacturers left the market for a complex set of reasons
relating primarily to the labor-intensive production process and lower
profitability of vaccines than pharmaceuticals that are less challenging to
manufacture. The departure also related, in some measure, to litigation
costs experienced and even more so to the perception of the potentially
high costs of future litigation as well as the lack of liability insurance
coverage due to the unpredictability of tort liability.68 This decline in
available manufacturers affected the country's ability to maintain accept-
able vaccine supply and vaccination levels. 69 In addition, as the occur-
rence of many historically common and very serious childhood diseases
had seemingly been all but eradicated, 70 many people became less con-
cerned with these diseases themselves and more concerned with the risk
of potential side effects from the vaccinations. 71 Further, there was great
65 See U.S. Dep't Health & Human Services, Health Resources & Services Administra-
tion, National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program-Covered Vaccines, http://www.hrsa.
gov/vaccinecompensation/covered-vaccines.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
66 Andrea Hiller, Gardasil, Other New Products Spur Strong Vaccine Sales in 2007,
REUTERS, Apr. 7, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS184052+07-Apr-
2008+PRN20080407 (noting that this "represents an increase of 38% over 2006 sales of $11.7
billion" among the "five major players-Merck & Co., GlaxoSmithKline, Sanofi Pasteur, Wy-
eth and Novartis-which "dominate vaccine sales" expected to "more than double in five
years"). Full, worldwide market reports on vaccines and their pharmaceutical manufacturers
are proprietary and available only from research firms such as Kalorama, at a price-tag of
$4,000.00 -beyond our budget but well within Congress's in considering our recommenda-
tions in Part III, infra. See generally Kalorama Information, http://www.kaloramainformation.
com (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
67 See H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 4-6 (1986). The pertussis component of the DPT vac-
cine (diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus) has been one of the most controversial of the childhood
vaccines because of the pertussis component of the vaccine. See Keith E. Abbott, The Na-
tional Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 20 COLO. LAW. 1825, 1825 (1991). See gener-
ally Susan G. Clark, Commentary, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act-The National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 94 EDOC. L. REP. 671, 674 (1994) (addressing the
issues raised by manufacture liability for vaccine-related injuries and the resulting enactment
of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program).
68 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 4-5; Hagan, supra note 35, at 479. The Centers
for Disease Control website also claims that liability was imposed on manufacturers for al-
leged vaccine-related injuries when there was little or no scientific evidence to establish causa-
tion. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, History of Vaccine Safety, http://www.cdc.gov/
vaccinesafetyfVaccine Monitoring/history.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
69 See H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 7.
70 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., A PARENT'S GUIDE TO KIDS' VACCINES, 1 (2007),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm048771 .pdf.
71 See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, History of Vaccine Safety, http://www.
cdc.gov/vaccinesafetyVaccineMonitoring/history.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
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uncertainty as to whether victims injured by vaccines would be able to
obtain compensation. 72 This concern was due in large part to the many
different theories of liability a plaintiff could bring against a manufac-
turer and the inconsistencies among the jurisdictions in how these vari-
ous theories were applied.73
In response to the concerns of both manufacturers and vaccine re-
cipients, Congress passed the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of
1986 (NCVIA). 74 The NCVIA, through the National Childhood Vaccine
Compensation Program (the Program), created a no-fault compensation
system, allowing claimants to proceed with their claim without having to
prove fault on the part of the manufacturer. 75 The Program is designed
to be a two-tiered system, whereby a claimant must first fully adjudicate
her claims under the NCVIA. 76 If the claimant is dissatisfied with the
result under the Program, he is then allowed to file a civil action against
the manufacturer. 77 This system is intended to be a more efficient alter-
native to a civil action against a manufacturer with more consistent re-
suits for claimants.78 Further, claimants are diverted away from the tort
system, thereby limiting the potential financial exposure risked by the
manufacturers. 79
Claimants file their petitions with the United States Court of Federal
Claims. 80 The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (HHS Secretary) is the named respondent in the petition, rather
than the manufacturer of the vaccine alleged to have caused the injury.81
The claims are heard initially by a Special Master, who decides whether
and to what extent compensation should be awarded.82 The judges of the
Federal Court of Claims have sole discretion in determining the qualifi-
cations of, and appointments to, these Special Master positions, and no
medical or scientific background has been mandated as a prerequisite to
appointment as a Special Master.83 Moreover, once a Special Master is
72 See Hagan, supra note 35, at 479.
73 See Dark, supra note 19, at 817; Neraas, supra note 19, at 153-56, 159.
74 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-I (1994); see Elizabeth A. Breen, One Shot Deal: The National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 309, 316, 319-20 (1999) (explaining
the two concerns of the act, while also indicating that the Act has not adequately met the
concerns of vaccine recipients).
75 See § 300aa-ll(c).
76 See Neraas, supra note 19, at 162.
77 See id.
78 See H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 5-7 (1986); Neraas, supra note 19, at 164, 165; see also
Breen, supra note 74, at 317.
79 See Neraas, supra note 19, at 162.
80 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1 l(a)(1) (1994).
81 See id.
82 Id. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(A).
83 See, e.g., Craig A. Conway, Federal Court Reverses Denial of Vaccination Compen-
sation Claim, HEALTH L. PERSPECTIVES (2009), available at http://www.law.uh.edu/health
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appointed, he may be removed during his four-year term only for "in-
competence, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental disabil-
ity."' 84 Criticism has been leveled at the selection process, qualifications,
and jurisdictional purview of these vaccine court Special Masters for cre-
ating arguably improper "unbridled discretion. 85
Generally, in order to succeed with their claims, claimants must es-
tablish, by a preponderance of the evidence, the following four elements:
[1] that they received a vaccine set forth on a "Vaccine Injury Table," 86
[2] they sustained injury, aggravation of an illness, disability, injury or
condition listed on the Table, or died as a result of administration of the
vaccine,8 7 [3] that the first symptoms or onset of injury, aggravation of
an injury, or condition, or death, occurred within the period of time spec-
ified in the Table, 88 and [4] that the injury or death was not caused by
factors unrelated to the administration of the vaccine. 89 The parties shall
have the right for the Special Master's decision to be reviewed by the
Court of Federal Claims, and then may obtain review of the Claims
Court's judgment by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. 90
Any compensation paid to a claimant is based on the Vaccine Injury
Table.91 This Table includes all routinely recommended childhood vac-
cines, the potential adverse side effects a particular vaccine might cause,
and the time frame within which a side effect might occur.92 To the
extent the claimant can establish these requirements, he is entitled to a
presumption of causation. 93 If, however, a claimant's injury is not on the
Table, or a manifestation of symptoms did not occur within the period of
time specified in the Table, then the claimant must establish, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, that the vaccine was a cause-in-fact of his
law/perspectives/2009/(CC)%20Vaccine.pdf. Surprisingly, "[t]here is no requirement that a
special master has any formal medical training, and none of the current special masters have an
extensive scientific background. The special masters have two primary functions: collection
of relevant information in a timely manner, and rendering a final, enforceable decision." Id. at
3 (quoting Bruce Patsner, Childhood Vaccines and Autism, Special Courts and Torts, HEALTH
L. PERSP., Feb. 18, 2008, http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/2008/(BP)%20autism.
pdf).
84 Breen, supra note 74, at 321 (footnotes omitted).
85 Id.
86 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14 (2006) (listing the table); § 300aa-1 1(c)(1)(A) (indicating that
the vaccinated individual must have "received a vaccine set forth in the Vaccine Injury Table).
87 Id. § 300aa-ll (c)(1)(C)(i).
88 Id.
89 Id § 300aa-13(a)(1).
90 Id. §§ 300aa-12(e)(1), (f).
91 See H.R. Rep. No. 99-908 at 15 (1986).
92 See id. at 19.
93 See id. at 18.
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injury by providing some scientific study or expert medical testimony. 94
This Table is periodically updated based on the most up to date data in an
attempt to more justly compensate those with "good" claims, while
weeding out the "bad" claims.95
Compensation under the Program includes expenses that have been
or will be incurred for diagnosis and medical or other remedial care,
"rehabilitation, developmental evaluation, special education, vocational
training and placement, case management services, counseling, emo-
tional or behavioral therapy, residential and custodial care and service
expenses, special equipment, related travel expenses, and facilities deter-
mined to be reasonably necessary. '96 Determining these damages is a
complicated process that requires the use of an expert who should be
experienced in preparing a comprehensive "life care plan" that details the
types of care the claimant will need over the course of his lifetime.97
However, compensation under the Program is secondary to other sources
of compensation, including state compensation programs or insurance
policies. 98 Thus, a claimant must first exhaust those sources of payment
before receipt of funds under the Program.99
Unlike the Swine Flu Act which did not place caps on any awards,
the NCVIA caps compensation at $250,000 for the estate of the de-
ceased, as well as for pain and suffering and emotional distress. °°
Claimants are entitled to compensation for actual and anticipated loss of
earnings, and reasonable attorney's fees and other costs. 10 1 Punitive or
exemplary damages, however, are not allowed. 10 2 Damage awards are
paid from the Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund,10 3 which is
funded by an excise tax charged on all childhood vaccines. 1°4
If the claimant chooses to receive the compensation awarded under
the Program, he is prohibited from bringing a civil suit against the vac-
cine manufacturer.10 5 However, if he is unsatisfied with the administra-
94 See id. at 15; Lisa J. Steel, National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Pro-
gram: Is This the Best We Can Do for Our Children?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 144, 156-57
(1994-1995).
95 See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(c) (2006); Breen, supra note 74, at 326 (describing the
authorities that bring the table up to date).
96 § 300aa-15(a)(1)(A).
97 See Abbott, supra note 67, at 1827.
98 See § 300aa-15(g).
99 See id.
100 See id. § 300aa-15(a)(2), (4).
101 See id. § 300aa-15(a)(3)(A), (B).
102 Id. § 300aa-15(d)(1), (e)(1).
103 See id. § 300aa-15(i)(2); Hagan, supra note 35, at 482.
104 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 4131, 9510 (2006); Hagan, supra note 35, at 482.
105 See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-21(a); see also id, § 300aa-1 l(a)(2) (specifying the limitations
on bringing a civil action after October 1, 1988).
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tive award, he can file a civil tort action against the manufacturer. 0 6 As
this route is not the "desired" one in the NCVIA's two-tiered struc-
ture, 10 7 Congress amended certain aspects of traditional tort law in an
effort to maintain protections for manufacturers. 10 8 For example, no vac-
cine manufacturer shall be liable in a civil action for damages if the in-
jury or death resulting from administration of the vaccine resulted from
"unavoidable" side effects that are inherent in the vaccine, "even though
the vaccine was properly prepared and was accompanied by proper direc-
tions and warnings."' 1 9 Further, a vaccine is presumed to be accompa-
nied by proper instructions and warnings if the manufacturer shows it
complied with the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and the Public
Health Service Act, unless the plaintiff can show fraudulent or inten-
tional and wrongful withholding of information when submitting infor-
mation for the vaccine's approval, or other criminal or illegal activity
relating to the vaccine's safety. 110
Congress also legislatively amended the rule from Reyes by provid-
ing that no manufacturer shall be liable for any injury or death due to the
manufacturer's failure to provide warnings about the risks associated
with the vaccines directly to the vaccinee. 111 Recall that it was precisely
the holding from that case that led insurance companies to drop liability
insurance for vaccine manufacturers in connection with liability associ-
ated with the swine flu vaccine.' 12
Thus, due to the government's increasing unwillingness to accept
full financial responsibility for vaccine manufacturers, 1 3 the NCVIA did
many things to change what the Swine Flu Act had provided. 14 First,
the Swine Flu Act created an exclusive civil tort remedy against the fed-
eral government, rather than the two-step program mandated by the
NCVIA, which requires the preliminary step of administrative adjudica-
tion of claims. 115 And to the extent a claimant chooses to pursue civil
tort liability, manufacturers are exposed to liability to which they were
not otherwise exposed under the Swine Flu Act," 16 but yet certain tenets
106 See § 300aa-21(a); see also id. § 300aa-I l(a)(2) (specifying the limitations on bring-
ing a civil action after October 1, 1988).
107 See Greenberger, supra note 35, at 15.
108 See § 300aa-22; Greenberger, supra note 35, at 15.
109 § 300aa-22(b)(1).
1to Id. § 300aa-22(b)(2).
M'' Id. § 300aa-22(c).
112 See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
113 See Greenberger, supra note 35, at 14.
114 See id. at 11.
115 See id. at 14.
116 See id. at 16 ("NCVIA's litigation stage potentially exposed vaccine manufacturers
and others to liability, if claimants were not satisfied with their administrative awards.").
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of tort law have been statutorily amended to the claimant's detriment.' 17
Further, the NCVIA capped certain damages awards that the Swine Flu
Act did not.1 18 Thus, "NCVIA's limitations clearly demonstrate that
Congress 'learned a lesson' from the 'open-ended' liability of the Swine
Flu Act and wanted to limit expenditures for injuries and deaths resulting
from childhood vaccines under NCVIA." l 9
C. Smallpox Vaccination Program
More recently, the government has dictated vaccination liability and
compensation policy in the context of this country's war on terror. In
December 2002, President Bush announced a plan to vaccinate roughly
500,000 civilian health care workers and emergency personnel against
smallpox in anticipation of the potential for terrorists to use smallpox as
a weapon against the United States. 120 Although the White House
stressed that there was no imminent threat of smallpox, the terrorist at-
tacks of September and October 2001 created heightened concern that
terrorists may have access to and use smallpox in another terrorist attack
against this country.121 Thus, the President requested that health care
workers and emergency personnel, or "first responders," volunteer to re-
ceive the smallpox vaccination, allowing them to mobilize quickly and
without risk of infection in the event of a smallpox attack.' 22 Even
though the WHO declared in 1980 that smallpox had been eradicated
worldwide, the virus still exists in laboratories, and the President ex-
pressed concern that terrorist r6gimes may possess it. 123
Unfortunately, Bush's vaccination plan was an incredible failure.124
Section 304 of the Homeland Security Act (HSA), 125 which authorized
the civilian smallpox countermeasures, specifically protected vaccine
manufacturers and those who administer the vaccine (collectively, "cov-
ered persons" under the HSA) from liability, except in the case of negli-
gence. 126 These covered persons are made federal employees under the
117 See id. at 15 ("Congress made certain alterations to traditional tort law to protect
vaccine manufacturers, as the government would not pay awards that arose out of litigation.").
118 Id. at 14.
119 Id. at 16.
120 See Remarks Announcing the Smallpox Vaccination Plan, supra note 22, at 2191;
Greenberger, supra note 35, at 16.
121 See Remarks Announcing the Smallpox Vaccination Plan, supra note 22.
122 See id.
123 See id.
124 See Marcia Coyle, Congress Tackles Vaccine Liability, FuLTON CouTrr DAiLY REP.,
Dec. 14, 2005, at 5 (quoting Michael Greenberger).
125 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2165 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 233(p) (2003)).
126 Id.
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HSA.' 27 Thus, any cause of action for injuries would have to be brought
against the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA). 128 However, commentators have suggested that it would be
very difficult for a plaintiff to claim negligence, as there would be no
reason to believe anyone would negligently administer (or presumably,
manufacture) the vaccine. 129 This liability scheme was in stark contrast
to the "no-fault" compensation schemes of the Swine Flu Act and
NCVIA, where injured victims need only establish that their injuries
were caused by administration of the vaccine, rather than prove fault. 130
Further, under the FTCA, the federal government is immune from liabil-
ity for any discretionary policy decision. 3 1 Thus, while it may be a poor
public policy decision to vaccinate health care workers against smallpox,
it is not necessarily a negligent decision. 132
More importantly, the HSA provided no sufficient mechanism for
compensation for those injured due to their inoculation. 133 Rather than
provide for a no-fault compensation system like the Swine Flu Act and
NCVIA, the HSA simply provided that those injured by the administra-
tion of a vaccine had an exclusive remedy against the United States.134
However, the United States would only assume liability for negligence or
any other wrongful act or omission by a covered person, 135 which, as
stated above, would be very difficult to establish. Thus, those injured
had either their own health insurance plans or state workers' compensa-
tion laws as their only remedy. 136 However, one commentator has sug-
gested that securing private insurance coverage for this kind of injury is
virtually impossible.' 37 Further, it was not certain that all state workers'
127 Id.
128 See Susan J. Landers, Compensation Plan Needed to Offset Smallpox Vaccine Risks,
AM. M!D. NEWS, Jan. 13, 2003, http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2003/01/13/hlsa0l 13.
him
129 See id.
130 See Greenberger, supra note 35, at 18.
131 Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671, 2680(a) (1948).
132 Robert Pear, Legal Risks; For Victims of Vaccine, Winning Case Will Be Hard, N.Y.
Tims, Dec. 13, 2002, at A13; see also Wood, supra note 15, at 12 (stating that under the
Swine Flu Act, the federal government could not avail itself of the discretionary function
exception).
133 The CDC reports complications of the smallpox vaccine to include that "[a]bout 1 out
of 10,000 people vaccinated for the first time will experience an inflamed heart (can be mild to
life-threatening); about I out of 83,000 people vaccinated will experience encephalitis, which
can lead to permanent brain damage or death; and about 1 out of 667,000 people vaccinated
will experience skin and tissue destruction which can lead to scarring or death." Ctrs. for
Disease Control & Prevention, Smallpox Vaccine: What You Need to Know, http://www.bt.
cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/vaccination/needtoknow.asp (last visited Feb. 11, 2010).
134 See 42 U.S.C. § 233(a) (2006).
135 See id.
136 See AFL-CIO, State and Federal Smallpox Compensation, http://www.aflcio.org/is-
sues/safety/smallpoxcomp.cfm#smact (last visited Feb. 11, 2010).
137 See Greenberger, supra note 35, at 19.
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compensation laws would accept claims for sickness caused by the
smallpox vaccine. 138
Bush's plan was ambitious: beginning January 24, 2003 and contin-
uing for the next month, 500,000 first responders would be vaccinated. 139
However, only 5,000 first responders were vaccinated, due in large part
to the lack of compensation in the HSA. 140 In response to the low suc-
cess rate of the vaccination plan, Congress passed the Smallpox Emer-
gency Personnel Protection Act (SEPPA) on April 30, 2003.141
SEPPA created a no-fault compensation system, similar to an extent
in structure to the NCVIA, for first responders who are injured as the
result of the administration of smallpox countermeasures. 142 Unfortu-
nately (as under the NCVIA), state workers' compensation and health
insurance plans are still the primary source of recovery for smallpox-
related injuries. 143 Claimants may request benefits from the HHS Secre-
tary who will determine whether payment of benefits is appropriate
based on a vaccine injury table. 144 Benefits include: all reasonable and
necessary medical expenses to treat the injury, loss of employment in-
come benefits at the rate of 66 2/3 percent of wages (increased by 8 1/3
percent if there are dependents) with total compensation per year not to
exceed $50,000 and capped for life at $262,100 for those with only par-
tial disability, as opposed to permanent disability; and a lump sum death
benefit payment of $262,100, to be reduced by any lost employment in-
come benefits previously paid. 145 These benefits seemingly cover signif-
icantly fewer medical expenses than those provided for in the NCVIA,
138 See AFL-CIO, supra note 136. According to the AFL-CIO website:
First Responders who have health insurance have the same cost-sharing now re-
quired by all health insurance plans. Less fortunate First Responders, who figure
among the forty-one million uninsured Americans, have nothing at all to cover the
medical care required to treat smallpox reactions. As for state workers' compensa-
don, an AFL-CIO survey reveals that only fourteen states clearly guarantee coverage
of smallpox injuries as of April 2, 2003.
Id.
139 Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Smallpox Inoculations Begin with Four Connecticut Doctors,
N.Y. TimEs, Jan. 25, 2003, at All; AFL-CIO, supra note 136.
140 AFL-CIO, supra note 136.
141 See Greenberger, supra note 35, at 19. SEPPA is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 233, 239,
239a-239h (2006).
142 42 U.S.C. § 239a(c) (2006).
143 Id. § 239c(b); see Greenberger, supra note 35, at 20.
144 Id. §§ 239a, 239b. The vaccine injury table component is similar to that under the
NCVIA. See id. In other words, if an injury or other adverse effect is specified on the table
and occurs within the time period specified in the table, such injury or side effect shall be
presumed to have been caused by administration of the vaccine. Id. § 239b.
145 Id. §§ 239c, 239d, 239e. For the purpose of providing benefits under these subsec-
tions, Congress authorized appropriations in such sums as may be necessary for each of the
fiscal years 2003 through 2007. Id. § 239g. The Secretary's payment of any benefits is sub-
ject to the availability of such appropriations. Id. See also Greenberger, supra note 35, at 20
(discussing SEPPA benefit scheme).
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which includes things like special education, counseling, special equip-
ment, and the like. 146 SEPPA, on the other hand, provides only expenses
necessary to "treat" the injury. 147 Assuming SEPPA's benefits would
not cover such future expenses, many injured by the smallpox vaccina-
tion may not receive full compensation for all of their injuries.
Unlike the NCVIA, there is no judicial review by any court of the
HHS Secretary's determination of appropriate compensation.1 48 Moreo-
ver, SEPPA's caps on these awards are more stringent than those im-
posed in prior federal vaccine compensation programs: the Swine Flu
Act did not cap any awards, and the NCVIA's awards are generally more
generous than those in SEPPA.' 49 For example, NCVIA's lost income
benefit is equivalent to the "actual and anticipated loss of earnings," as
opposed to the $50,000 per year and life total of $262,100 (in the ab-
sence of a permanent and total disability) under SEPPA. 150 Notwith-
standing the government's attempt to reinvigorate the Program by
passing SEPPA, as of October 31, 2005, only 39,608 individuals have
been vaccinated. 15 1
D. Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act
Another recent congressional vaccine-related initiative is the Public
Readiness and Emergency Response Act, or "Prep Act." 152 Reports of
bird flu and the possibility of a worldwide flu pandemic recently flooded
the news media. 153 The bird flu, or avian influenza, known as A (H5N1),
has been in existence for the past ten years in Southeast Asia. 154 The
cause of the more recent concern about the spread of bird flu, however, is
the fact that a few years ago, it moved out of Southeast Asia to Europe,
Africa and India.155 Many scientists believe it is only a matter of time
before the bird flu reaches North America. 156 Not only has the bird flu
migrated across the globe, it has also infected other animals, such as
146 See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a)(I)(A)(iii)(ll) (2006).
147 See 42 U.S.C. § 239c(a) (2006).
148 Id. § 239a(f)(2).
149 See Greenberger, supra note 35, at 14-16, 20.
150 Id. at 14, 16, 20.
151 See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Smallpox Vaccination Programs by State,
Oct. 31, 2005, http://www.cdc.gov/media/pressrel/smallpox/spvaccin.htm (last visited Feb. 11,
2010).
152 See Public Readiness and Emergency Response Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d (2006).
153 Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Avian Flu: The Worrier; At the U.N.: This Virus Has an Ex-
pert 'Quite Scared', N.Y. Titms, Mar. 28, 2006, at Fl.
154 Id.
155 Id. at F1-F2.
156 Erin Aigner & David Constantine, Avian Flu: Calibrating the Message; The Spread:
In 3 Years, 3 Continents, N.Y. TimEs, Mar. 28, 2006, at F5.
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ferrets and cats. 157 Further, influenza generally is a virus that can
quickly mutate; 158 thus, the H5N1 virus could combine with a human flu
strain and create a new virus that could cause a pandemic.159 All of these
factors combine to create a real concern around the globe that the virus
will infect more humans, and that human to human transmission of the
virus will also begin to occur. 16 0 To date, the virus has killed millions of
birds and approximately 200 people. 161 However, this flu is still largely
an avian disease, and the humans who have contracted the disease have
mostly been exposed to infected birds.162 And although there are people
on both sides of the debate who believe a pandemic either is or is not
likely, there is no doubt that the disease can be quite deadly when con-
tracted by a human. 163
In December of 2005, Congress passed bio-defense legislation as
part of a Department of Defense appropriations bill.164 The appropria-
tions provisions in the bill provided funds "to prepare for and respond to
an influenza pandemic, including the development and purchase of vac-
cines, antivirals, and necessary medical supplies, and for planning activi-
ties[.]" 165  These appropriations allowed the federal government to
procure and stockpile vaccines in the event of a bird flu pandemic. 166
However, provisions were later added to the bill after a House-Senate
conference committee, which offered drug manufacturers "targeted lia-
bility protection,"' 167 even though House Republicans had earlier prom-
157 Elisabeth Rosenthal, On the Front: A Pandemic is Worrisome but 'Unlikely', N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 28, 2006, at Fl.
158 See McNeil, supra note 153.
159 See Lawrence K. Altman, M.D., With Every Epidemic, Health Officials Face Tough
Choices, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2006, at F5.
160 See Denise Grady & Gina Kolata, How Avian Flu: The Uncertain Threat, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 28, 2006, at Fl.
161 See id.
162 Id. The New York Times reports an example of bird-to-human transmission, where a
13-year old boy died within nine days of being hospitalized with flu symptoms. From Birds to
Humans, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2006, at F4. He lived near a live-poultry market and handled
birds at cockfights. Id. An example of possible human-to-human contact occurred where a
mother sat at her 11-year old daughter's hospital bedside for 16 hours, wiping and kissing the
girl's mouth. Id. Although the girl played and slept where chickens were kept, the mother
lived in Bangkok and had no exposure to birds. Id. The mother died 12 days after her daugh-
ter. Id.
163 See Grady & Kolata, supra note 160. In the few human autopsies that have been done,
it appears that the virus can attack the lungs, the brain and possibly the intestines. See id. And
of the 186 people in the world who have contracted the virus, 105 have died. See Altman,
supra note 159.
164 See Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hur-
ricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, Pub. L.109-148, 119 Stat.
2818 (2005).
165 Id 119 Stat. at 1786.
166 Id.
167 See Public Readiness and Emergency Response Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d (2006).
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ised that there would be no liability protections included in the
legislation. 168 Leading Senate Democrats alleged that then-Senate Ma-
jority Leader Bill Frist and others "cut a back room deal" at the last
minute to give massive liability protections to drug companies.1 69
These immunity provisions, collectively called the Prep Act,' 70 pro-
vide immunity from lawsuits for any manufacturer, distributor or admin-
istrator of a "covered countermeasure"-drugs, vaccines or other
medical devices-used to protect Americans in the event of a pandemic,
epidemic, or biological attack. 71 The sole exception to immunity "shall
be" for injury caused by willful misconduct.112 The ' imirunity is quali-
fied in that it is afforded only to the extent the countermeasure was ad-
ministered during the period of a declaration issued by the HHS
Secretary. 173
Although effectively immunizing drug manufacturers from virtually
all liability, the Prep Act does allow compensation from a fund to victims
injured by a vaccine administered pursuant to the HHS Secretary's decla-
ration.174 However, the fund is contingent-Congress will appropriate
funds only after the issuance of a declaration. 175 The compensation
amounts provided in the Prep Act are the same as those provided by
SEPPA to victims injured by smallpox vaccinations. 176 Further, like
SEPPA and the NCVIA, injuries eligible for compensation are only those
that fall on a vaccine injury table, which are presumed to be caused by
the vaccine, assuming the symptoms or manifestation or onset of adverse
side effects occur within a specified period of time. 177 Moreover, no
168 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Legal Shield for Vaccine Makers Is Inserted into Military
Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2005, at A26; Democrats Blast 'Midnight Rider' Adding Rx Liabil-
ity Shield to DOD Bill, FDA WEEK, Dec. 23, 2005.
169 Stolberg, supra note 168.
170 See § 247d-6d.
171 See id. § 247d-6d(a)(1).
172 Id. § 247d-6d(d)(l). Most significantly, if an act or omission by a manufacturer is
alleged to constitute willful misconduct, and that act or omission is subject to FDA regulation,
the act or omission shall not constitute willful misconduct unless the HHS Secretary or Attor-
ney General has initiated an enforcement action with respect thereto, establishing the willful
misconduct. Id. § 247d-6d(c)(5).
173 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a)(3) (2006).
[ I]f the Secretary makes a determination that a disease or other health condition or
other threat to health constitutes a public health emergency, or that there is a credible
risk that the disease, condition, or threat may in the future constitute such an emer-
gency, the Secretary may make a declaration . . . recommending ... the manufac-
ture, testing, development, distribution, administration, or use of one or more
covered countermeasures.
Id. § 247d-6d(b)(1).
174 See id. § 247d-6e.
175 See id.
176 See id. § 247d-6e(b)(2).
177 See id. § 247d-6e(b)(5).
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court may review any action of the HHS Secretary taken under the Prep
Act, 178 nor may one eligible for compensation bring a civil tort action
without first exhausting his remedies available under these provisions. 179
According to critics, the Prep Act falls short of its goal on a variety
of fronts. Not only was manufacturer immunity inserted allegedly "be-
hind closed doors," 180 and "without Congressional debate or public scru-
tiny,"1 81 critics have condemned the compensation provided in the Act as
a "fig leaf'-a compensation fund that has not been funded ahead of
time. 18 2 According to a statement by Senator Edward Kennedy, "[t]here
is no guarantee that any victim of a faulty or negligently made drug or
vaccine will receive any compensation whatsoever." 183 Finally, critics
argue that the language of the Prep Act is too broad. 184 A determination
by the HHS Secretary that a public health emergency exists (and thus,
immunity for manufacturers would attach) is not specifically limited in
the Prep Act to a pandemic, epidemic, or bio-terror attack "emergency";
rather, the HHS Secretary's declaration could be used to include any "ep-
idemic" such as obesity, diabetes, or arthritis. 185 Thus, the provisions
could allow the manufacturers of Vioxx, for example, to escape liability
for any act other than the manufacturer's willful misconduct.1 86 The
HHS Secretary has not exercised any declaratory power as yet, so the
effect this law will have is unclear. 187
Many Democrats joined with Senator Kennedy in proposing what
they call the Responsible Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness
Act of 2006.188 This Act would repeal the Prep Act and replace it with
limited liability protection (rather than effectively full immunity) for a
specified set of countermeasures. 189 It would also include a fully-funded
178 See id. § 247d-6e(b)(5)(C).
179 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6e(d) (2006).
180 Senator Kennedy, Colleagues Call on Majority Leader Frist, Speaker Hastert to Re-
peal 'Dead of Night' Vaccine Liability Provision, Enact Real Protections, U.S. FED. NEWS,
Feb. 16, 2006, at 2, available at 2006 WLNR 2705752 (Westlaw) [hereinafter Senator Ken-
nedy, Colleagues].
18t Id.
182 Stolberg, supra note 168, at 1.
183 See id. The Republican response to this criticism is that it is impossible to know how
much money to set aside in a fund, and to allocate money to the fund right now could make the
bill too expensive to pass. Id. at 2. Rather, the compensation fund would be funded after an
emergency has been declared. Id.
184 See Senator Kennedy, Colleagues, supra note 180, at 3.
185 See id.
186 See id.
187 See THOMAS 0. MCGARrrY, THE PREEMPTION WAR: WHEN FEDERAL BUREAUCRACIES
TRUMP LOCAL JURIES 127 (2008).
188 Responsible Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, S. 2291, 109th Cong.
(2006).
189 S. 2291, § 3(a).
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compensation plan, modeled after the NCVIA. 190 Further, the federal
government would indemnify manufacturers, distributors, and adminis-
trators of certain countermeasures. 191 Thus, victims may choose to sue
the federal government under any theory of liability. 92 However, the
government would indemnify manufacturers only where [1] the product
has not undergone full FDA testing, and [2] the product is recommended
by the HHS Secretary in a declaration for use to protect the American
people. 193 Thus, manufacturers of drugs and vaccines that must be used
in an emergency situation for this specific set of countermeasures (rather
than any public health "epidemic"), but have not undergone full FDA
testing, would be protected. 194 Finally, the government would be able to
sue a manufacturer or administrator who was grossly negligent or reck-
less to recover payments made by the government to an injured vic-
tim.19 Supporters of the Prep Act, on the other hand, maintain that the
liability protections are in fact targeted only for pandemic, epidemic and
biodefense products, and that such protections are necessary to better
protect American citizens, as not doing so would expose the United
States to threats such as avian influenza.1 96
II. NONRECIPROCAL RISK THEORY AS APPLIED TO VACCINE-RELATED
INJURIES AND THE APPROPRIATE LIABILITY AND
COMPENSATION SCHEME
Other commentators have reviewed the positive and negative as-
pects of these congressional programs from the confines of a purely in-
strumentalist or "goal-oriented" perspective by suggesting a variety of
ways to "fix" the problems of manufacturer immunity or victim compen-
sation inherent in these programs. 197 Yet their suggestions disregard the
fact that vaccine liability and compensation should be driven by princi-
ple, rather than instrument. Principles implicated by vaccine injury in-
clude corrective justice (that the tort system should fully compensate
victims of torts) and nonreciprocal risks (that liability for injury-causing
conduct should not be determined by the reasonableness-or social util-
ity-of such conduct, but rather on the disproportionality of the risks the
conduct imposes on its victims). Professor Fletcher's nonreciprocal risk
190 Id.
191 S. 2291, § 4(5)(D).
192 Id.
193 S. 2291, § 4(6)(A).
194 Id.
195 Senator Kennedy, Colleagues, supra note 180.
196 See John Clerici & Dana Perkins, From BioShield to the Prep Act and Beyond: Devel-
oping a Market for Infectious Disease and Bioterror Countermeasures, 14 MErRO CORP.
CouNs. 18 (2006).
197 See infra Part ll.B. (discussing the various criticisms of these congressional
programs).
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theory of corrective justice challenged the historical development of tort
doctrine along instrumentalist lines. 198 His theory focuses on the fairness
of recovery, measured not by fault, social costs, or utility of the risk-
creating activity, but by injuries resulting from nonreciprocal risks: risks
imposed on the plaintiff that are greater in degree than those the plaintiff
imposes on the defendant.' 99
We apply Fletcher's theory of nonreciprocal risk as a starting point
for rethinking what kind of liability various stakeholders should have for
vaccine injury and how that liability ought to be distributed among the
stakeholders. At its most intuitive level, vaccine liability seems to pre-
sent a conflict of objectives that appear difficult to reconcile without do-
ing violence to the interests of objectives that are preferred over other
objectives. Certainly, it is a socially desirable goal for our society to be
vaccinated against a variety of contagious diseases. But if that instru-
mentalist objective dictates the result that one injured by a vaccine
should receive no compensation, this Article concludes otherwise.
Drawing coherence between such objectives requires us to examine the
principles at work behind any r6gime of compensation and regulation,
and to recognize the limits of the reciprocity paradigm to permit a fully
coherent resolution of the tension among those principles, as well as be-
tween those principles and the various outcomes that may be seen to
serve them. Those are the complex tasks we undertake in this Part and
Part III.
A. The Preemption Debate: FDA Preemption in Light of the
Nonreciprocal Risk Theory of Corrective Justice
Notwithstanding the current statutory regimes pursuant to which
many vaccine injuries are adjudicated, the tort system still exists for inju-
ries which fall outside of those programs and for exceptions to immunity
provided therein. Yet tort liability is threatened by a new argument
which defendants have thrust before the courts in the last few years in the
context of other prescription drugs and medical devices: preemption.
Preemption offers a certain superficial appeal, but poses serious
problems and, if applied to vaccines, would transgress fundamental as-
pects of corrective justice and enterprise regulation principles. FDA pre-
emption of private tort claims is a widely debated issue. 20 0 The debate
198 See Fletcher, supra note 29.
199 See id.
200 On March 8, 2010, the United States Supreme Court granted review in Bruecewitz v.
Wyeth, No. 09-152, to determine whether section 22(b)(1) of the NCVIA preempts all vaccine
design defect claims, whether based on negligence or strict liability. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129
S. Ct. 1187 (2009); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
518 U.S. 470 (1996); Richard A. Epstein, Why the FDA Must Preempt Tort Litigation: A
Critique of Chevron Deference and a Response to Richard Nagareda, 1 J. TORT LAW 5 (2007);
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lies at the intersection of the advisability of tort recovery against a manu-
facturer who, theoretically, has complied with all FDA regulations re-
garding its medical product, and the disquiet accompanying a failure to
provide a remedy for victims injured by a FDA-approved product. The
Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area has been inconsistent, stoking
the fires of this dispute.20' In addition, the FDA's own position as to
preemption has changed, from one in which FDA regulatory action and
tort liability "maintained a relatively tranquil coexistence" 20 2 to one in
which tort liability must yield to the administrative state.20 3 Much schol-
arly commentary has been devoted to this debate, and the sometimes
widely divergent views are dramatic in their breadth and depth.204 Yet
the recognition of corrective justice principles in any of these contexts is
largely absent.205 And the extent to which tort claims for injuries caused
by vaccines would be preempted due to FDA approval of those vaccines
is unclear.
One of the first Supreme Court cases to take up the FDA preemp-
tion debate was Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr.206 In Lohr, the Court held that
the plaintiffs design defect claim against the manufacturer of a pace-
maker was not preempted by § 360k of the Medical Device Amendments
(MDA)207 to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA).20 8 The
David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA's Efforts to Pre-
empt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461 (2008); Richard A. Nagareda, FDA Preemp-
tion: When Tort Law Meets the Administrative State, 1 J. TORT LAW 4 (2007); Catherine M.
Sharkey, Federalism in Action: FDA Regulatory Preemption in Pharmaceutical Cases in State
Versus Federal Courts, 15 J. L. & POL'Y, 1013 (2007) [hereinafter Sharkey, Federalism in
Action]; Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 449 (2008) [hereinafter Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption]. See
also, Tara Guffrey, Note, Does the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act Re-
ally Prohibit Design Defect Claims?: Examining Federal Preemption in Light of American
Home Products Corp. v. Ferrari, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 617 (2010).
201 Compare Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, and Wyeth, 129 S.Ct. 1187 (finding no preemption of
state law tort claims), with Riegel, 128 S.Ct. 999 (finding preemption of state law tort claims to
exist). The question of FDA preemption appears to turn on "the nature of the claim and the
degree of prior FDA scrutiny of the product." Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort
System: Postmarketing Surveillance, Compensation, and the Role of Litigation, 5 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHics 587, 610 (2005).
202 Nagareda, supra note 200, at 1.
203 See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201-03; Epstein, supra note 200, at 4-7; Nagareda, supra
note 200, at 37-40; Jonathan V. O'Steen, The FDA Defense: Vioxx and the Argument Against
Federal Preemption of State Claims for Injuries Resulting from Defective Drugs, 48 ARiz. L.
REv. 67, 77 (2006); Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 200, at 472-76.
204 See supra note 200.
205 But see McGARrrY, supra note 187, at 183, 185, 195, 210, 232, 237, 253. Professor
McGarity notes that if preemption of tort claims is to be found to exist, the regulatory agencies
must perform their functions close to perfectly for corrective justice principles not to be
thwarted. Id.
206 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
207 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2006).
208 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2006); Lohr, 518 U.S. at 487-89.
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pacemaker at issue in Lohr was designated a "Class HI" medical de-
vice.209 Class III medical devices must receive premarket approval from
the FDA before being introduced to the market, unless it can be shown
that the device is "substantially equivalent" to a Class HI device that is
already on the market.210 In that instance, the device can avoid the rigor-
ous premarket approval process and be introduced to the market pursuant
to a "premarket notification" process, a more rapid process pursuant to
§ 360e of the MDA.211 Section 360k of the MDA provides that subject
to limited exceptions:
no State or political subdivision of a State may establish
or continue in effect with respect to a device . . . any
requirement-(1) which is different from, or in addition
to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to the
device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effective-
ness of the device or to any other matter included in a
requirement applicable to the device under this
chapter.212
The manufacturer in Lohr argued that by the language in this sec-
tion, Congress meant to preempt all common law tort claims, insofar as
tort liability would amount to a "requirement" that is different from or in
addition to the requirements imposed by the FDA approval process.
213
The Court held otherwise; none of the legislative history with regard to
the MDA suggested a comprehensive preemption of traditional common
law remedies. 214 Moreover, had Congress intended such a result, it
chose a very odd word with which to achieve it.215 When it used the
word requirement, Congress was primarily concerned with conflicting
209 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 476-77 (1996). A Class In device is one
which either "presents a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury," or which is "pur-
ported or represented to be for a use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which
is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health." 21 U.S.C.
§ 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii) (2006).
210 See Id. § 360c(f)(1)(A).
211 See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(I); Lohr, 518 U.S. at 477-79. As the Court explains in Lohr,
this process of limited review by the FDA for devices which are substantially equivalent to
previously approved devices is known as the "premarket notification process" or the "510(k)
process," after the number of the section in the original MDA. Id. at 478. The Court in Riegel
v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008), noted that in 2005 the "FDA authorized the marketing
of 3,148 devices under § 510(k) and granted premarket approval to just 32 devices." 128 S.Ct.
999, 1004 (citing P. Hutt, R. Merrill, & L. Grossman, Foot AND DRUG LAW 992 (3d ed.
2007)).
212 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006).
213 See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 486.
214 Id. at 491. The portion of the opinion rejecting the argument that common law tort
claims are preempted by § 360k was joined by only three other justices, in addition to Justice
Stevens, who delivered the opinion. Id. at 474.
215 Lohr, 518 U.S. at 487.
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state statutes and regulations, not state common law duties and reme-
dies.216 With specific regard to the design defect claim, the manufacturer
argued that since the pacemaker was deemed "substantially equivalent"
to an earlier-approved device, that determination amounted to a specific,
federal requirement that could not be affected by tort liability. 21 7 The
Court rejected this argument. As the premarket notification process is
concerned with "equivalence" to another device, as opposed to safety of
the current device, the Court reasoned that the process could not be
deemed to impose requirements on the manufacturer. 218
The Court changed course in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. when it again
considered the preemptive effect of § 360k.2 19 In Riegel, however, the
device at issue-a balloon catheter used for a coronary angioplasty-had
undergone the rigorous premarket approval process. 220 The Court rea-
soned that the premarket approval process does impose "requirements,"
as it relates specifically to the "safety and efficacy" of a particular de-
vice.221 Moreover, the Court held that a tort judgment also imposes a
requirement, insofar as it "establishes that the defendant has violated a
state law obligation. '222 Thus, a tort judgment that requires the manufac-
turer's device to be safer than what was prescribed by the FDA approval
process would "disrupt[ ] the federal scheme no less than state regulatory
law to the same effect. '223
The most recent Supreme Court case to address the tension between
FDA preemption and common law tort claims is Wyeth v. Levine. 224 Wy-
eth involved a failure to warn claim against Wyeth, the manufacturer of
Phenergan, an anti-nausea drug. 225 The plaintiffs right forearm had to
be amputated after she developed gangrene caused by injection of the
drug by the "IV-push method," 226 whereby the drug entered plaintiffs
216 Id. at 489.
217 Id. at 492.
218 Id. at 492-94. Even though the Court held that the premarket notification process did
not impose requirements sufficient to satisfy the preemptive effect of § 360k, five Justices
concluded that, in a different context, tort liability could be a requirement that is different
from, or in addition to, a federal requirement. Id. at 503-05 (Breyer, J., concurring), 512
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, J,
and Thomas, J).
219 See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 999, 1011 (2008).
220 Id. at 1005.
221 Id. at 1007.
222 Id. at 1008 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 522 (1992)).
223 Id. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, reasoned that tort judgments should yield to
FDA regulation because a jury does not engage in the same cost-benefit analysis that the FDA
does in determining whether a device is safe. Id. The jury only sees the harm done to this one
plaintiff before it; it does not see the patients who have benefited greatly from the device. Id.
224 129 S.Ct. 1187 (2009).
225 Id. at 1191.
226 Phenergan can be administered either directly into a muscle or intravenously, by either
an IV drip (where the drug is introduced into a saline solution and then dripped into the patient
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artery.227 The plaintiff alleged that Phenergan's label was "defective be-
cause it failed to instruct physicians to use the IV-drip method of intrave-
nous administration instead of the higher-risk IV-push method.
2 28
Moreover, she alleged that intravenous administration of the drug was
not reasonably safe because the risk of gangrene and amputation out-
weigh the drug's benefits. 229
The FDA's drug labeling regulations include no preemption provi-
sion similar to that found in § 360k in the medical device context. Thus,
Wyeth's preemption arguments focused on the FDA approval of Phener-
gan's label generally.2 30 As FDA approval of a drug includes approval
of the drug's label, Wyeth claimed it could not have changed the Phener-
gan label without violating FDA regulations. 231 In other words, it could
not comply with both the FDA labeling requirements and the tort liability
against it that would require it to change its label.232 The Court rejected
this argument; the FDA regulations allow a manufacturer to "add [to] or
strengthen" a drug's label without prior FDA approval.2 33 Thus, Wyeth
could have changed Phenergan's label to contraindicate the IV-push
method of administration without violating federal law. 234 Wyeth also
contended that the plaintiffs tort claims were preempted because the
FDA's preamble to its regulation governing labeling requirements de-
clared that FDA approval of drug labels establishes "'both a 'floor' and a
'ceiling," so that 'FDA approval of labeling ... preempts conflicting or
contrary [s]tate law.' ' '235 The Court rejected this assertion, reasoning
that Congress had not enacted an express preemption provision for drugs
in the FDCA, nor would it accord deference to the FDA's contention.2 3
6
from a hanging bag) or a direct injection into the vein. Id. This direct injection into the vein is
called the IV-push method. Id. The drug causes irreversible gangrene if it enters a patient's
artery. Id. At trial, evidence was introduced that the risks associated with the IV-push method
could be almost entirely eliminated using the IV-drip, and that even an experienced and careful
clinician using the IV-push method will sometimes expose an artery to Phenergan. Id. at 1192.
227 Id. at 1191.
228 Id. at 1192.
229 Id.
230 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1193-94 (2009).
231 Id. at 1193.
232 Id. at 1196.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 1200 (citing Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Pre-
scription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed.Reg. 3922, 3934-35 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 201, 314, 601)).
236 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1200-02 (2009). The Court reasoned that in prior
cases where deference was given to an agency's views of the preemptive effect on tort law of
its own regulations, that deference was based on the agency's explanation of how state law
affects the regulatory framework, not on a conclusory statement that state law is preempted.
Id. at 1201.
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These cases are troubling in light of the fact that the FDA preemp-
tion battle could next be fought in the context of vaccine injury. Imagine
the next vaccine created to stave off the latest pandemic illness. Imagine,
perhaps, that the HHS Secretary announces to a group of governmental
leaders in July that a vaccine for the HIN virus will be ready by mid-
October of that same year.237 The vaccine receives FDA approval prior
to its use, and perhaps receives "fast track approval" 238 due to timing
concerns as flu season approaches. Notwithstanding FDA approval, it
causes many to suffer adverse-and perhaps, life-threatening-effects.
To what extent would those injured by the vaccine be able to recover
against the manufacturers for their injuries in the face of a preemption
argument? Since the Prep Act immunizes manufacturers for any injury
absent willful misconduct upon the HHS Secretary's declaration of a
pandemic, victims injured by certain vaccines may receive nothing. At
this point, it is unclear whether or to what extent FDA approval of a
vaccine would be considered as having imposed federal requirements on
a manufacturer, and the current jurisprudential landscape yields little in
the way of consistently preserving corrective justice principles in this
context, particularly when the nonreciprocal risks created are so blatant.
The approval process in a given context is far too open to conflicting
interpretations, particularly in light of the deference a court might give to
the FDA's own views on the matter.239 And, assuming a court deter-
mined federal requirements did exist, the Supreme Court's current stance
on tort liability as a conflicting requirement would compel preemption of
the claim. Certainly, if preemption was found to exist, any victims' inju-
ries would go uncompensated, thwarting corrective justice principles.
If the current conventional wisdom would yield preemption as the
appropriate result, the FDA approval process deserves attention, particu-
larly since the process has been criticized as having serious deficiencies
that should counter-balance any preemptive effect FDA approval would
have.240 To obtain FDA approval for a new vaccine, the manufacturer
must submit a "new drug application" (NDA) to the FDA's Center for
Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) for review. 241 The NDA must
contain reports of investigations which demonstrate the vaccine's safety
237 States Told to Prepare for Worst-case Swine Flu Scenario, CNN.coM, http://www.
cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/07/09/obama.swine.flu/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
238 See infra notes 248-54 and accompanying text.
239 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Feder-
alization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 227, 233-49 (2007).
240 See infra notes 273-76 and accompanying text.
241 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2006); see FDA, Development and Approval Process (Drugs),
http://www.fda.govlDrugslDevelopmentApprovalProcess/default.htm [hereinafter FDA, De-
velopment and Approval Process] (last visited Feb. 24, 2010) (describing the approval process
for new drugs).
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and effectiveness. 242 These investigations include such things as labora-
tory testing of the drug, as well as clinical trials on human subjects.243 A
team of CDER physicians, statisticians, chemists, pharmacologists, and
other scientists reviews the NDA. 244 The CDER may deny approval to
the NDA upon a finding that, inter alia, [1] the investigations do not
include adequate tests to show whether or not a drug is safe for its in-
tended use; [2] the results of such tests show the drug is unsafe or do not
show the drug is safe for its intended use; [3] there is insufficient infor-
mation to determine whether the drug is safe for its intended use; or [4]
there is a lack of substantial evidence that the drug will have the effect it
purports. 245
Approval of a drug is a lengthy process, yet an accelerated "fast
track" approval process exists for a drug "if it is intended for the treat-
ment of a serious or life-threatening condition and.., demonstrates the
potential to address unmet medical needs for such a condition. '246 These
drugs have shorter review periods 247 and may require less in the way of
safety and efficacy information prior to approval. 248 The drug may also
receive accelerated approval.24 9 Drugs which might receive fast track
approval include those the HHS Secretary designates a "priority counter-
measure," which may occur prior to any request for such a designation
242 § 355(b).




247 § 356(a)(3). The FDA designates certain fast-tracked drugs for Priority Review. See
FDA, Fast Track, Accelerated Approval and Priority Review, http://www.fda.gov/ForConsum-
ers/ByAudience/ForPatientAdvocates/SpeedingAccesstolmportantNewTherapies/ucml28291.
htm. (last visited Mar. 8, 2010). The goal for completing a Priority Review is six months, as
opposed to ten months for a drug receiving Standard Review. Id.
248 See Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 200, at 470 (citing U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, DRUG SAFETY: IMPROVEMENT NEEDED IN FDA's POSTMARKET DECISION-MAKING AND
OVERSIGrr PROCESS 10, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06402.pdf).
249 See FDA, Fast Track, Accelerated Approval and Priority Review, supra note 247 (last
visited Feb. 24, 2010).
When studying a drug, it can take a long time-sometimes many years-to learn
whether a drug actually provides real improvement for patients-such as living
longer or feeling better. This real improvement is known as a "clinical outcome."
Mindful of the fact that obtaining data on clinical outcomes can take a long time, in
1992 FDA instituted the Accelerated Approval regulation, allowing earlier approval
of drugs .. .based on a surrogate endpoint. A surrogate endpoint is a marker-a
laboratory measurement, or physical sign-that is used in clinical trials as an indirect
or substitute measurement that represents a clinically meaningful outcome, such as
survival or symptom improvement. The use of a surrogate endpoint can considera-
bly shorten the time required prior to receiving FDA approval. Approval of a drug
based on such endpoints is given on the condition that post marketing clinical trials
verify the anticipated clinical benefit.
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by the manufacturer.250 A priority countermeasure includes any vaccine
that the HHS Secretary determines to be "a priority to treat, identify, or
prevent infection" by a biological agent or toxin, or to "prevent condi-
tions that may result in adverse health consequences or death."'251 In
other words, the HiNi vaccine would be designated a priority counter-
measure. Presumably in response to the fast track approval process and
the nature of the expedited approval process, a fast tracked drug may be
subject to post-approval studies conducted by the manufacturer.252
While the FDA approval process is lengthy and detailed, many criti-
cisms have been leveled against it, particularly as the process relates to
the FDA's pro-preemption stance.25 3 First, the process focuses on the
safety and efficacy of a drug or vaccine prior to its use by the general
public.2 54 Yet, as clinical trials involve generally only a few thousand
people, many adverse effects from a drug occur only after it is on the
market; 255 generally, clinical testing pre-approval would not reveal ad-
verse effects which "occur infrequently, have long latency periods, or
affect subpopulations not included or adequately represented in the stud-
ies."'256 Thus, the FDA's approval of a drug is premised on, arguably,
modest information as to the drug's potential side effects.25 7 Moreover,
250 21 U.S.C. § 356-1(c) (2006).
251 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6(e)(4) (2006).
252 § 356(b)(2).
253 See Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 200, at 481-90; see also Struve, supra note 201, at
598-606 (discussing why post-marketing surveillance is critical to the FDA's process).
254 See Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 200, at 483-84 (arguing that premarket approval is
generally incapable of detecting certain adverse effects). According to Kessler and Vladeck:
[M]ost clinical studies 'can detect drug-related injuries that occur at a rate of be-
tween one in 500 and one in 1,000. Yet, if the drug is used by 200,000 people... a
serious adverse event appearing in as few as one in 10,000 people is very significant,
since it would occur 20 times. These rare reactions can be identified only after the
drug has been widely used.'
Id. at 471 (quoting William B. Schultz, How to Improve Drug Safety, WASH. POST, Dec. 2,
2004, at A35). See also Struve, supra note 201, at 595-606 (arguing that even though the
premarket approval process may be rigorously conducted, it will inevitably fail to reveal all of
the risks associated with a medical product).
255 See Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 200, at 466, 470.
[T]he FDA's knowledge-base of the risks posed by a new drug is far from static. At
the time of approval, the FDA's knowledge-base may be close to perfect, but it is
also highly limited because, at that point, the drug has been tested on a relatively
small population of patients. Once the drug enters the marketplace, risks that are
relatively rare, that manifest themselves only after an extended period of time, or
that affect vulnerable subpopulations, begin to emerge.
Id. at 466 (citing INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L AcADs., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PRO-
MOTING AND PROTECrING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 36 (Alina Baciu, Kathleen Stratton &
Sheila P. Burke eds., 2006) [hereinafter IOM Report]).
256 Id. at 471; see Struve, supra note 201, at 598-99.
257 A different kind of risk created by vaccines is the extent to which they may lack
potency to ward off the very disease they are meant to protect against. Recently, pharmaceuti-
cal company Sanofi Pasteur recalled 800,000 doses of the HINI vaccine due to a 12% loss in
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in determining whether to approve a drug, the FDA relies on advisory
committees composed of "independent" experts in the field. 258 Yet a
Journal of the American Medical Association study details financial con-
flicts of interest between advisory committee members and the pharma-
ceutical companies seeking approval for their drugs. 259 A new report
finds that the CDC's advisory committee members evaluating flu vac-
cines also had unresolved potential conflicts with drug companies. 260
The danger in such conflicts existing, of course, is the potential that advi-
sory committees are recommending potentially unsafe drugs in part be-
cause manufacturers are paying them.26'
In addition, once a drug has been approved and distributed in the
market, significant deficiencies exist regarding the FDA's post-market
surveillance process. First, the FDA has limited resources that prevent it
from adequately monitoring a drug's safety post-approval and taking
prompt corrective measures. 262 Congress recently enacted the Food and
Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA), 263 which provides the
FDA with new resources to monitor a drug's safety once it has been
approved. 264 Although the FDAAA is a step in the right direction, the
extent to which these new resources will improve the post-market sur-
veillance process is unknown at this time. Moreover, it has been sug-
gested that the infusion of resources by Congress suggests that Congress
potency. See Sheila M. Poole & Craig Schneider, Ga. Got 43,000 Doses of Recalled Swine
Flu Vaccine, THE AL. J. CONST., http://www.ajc.com/health/ga-got-43-000-242141.html (last
visited Dec. 15, 2009). Although this relatively small decrease in potency did not create any
safety concerns, one could envision a scenario where a vaccine has lost all or most of its
potency, and thus cannot provide necessary protection.
258 See FDA, Advisory Committees, http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/default.
htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
259 See Peter Lurie et al., Financial Conflict of Interest Disclosure and Voting Patterns at
Food and Drug Administration Drug Advisory Committee Meetings, 295 JAMA 1921-28
(Apr. 26, 2006).
260 See Gardiner Harris, Advisors on Vaccines Often Have Conflicts, Report Says,
N.Y.TLMES, Dec. 18, 2009, at A28.
261 See id.
262 See Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 200, at 465, 467-68. The FDA's post-market
surveillance of approved drugs is chronically underfunded and has not functioned appropri-
ately. Id. at 472. And although the FDA has an adverse reaction reporting system in place,
only a small number of adverse reactions are reported. Id.
The Institute of Medicine (IOM) reported in 2006 that the FDA "lacks the resources
needed to accomplish its large and complext mission today, let alone position itself
for an increasingly challenging future." FDA doctors and scientists share this view;
70% believe that the FDA lacks sufficient resources to protect the public health, and
two-thirds worry that the FDA is not adequately monitoring the safety of drugs once
they are on the market.
Id. at 485 (quoting the IOM Report, supra note 255). See Struve, supra note 201, at 601.
263 Food & Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat.
823 (2007) [hereinafter FDAAA].
264 FDAAA, tit. I, sec. 103(b)(4), § 736(b), 121 Stat. 823, 828 (2007).
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does not agree with the FDA's view that it is able adequately to monitor
drug safety. 265 In addition, Congress did not include any preemption lan-
guage in the FDAAA, much to the pharmaceutical companies'
disappointment. 266
Other criticisms include the lack of data the FDA can demand drug
companies produce post-approval, as well as the FDA's laxity in over-
sight of companies that it requires to perform post-marketing studies.267
These critical assessments of the FDA approval process demonstrate that
the process itself, while certainly essential to the public welfare, should
not provide the basis for preemption of tort claims. Even if the safety
and effectiveness of a drug or vaccine can conclusively be determined at
the time of approval, at most that determination should be relevant to that
period of time only. To the extent adverse reactions occur over time that
could not have been established at the moment of approval, tort liabil-
ity-or some other form of compensation-should continue to fill in the
gaps. Allowing the two systems to parallel one another will best serve
corrective justice principles.
These criticisms highlight well that aspect of the preemption debate
which focuses on whether the FDA regulates for "minimal" versus "opti-
mal" safety. 268 In other words, does FDA regulation create a "floor"
with regard to a drug's safety over which tort liability can comfortably
exist? Or does it create a "ceiling," thereby effectively ensuring a drug's
safety, with which tort liability would be inherently inconsistent? If the
FDA approval process for vaccines creates a floor, the preemption of tort
claims has effectively endorsed a structure whereby the standard for vac-
cine safety is less than that which would be imposed in the tort system,
yet recovery is eradicated at the same time. On the other hand, if the
FDA regulates for optimal safety, the argument for preemption may be
stronger, but it still ignores the fact that even exceptionally safe vaccines
can cause injury to some, particularly as additional risks become known
over time. Yet the nonreciprocal risk theory of corrective justice would
265 See Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 200, at 468,
266 See FDAAA, tit. LX, sec. 901(a), § 505(o)(4)(I), 121 Stat. 823, 925-26 (2007); Kessler
& Vladeck, supra note 200, at 468-69. The Rule of Construction in the FDAAA clarifies the
FDA's authority regarding labeling, and reiterates that manufacturers have an obligation to
provide up-to-date safety information without first securing FDA approval. See Kessler &
Vladeck, supra note 200, at 468-69. "The codification of this obligation undercuts the key
pro-preemption argument the FDA and manufacturers make-namely, that the FDA alone
decides the content of drug labels." Id. at 468-69.
267 See Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 200, at 486, 488-89, 491.
268 See Peter H. Schuck, FDA Preemption of State Tort Law in Drug Regulation: Finding
the Sweet Spot, 13 ROGER WtAAMs U. L. REv. 73, 77-78 (2008). Professor Schuck de-
scribes optimal safety standards as those which have "the socially best balance between safety,
effectiveness, cost, and other relevant factors, taking into account that some individual users
may be harmed even under such a standard." Id.
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deem the distinction irrelevant and demand that all injured plaintiffs be
compensated for their losses. As the preceding discussion illuminates,
the approval process is flawed in many respects. Thus, using the process
as the basis for preemption is inappropriate, particularly in light of the
corrective justice principles upon which the tort system is founded.
Despite the criticisms that accompany the FDA approval process,
preemption nonetheless offers a certain attractiveness. After all, notwith-
standing the flaws in the FDA's process, the manufacturer has theoreti-
cally complied with the FDA's conditions for approval. Thus, as the
preemption debate continues to advance, tort liability may be usurped,
leaving injured plaintiffs with no remedy. Yet corrective justice does not
necessarily require tort liability; it merely requires that a plaintiff be
compensated-monetarily or otherwise-for his injuries. 269 Thus, as ex-
plained in greater detail in Part III below, corrective justice can still be
achieved, notwithstanding the perceived effect tort liability might have
on a defendant who must also comply with federal regulation. 270
B. Criticisms of Current Congressional Vaccine Programs
Even if traditional tort claims for vaccine injury are not deemed
preempted, recovery for a particular vaccine injury may ultimately be
prescribed pursuant to a statutory program. This section explores the
shortcomings of the existing statutory programs for vaccine compensa-
tion upon which a future vaccine program could be based, particularly in
light of the nonreciprocal risk theory of corrective justice. These inade-
quacies inform our determination of a more appropriate paradigm for
determining liability and compensation in Part III below.
Congress has created the current statutory vaccine programs with an
eye toward purely instrumentalist goals like widespread vaccination
levels and protection of vaccine manufacturers that facilitate continued
production of vaccines. One goal of the NCVIA does appear to be ensur-
ing compensation to certain victims as well.271 But the other more recent
vaccine programs appear to eschew such a goal, with the sole objective
being manufacturer immunity. 272 Those programs have substantially di-
minished claimants' ability to recover for vaccine-related injuries, while
manufacturer liability has all but disappeared. 273 Although the federal
government's programs have most assuredly solved the concern regard-
ing manufacturer liability, with the subsequent consequence of limited
vaccine resources and vaccination levels, injured victims increasingly ap-
269 See Nagareda, supra note 200, at 15.
270 See id.; Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 200, at 459-66.
271 See Clark, supra note 67, at 674.
272 See Coyle, supra note 124 at 5
273 See, e.g., Steel, supra note 94, at 160; see also supra Part I.B.
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pear to get the short end of the stick. Benefits received have been re-
duced from the unlimited awards procured by virtue of a civil tort action
under the Swine Flu Act (not to mention the right of the United States to
seek indemnification from manufacturers in certain instances), to capped
awards, no judicial review of administrative decisions, and virtual immu-
nity for manufacturers under SEPPA and the Prep Act.
Although it is important to keep this nation's vaccine supply at safe
working levels by shielding manufacturers from liability, this goal is
purely instrumental in nature. It focuses on what result would benefit
society at large, as opposed to whether it is fair to allow injured victims
to recover. "Targeted liability protection" 274 for manufacturers has be-
come a code word for instrumentalist thinking. However, Fletcher's the-
ory may be a more appropriate and principled starting place for
establishing rules of liability and compensation. In other words, the fo-
cus in vaccination liability and compensation should reflect what result is
fair as among the parties involved, rather than allowing compensation
and liability to be directed by the most powerful lobby groups in Wash-
ington. When principles of corrective justice fail to underlie a particular
vaccine program, the program fails, as in the case of SEPPA. If the pos-
sibility exists that a victim of a vaccine injury may not receive any dam-
ages for that injury, then that person may choose not to be vaccinated.
This result may be tolerated when the threat of infection is not imminent,
as in the case of a terrorist smallpox attack when SEPPA was enacted.
But what about those injured by vaccines when the threat of infection is
real and imminent, as perhaps the H1NI virus? Or those infected be-
cause they declined vaccination due to fear of injury and lack of compen-
satory mechanisms? Or those the infected subsequently infect?
Increasingly, the existing statutory framework is failing these parties.
It is useful to keep in mind that these congressional programs were
born from certain specific problems. Enactment of the NCVIA was
driven by the problems inherent in the civil tort system: inconsistent
judgments for plaintiffs on the one hand, 275 and potentially crippling
conditional liability for pharmaceutical companies on the other.
276
274 See Public Readiness and Emergency Response Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d (2006).
275 See, e.g., Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341, 1345 (5th Cir. 1977); Reyes v. Wyeth
Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1295 (5th Cir. 1974); Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 128
(9th Cir. 1968). But see, e.g., Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318, 1325-26
(Kan. 1986); Wyeth Labs., Inc. v. Fortenberry, 530 So. 2d 688, 691-93 (Miss. 1999). See also
Steel, supra note 94, at 152.
276 At least one commentator is skeptical of the vaccine industry's claims that the product
liability system is responsible for deterring research and development of products. See Teresa
Moran Schwartz, Prescription Drugs and the Proposed Restatement (Third), 61 TENN. L. REv.
1357, 1361 (1994). As Schwartz points out, little data exists to provide a causal link between
liability costs and the development or availability of prescription products, as the pharmaceuti-
cal companies are the best ones to provide that data, but they have been reluctant to do so. See
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SEPPA and the Prep Act were created due to governmental, and perhaps,
societal, fear of a pandemic-borne either naturally, or by terroristic
means. The geneses of these programs, in conjunction with the criti-
cisms and shortcomings thereof, are significant in light of corrective jus-
tice principles and provide the basis for our construction of a more
comprehensive compensation and liability model, focused on the inter-
section of a variety of risks implicated by vaccine injury. As discussed
below, they each provide a "band-aid" for a perceived problem. Moreo-
ver, they serve to further the purely instrumentalist goals of widespread
vaccination and some degree of manufacturer immunity.
Both SEPPA and the Prep Act, either effectively or directly, provide
immunity for vaccine manufacturers. Thus, any compensation would be
paid from funds appropriated by Congress. In this era of insurance com-
panies refusing to cover liability costs for vaccine-related injuries, manu-
facturers must be protected so as not to threaten the nation's vaccine
supply.277 Governmental payment of claims may be appropriate here
considering the government is mandating the manufacture, distribution
and administration of an HINI vaccine, for example, in case of a pan-
demic. Yet the decision to vaccinate oneself is purely voluntary. This
decision furthers the government's goal of public health;2 78 each person
who voluntarily receives a vaccination is effectively a "foot soldier" for
the United States fighting the war on terror or the war on disease.2 7 9 In
case of a flu pandemic or bioterrorist attack, the American public must
be immunized at a high rate and on a large scale to prevent the spread of
disease.280
Further, the extent to which a vaccine's risks are relatively unknown
at the time the government mandates its manufacture and administration
to the public may very well dictate government responsibility for inju-
ries.281 This reasoning reflects the language in the Responsible Public
Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act of 2006282 that indemnifica-
tion should be available only to the extent the HHS Secretary has issued
a declaration and the vaccine or other countermeasure has not received
id. at 1399; see also Kelley E. Cash, The New Restatement (Third) of Torts: Is it the Cure for
the AIDS Vaccine Ailment?, 16 REV. Lrnc. 413, 418-19 (1997); H. William Smith Id, Vacci-
nating AIDS Vaccine Manufacturers Against Product Liability, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 207,
238-39 (1992).
277 See Greenberger, supra note 35, at 27, 31-32.
278 See Derry Ridgway, No-Fault Vaccine Insurance: Lessons from the National Vaccine
Injury Compensation Program, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 59, 79 (1999).
279 Steel, supra note 94, at 145.
280 See Robert M. McKenna, The Impact of Product Liability Law on the Development of
a Vaccine Against the AIDS Virus, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 945-46 (1988).
281 See id.; Greenberger, supra note 35, at 31-32.
282 Responsible Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, S. 2291, 109th Cong.
(2006).
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full FDA testing. In other words, the fact that the government has effec-
tively required immediate manufacture, testing, and administration of a
vaccine, without knowing the full extent of the risks involved, suggests,
if not requires, that the government be the one to pay any claims. 283
Yet the immunity for manufacturers under SEPPA and the Prep Act,
in addition to the dim prospect of just compensation for victims under
these programs, is inconsistent with corrective justice principles. Not
only do corrective justice principles favor compensating victims, they do
so from the standpoint of forcing the wrongdoer-here theoretically, the
manufacturer, not the government-to pay a victim's damages.28 4 Thus,
some specter of liability should remain to maintain vaccine manufactur-
ers' consistent production of safe, effective vaccines. 285 Moreover, the
compensation provided under these Acts has been criticized as being illu-
sory. 28 6 If a claimant has no realistic possibility for compensation, cor-
rective justice principles are assuredly thwarted. That does not mean,
however, that the manufacturer's liability must be expressed as a judicial
judgment or special-court award directly against the manufacturer.
Rather, there may be other ways, through a comprehensive regulatory
system and mandated contributions from all manufacturers in the phar-
maceutical industry. Notions of this kind of approach are sometimes re-
ferred to as "enterprise liability"-and we will take those up in more
depth in Part III.
The NCVIA, on the other hand, was the product of the compulsory
system for vaccine administration to children in this country. Each state
and the District of Columbia requires a child be vaccinated if the child is
enrolled at a day care or is in a public school. 287 The decision whether to
vaccinate one's child has been made for every parent who chooses either
of these paths. NCVIA is arguably the most successful of these congres-
sional programs, in terms of claimant numbers under the program and the
extent to which damages are paid to those claimants. 288 Yet the NCVIA
is still not an adequate model upon which to formulate a future program
283 The FDA also states that, notwithstanding a rigorous licensure system for vaccines, all
potential risks and side effects cannot be anticipated until the vaccine is administered to the
general public and may need to undergo further studies. FDA, Vaccines, http://www.fda.gov/
BiologicsBloodVaccinesfVaccines/default.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2010).
284 See MCGARTY, supra note 187, at 232.
285 See Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
of 1986: An Ad Hoc Remedy or a Window for the Future?, 48 OuIo Sr. L.J. 387, 395 (1987).
286 See Breen, supra note 74, at 319-20.
287 See Hagan, supra note 35, at 479. Although compulsory vaccination laws are a prod-
uct of state law, the funding of state's vaccination programs is made possible by a grant from
the federal government. Id. "These federal grants require compliance with national objec-
tives, such as 'the rigorous enforcement of school immunization laws,"' Id.
288 See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, Health Resources and Services Admin.,
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program Statistics Report, Jan. 20, 2009, http://www.
hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/statisics-report.htm.
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for injuries due to other vaccines. First, although the government man-
dates administration of childhood vaccines, the manufacturer should bear
some responsibility for any injuries suffered. As suggested by the vac-
cine table, there are a number of well-known side effects, as well as well-
known rates of such side effects occurring. 289 Thus, insurance compa-
nies may be able, and perhaps should be willing, to insure manufacturers
to the extent there is predictable liability. Currently, manufacturers feel
no sting of liability under the NCVIA, as the compensation fund from
which claimants are paid is funded by excise taxes paid by the purchasers
of the vaccines. 290
Moreover, as the NCVIA involves the use of a vaccine table, it may
be "easier" to withhold compensation under the NCVIA in situations
where the injury falls outside the table. Even the NCVIA's "fail-safe"
vaccine table, however, is prone to unreliability, as revealed by the
FDA's inability or unwillingness to conduct post-marketing surveil-
lance.291 In fact, all vaccine tables under each of these programs become
increasingly suspect for that reason. This problem is exacerbated by the
fact that side effects of future vaccines, particularly those that are manu-
factured hastily to respond to a growing threat of pandemic, may not be
known for many years. To the extent a vaccine table is created to weed
out good claims from bad in this context, claimants would face the al-
most insurmountable task of proving causation, and many victims of vac-
cine injury may be left with no recompense.2 92 A choice must be made
to either [a] get vaccinated and face potential injury with perhaps little
chance of recovery, or [b] decide against receiving a vaccination. This
choice implicates a variety of risks, which extend well beyond the risks
that underlie Fletcher's theory. As discussed in more detail in Part II, a
liability and compensation scheme must take these other risks into con-
289 See, e.g., LESTER M. CRAWFORD, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF FOOD AND DRUGS, EN-
SURING THE SAFETY, EFFECTIVENESS, AND AVAILABILITY OF INFLUENZA AND OTHER VACCINES,
TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITrEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE (Nov. 18, 2004),
available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm113231.htm ("[The Center for
Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER)] and the [CDC] jointly manage the Vaccine Ad-
verse Event Reporting System (VAERS), a cooperative program for vaccine safety. VAERS
is a post-marketing safety surveillance program, collecting information about adverse events
(side effects) that occur after the administration of U.S. licensed vaccines."); FDA, Vaccine
Adverse Events, http://www.fda.gov/cber/vaers/vaers.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2010) ("The
purpose of VAERS is to detect possible signals of adverse events associated with vaccines.
VAERS collects and analyzes information from reports of adverse events (possible side ef-
fects) that occur after the administration of US licensed vaccines."); see generally 42 U.S.C.
§ 300aa(l)-(5) (2006) (describing the purposes, structure, and risks of the National Vaccine
Program).
290 See Steel, supra note 94, at 158.
291 See id. at 169.
292 See id. at 170-71.
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sideration if it is to encompass the spectrum of risks created in this
context.
Although NCVIA's vaccine table may streamline the proceedings
for certain claimants because causation is presumed, others have signifi-
cant difficulties proving their case. Certainly, a plaintiff who brings a
tort claim against a vaccine manufacturer may encounter difficulty estab-
lishing that a particular vaccine caused her injury. However, the mecha-
nisms in the NCVIA make proving causation considerably more difficult.
While having proven successful at reducing the amount of lawsuits
brought against vaccine manufacturers, the Special Masters' discretion in
making compensation determinations, as well as the Act's causation re-
quirements, have resulted in the denial of compensation to the majority
of persons seeking it.293
As discussed earlier, 294 Special Masters gain their expertise on the
job-in the rough and tumble of handling actual NCVIA cases; they are
not scientific or medical experts. Yet, anomalously, the NCVIA treats
them as though they were. Each Special Master is chosen by a majority
of the judges on the U.S. Federal Claims Court2 95 and has total jurisdic-
tion over the initial proceedings. 296 Although a petitioner may seek re-
view of the Special Master's determination of compensation, and even
appeal that review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
the standard of review of these courts is highly deferential to the Special
Master's decision. 297 The U.S. Federal Claims Court will only set aside
the Special Master's decision if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 298 And although
the NCVIA imposes no standard of review upon the federal courts of
appeal for the Federal Claims Court's review of the Special Master's
decision, one such court has determined that the standard should be the
same as that of the Federal Claims Court. 299 This highly deferential stan-
dard of review of the Special Masters effectively ensures that a Special
Master's determination will not be overturned.3 ° °
Not only has the authority of the Special Masters been called into
question, the entire goal of the NCVIA of fair and efficient adjudication
293 Breen, supra note 74, at 320. Despite the fact that between 1988 and 1999 Special
Masters have awarded over $1 billion in damages and attorneys' fees, "more than two-thirds of
all claims filed by petitioners ultimately are dismissed." See id.; Ridgway, supra note 278, at
59; Steel, supra note 94, at 146, 168-71.
294 See supra Introduction.B.
295 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(c)(1) (2006).
296 Id. § 300aa-12(a).
297 See Breen, supra note 74, at 322-23.
298 § 300aa-12(e)(2)(B); see Breen, supra note 74, at 322.
299 See Breen, supra note 74, at 323.
300 See id.
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of claims has also been criticized. 30' The system has become increas-
ingly adversarial, and the government has taken to arguing "aggressive
and technical" defenses, comparable to a trial.30 2 Similarly, other than
for very clear-cut injuries that fall within the Table injuries and time
periods, expert testimony is routinely provided to support causation. 30 3
As one commentator has stated:
After repeated exposure [to certain experts' testimony],
Special Masters have developed preferences for or
against the testimony of certain experts. In the published
opinions, claimants are warned off some experts as be-
ing unsuitable for [National Vaccine Injury Compensa-
tion Program (NVICP)] cases. At the other extreme,
preferred experts receive rich praise in the Special Mas-
ters' decisions, and one was singled out to receive hourly
consultation fees of $250 instead of the $200 HHS
rate .... Criticism of the tort system often focuses on
the arbitrary and irrelevant factors that determine out-
comes. The NVICP contains no provision to deflect ac-
cusations of the same sort brought against the no-fault
claims process. 3°4
This process, therefore, pits experts against one another, and the
Special Master-"special" only in the sense that they are an administra-
tive judge employed to hear a single category of controversies-has total
discretion to determine whether a compensable injury occurred. 30 5
NCVIA's promise of reasonable attorney's fees has also suffered
from this heightened adversarialness. The NCVIA allows the Special
Master to determine "reasonable attorneys' fees," regardless of whether
the claim was decided in favor of the claimant, "if the Special Master
determines that the petition was brought in good faith and there was a
reasonable basis for the claim for which the petition was brought. '30 6
The attorney is thus required to prove that the fee requested was reasona-
ble.30 7 However, as these claims have become more adversarial in na-
ture, attorneys have spent many more hours on them than was initially
anticipated. 30 8 As such, Special Masters have determined in some cases
301 See id. at 320; see also H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 12 (1986) (describing congressional
goals in passing the NCVIA).
302 See Steel, supra note 94, at 159-60.
303 Ridgway, supra note 278, at 68.
304 Id. at 69.
305 See Steel supra note 94, at 169.
306 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e) (2006).
307 Steel supra note 94, at 161.
308 See id. at 162.
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that the attorney's fee was not reasonable.3°9 Moreover, if a claimant
wants the Special Master's decision reviewed, and then appeals that re-
view, the attorney will not be compensated until a final decision has been
reached.310 As a result, many attorneys are now reluctant to take NCVIA
cases.
311
Similarly, attorneys pay for the expert witness testimony, which is
necessary to establish causation in many cases; thus, the expert cannot
get paid until all of the subsequent judicial reviews have been ex-
hausted. 312 And since the Special Master has discretion to determine that
the fee paid to an expert was not reasonable, and thus, decide not to
compensate the attorney for having paid the fee, an attorney takes a very
large risk in securing expert testimony. 313 Some attorneys have chosen
to hire a less qualified, and therefore, less expensive expert, which can
prove to be risky to the claimant's case.314 Finally, an attorney is only
paid under the program by the HHS if the claimant chooses the Special
Master's award; if the claimant rejects this award and files a civil tort
action, the attorney can only recover if the claimant is successful at
trial. 315 This system effectively places the attorney's interests at odds
with the claimant's interests. 316
Finally, although the NCVIA may adequately compensate claimants
in that it provides recovery for all incurred and future expenses, as well
as actual and anticipated loss of earnings, it also provides for certain caps
on awards, such as death benefits and pain and suffering 317-and it cov-
ers no injuries that are suffered in vitro when an expectant mother re-
ceives a vaccine.318 Arguably, the caps on those awards should be
increased from what was established twenty years ago, 319 death benefits
should be significantly enhanced, the scope of covered vaccines should
be expanded, and the vaccination of expectant mothers encompassed.
309 See id.
310 See id. at 160-61.
311 Cf. id. at 161 ("The prospect of postponed attorney fees may make some attorneys
wary of pursuing a long and expensive appeals process.").
312 See id. at 166.
313 See id.
314 See id. at 166-67.
315 See id. at 165.
316 See id.
317 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15 (2006).
318 Compare Rooks v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 35 Fed. Cl. 1, 12 (1996)
(finding that Congress intended to provide compensation for injuries stemming from in utero
receipt of vaccines), with Steven L. Schooner, The Future: Scrutinizing the Empirical Case for
the Court of Federal Claims, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 714, 734 (2003) (quoting special master
who followed Rooks as a matter of preference but noted that decisions of U.S. Court of Federal
Claims are not binding on special masters).
319 See Jaclyn Shoshana Levine, The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program:
Can It Still Protect an Essential Technology?, 4 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 9 77 (1998).
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This certainly seems possible, as the fund from which these benefits are
paid currently has a balance of over $2 billion.320 Moreover, a renewed
profitability of vaccines to the pharmaceutical industry, such as Gardasil
and DNA-based vaccines under current development, augur a more than
adequate industry source from which a compensation fund-or even
more usefully, a comprehensive vaccine policy implementation fund-
may be maintained. These ideas are further developed in Part ElI.
In sum, while these programs arguably serve laudable goals, they
are exactly that: goal oriented. They serve to further instrumentalist in-
terests, rather than taking a more principled approach. They also were
targeted on a fairly narrow aspect of vaccine policy-the protestations of
pharmaceutical companies that they would get out of the vaccine busi-
ness entirely unless Congress immunized their vaccine products from
products liability claims. As such, the statutory programs are not desti-
nations, but rather, milestones on the road travelled since the introduction
of vaccination in colonial America towards a coherent national vaccine
policy that achieves the optimal balance of stakeholder interests in con-
gruence with the overarching legal principles in this area that must be
accounted for if vaccine injury in particular and vaccine policy in general
is to be reasoned and effective. Outlining the parameters of such a holis-
tic vaccine policy, and exploring the principles that must undergird it, are
what we now take up in Part III.
III. RETHINKING THE MODEL FOR VACCINE-INJURY REGULATION: A
PARADIGM FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
A. Introduction
As Professor Thomas 0. McGarity recently observed in his book
The Preemption War, "Congress is the only institution that can bring an
end to the preemption war"-and, as we contend here, prevent that war
from making the twenty-first century world of vaccination its latest
front-"for the simple reason that Congress is the only institution with
the power to preempt. ' 321 Congress should, therefore, take up the ques-
tion of FDA preemption generally-and the related question of the cur-
rent statutory preemption by the NCVIA and similar laws specifically-
and do so with special regard to vaccines. The time for rethinking vac-
cine liability has come, given the confluence of legal, medical, and his-
torical developments of the last decade. It is our concern in this section
to suggest a thought-paradigm for Congress.
320 See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, BUREAU OF PUB. DEBT, VACCINE INJURY COMPENSA-
TION REPORTS 7-8 (Jan. 2010), ftp://ftp.publicdebt.treas.gov/dfi/tfmb/dfiviOl I0.pdf.
321 McGARrry, supra note 187, at 247.
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B. Using Principles and a Dipegage Approach to Begin the
Rethinking of Approaches to Vaccine-Injury Liability
1. Principles
The nonreciprocal risk theory calls into question some aspects of the
current congressional schemes in use or proposed to deal with vaccine-
caused injuries.322 Each of these schemes distorts the nature of the
risks-both reciprocal and nonreciprocal-in favor of vaccine manufac-
turers and the federal government. 323 These bills strike a balance at vari-
ous points along a risk continuum in favor of a governmental interest in
widespread vaccination by incentivizing the pharmaceutical industry
with liability sieves-and in some of the legislation-outright shields.324
The nonreciprocal risk theory also calls into question the "tort-re-
form" effort du jour-the activist wielding of federal preemption. 325 The
balance is struck, of course, at the expense of each individual member of
the public that is subjected to vaccine-associated risks; and the subset of
individuals that actually suffer when the risks eventuate in their case.
This is fairly typical of the tort-reform movement. 326
However, in the vaccine cases, we are not speaking merely of the
risks posed to individuals by the vaccines created by manufacturers and
mandated by legislatures and public health administrative agencies. The
picture is more complex. Unlike the typical case of consumer products,
vaccines are not simply disposal goods, luxury items, or commodities of
convenience. The risk analysis must take into account a larger set of
risk-causers and risk-exposed because of the very fact that we have more
than binary relationships between, for example, manufacturers and con-
sumers. Reciprocity must be viewed not in the monochromatic, illustra-
tive risk-creating pairs analysis that characterized the examples Fletcher
used in his iconic article 327-i.e., the risk that the manufacturers of vac-
cines pose to the vaccinated consumer versus the risk that the vaccinated
consumer poses to the manufacturer. Rather, the risk must be viewed in
a much more complex-and confusing-confluence of risks.
For example, vaccines reduce the risk that each of us, as individuals,
poses to every other individual in our community 328 and, on a more at-
tenuated yet palpable level due to modern car and air travel, to our state
322 See Fletcher, supra note 29, at 572 (discussing nonreciprocal risks); Kathleen E.
Payne, Linking Tort Reform to Fairness and Moral Values, 1995 DET. C. L. REV. 1207, 1228
(1995) (discussing nonreciprocal risks in medical malpractice cases).
323 See Payne, supra note 322, at 1224, 1228.
324 See supra Part II.B.
325 See Payne, supra note 322, at 1227-33.
326 See, e.g., id. at 1224-36.
327 Fletcher, supra note 29, at 572.
328 See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Vaccines: How Vaccines Prevent Disease,
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vac-gen/howvpd.htm#why (last visited Feb. 24, 2010); Nat'l
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and the nation as extended communities. 329 The risk calculus here is
particularly challenging, because it requires a zero-sum arrangement: ei-
ther we are all vaccinated, to protect us from being carriers or victims of
disease, or we are not, subjecting ourselves to the risk of being a carrier
or victim, and all others, potentially, of being infected by us and becom-
ing carriers and victims. This confluence of risk also includes the risk
that an unvaccinated person, or groups of persons, pose to society as a
whole (and, in some cases, the risk that the vaccinated pose to unvac-
cinated or not recently vaccinated persons because of the "shedding" ef-
fects of some live-virus vaccines 330 ), versus the risk society poses to that
unvaccinated individual or group. To that extent, the risks might appear
reciprocal. 331
Such appearances are misleading. While binary pairs of risks may
suggest that the problem is susceptible to characterization as reciprocal
risks, closer scrutiny reveals the fallacy of such comforting simplicity.
The risks are far more complex than that. They are linked not by pure
reciprocity pairs, but rather, in a polycentrism that weaves interconnec-
tions. For example, the entity creating the vaccine-injury risk to individ-
uals is not merely another person in the victim's space-time. Instead,
that entity is composed of a collection of entities, in addition to the phar-
Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Vaccines: Vaccine Benefits, http://www3.niaid.nih.gov/
topics/vaccines/understanding/vaccineBenefits.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
329 The notorious instance in 2007 of an individual suffering from drug-resistant tubercu-
losis who engaged in inter-continental and trans-national travel while infected and contagious
brought the globalization of infectious disease into sharp relief. See, e.g., Felice Batlan, Law
in the Time of Cholera: Disease, State Power, and Quarantines Past and Future, 80 TEMP. L.
REV. 53, 58 n.22 (2007); David P. Fidler et al., Through the Quarantine Looking Glass: Drug-
Resistant Tuberculosis and Public Health Governance, Law, and Ethics, 35 J.L. MED. & Em-
Ics 616, 617-18 (2007); L. Masae Kawamura, Op-Ed., Have Germs Will Travel, N.Y. TIMES,
June 2, 2007, at A13.
330 See Minn. Dep't of Health, Infectious Disease Epidemiology, Live Attenuated Influ-
enza Vaccine (LAIV): A Safe and Effective Choice, http://health.minnesota.gov/divs/idepc/
diseases/flu/hcp/vaccine/laiv.html#shed (discussing the risks of virus shedding after
vaccination).
331 On the other hand, with some illnesses, there are subpopulations of individuals who
are much more likely to come in contact with the disease in their work and life. See Ctrs. for
Disease Control & Prevention, Disease Listing: Anthrax General Information, http://www.cdc.
gov/nczved/dfbmd/disease listing/anthrax-gi.html#common (last visited Feb. 24, 2010). Such
subpopulations pose greater risks of spreading disease than others in the population present of
spreading it to them. Id. Anthrax is a paradigm example:
Anthrax is most common in agricultural regions where it occurs in animals. These
include South and Central America, Southern and Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, the
Caribbean, and the Middle East. When anthrax affects humans, it is usually due to
an occupational exposure to infected animals or their products. Workers who are
exposed to dead animals and animal products from other countries where anthrax is
more common may become infected with B. anthracis (industrial anthrax). Anthrax
outbreaks occur in the United States on an annual basis in livestock and wild game
animals such as deer.
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maceutical entities which design, manufacture, and/or distribute the vac-
cine. This collection of entities includes representatives of the military-
industrial complex, research laboratories, public health agencies and offi-
cials, government officials, administering medical professionals, and the
medical profession generally. These players engage in disparate, yet in-
tegrally interconnected activities, the sum total of which is to require
individuals to confront the risk of taking the vaccine. The interaction of
these players varies by such circumstances as [a] the specific disease to
be prevented, [b] the specific variety and functionality of the vaccine at
issue (live-virus, killed-virus, culture medium (e.g. kidney cells of
monkeys, as Salk's vaccine was, or chicken egg embryos, the common
method for the last 40 years), and the addition of adjuvants), as well as
the circumstances of the vaccine's marketing, field testing, approval pro-
cess, governmental adoption or mandate, and systematic distribution.
Furthermore, the risks of infection and contagion posed by the individual
and posed by the societal group are different than the risks created by the
vaccine work of developers, manufacturers, distributors, physicians, and
public health authorities who mandate particular vaccines or approve
particular vaccines.
It is evident, therefore, upon closer examination that the relation-
ships are too heterogeneous, and their intersections too polycentric, to
admit of fine distinction and categorization of real-world vaccine-to-in-
jury encounters. Because of the peculiar, multi-layered nature of the
risk-reciprocity analysis, we must work with an approximation of the
typical risk reciprocities created in the aggregate by the operation and
interplay of these forces. Recognizing, then, that we are dealing at best
with a proxy for the existence of risks and the constituencies affected by
them is critical to the construction of a tenable assessment model.
But there is more here to consider. As noted above, the risk-
calculus when various systems of liability allocation and dispute resolu-
tion are at play-as they have been, historically, in the vaccine products
liability area since the 1980s-the adjudicatory process itself becomes an
extension of the tort injury and the limitations that the regime imposes
operate as an extension of the risk to person. The relationship among the
principles underlying such procedural rdgimes is worth fleshing out.
Scholars typically view corrective justice as a principle underlying
the substantive aims of tort law.332 That principle intersects with the
332 See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, in PILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 53 (David G. Owen ed., 1995); Jules L. Coleman, RisKS AND
WRONGS 361-85 (1992); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 13-16 (2000); ERNEST J.
WEnRun, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 84-113 (1995); Fletcher, supra note 29, at 538; Keating,
supra note 30, at 195 ("Tort scholarship on the law of negligence has long been torn between
two competing conceptions. One of these conceptions-the corrective justice conception-
holds that negligence law is (and should be) an articulation of our ordinary moral conceptions
RETHINKING LIABILITY FOR VACCINE INJURY
broader principle of what is called enterprise regulation. 333 What we
typically describe as tort law are substantive rules that emanate from one
or both of those principles. The rules of law we choose to apply should
reify the corrective justice and enterprise regulation principles in a
Dworkinian model.334 Those principles justify the rules for framing and
pursuing a tort cause of action.
To use Dworkin's lexicon, the enterprise regulation principle delin-
eates those situations in which it is appropriate for the state to apply its
coercive rules to shape corporate activity and to provide remedies for the
effects of non-conforming corporate activity. 335 The enterprise regula-
tion principle defines the categories of cases in which a state may legiti-
mately impose its positive rules of law. This is particularly so when an
alleged tortfeasor-such as a vaccine maker-is licensed by the govern-
ment to manufacture and distribute a particular product.
There is a third principle that must be recognized for vaccine liabil-
ity: the "Social Compact or Society Principle,"336 which embodies the
of agency and responsibility, carelessness and wrongdoing, harm and reparation."); Richard A.
Posner, The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD.
187, 188 (1981); Susan Randall, Corrective Justice And The Torts Process, 27 IND. L. REV. 1
(1993) ("Corrective justice stands in direct opposition to instrumental views of tort law, posit-
ing a moral foundation of and rationale for the present system of tort law."); Alan Schwartz,
Responsibility and Tort Liability, 97 ETHICS 270, 270 (1986); Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theo-
ries of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEx. L. REv. 1801,
1801 (1997); Catharine Pierce Wells, Corrective Justice and Corporate Tort Liability, 69 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1769 (1996); Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A
Pragmatic Justification for Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348, 2348 (1990).
333 See Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Dialogue with a Neurosurgeon: Toward a Depevage Ap-
proach to Achieve Tort Reform and Preserve Corrective Justice in Medical Malpractice
Cases, 71 U. PrrT. L. REv. 1, 27 diag.1 (2009) [hereinafter Van Detta, Dialogue with a Neuro-
surgeon]; see also Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Justice Restored: Using a Preservation-of-Court-
Access Approach to Replace Forum Non Conveniens in Five International Product-Injury
Cases, 28 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 53 (2003) [hereinafter Van Detta, Justice Restored]; Jeffrey
A. Van Detta, The Irony of Instrumentalism: Using Dworkin's Principle-Rule Distinction to
Reconceptualize Metaphorically a Substance-Procedure Dissonance Exemplified by Forum
Non Conveniens Dismissals in International Product Injury Cases, 87 MARQ. L. REv. 425,
441-45 (2004) [hereinafter Van Detta, The Irony of Instrumentalism].
334 See Ronald M. Dworkin, Model of Rules, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14 (1978);
RONALD DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 147 (1978); Kenneth J. Kress, Legal Reasoning
and Coherence Theories: Dworkin's Rights Thesis, Retroactivity, and the Linear Order of
Decisions, 72 CAL. L. REV. 369, 373 (1984) ("Dworkin's objections [to an entirely rule-bound
view of law] are motivated by the need to provide principled justification for the State's use of
coercion and force in enforcing judgments."); Eric Dorkin, Note, Debunking Integrity's
"Equality Advantage": The Absence of Coordination in Ronald Dworkin's Law's Empire, 83
IOWA L. REv. 1071, 1080 (1997-1998) ("Within Dworkin's jurisprudence, principles have a
descriptive and a normative function. Principles simultaneously explain (descriptive) and jus-
tify (normative) the legal practice within a particular community").
335 See Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Cn. L. REV. 14 (1967-1968).
336 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEviATHAN: PARTS ONE AND Two (Herbert W. Scheider ed.,
Liberal Arts Press, 1958) (1651); JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT
(Thomas P. Peardon ed., Liberal Arts Press, 1952) (1689); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE
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post-Enlightenment philosophical view that civil society is organized to
create the security needed to enjoy life, liberty, property, and the pursuit
of happiness. In such a system of reciprocal benefits, social theory ex-
tracts from the individual certain sacrifices of life, liberty, and property
in the benefit both of the individual and the common good. Such sacri-
fices include paying taxes, military service, jury service, and public
health measures-such as vaccination-in which an individual is asked
to sacrifice some of his or her liberty and health in a group enterprise to
preserve the health and liberty of all members of society as a whole,
including that individual. 337 The inherent duality in the nation of bene-
fits and obligations-including the obligation to incur risks to the indi-
vidual in pursuit of societal goals-makes the evaluation of scenarios of
individual sacrifice for what is perceived as the social good potentially
complex as an equation of polycentric decisions.338
We may get a better understanding of the intersection of these three
principles in vaccine-injury cases by resorting to the following visual
metaphors. The first diagram is a visual metaphor illustrating the
polycentric nature of the relationships among communicable disease,
vaccination, and vaccine-related injuries. Decisions made in one domain
may have effects that produce significant results in another. Because the
cause-and-effect relationship of disease, vaccination, and injury is not
necessarily linear, but may produce differing but overlapping results as
demonstrated in Diagram No. 1, the great flaw in a one-size-fits-all ap-
proach to vaccine injuries is that it tends to obscure the polycentric na-
ture of these decisions, producing results that are incoherent and
dissonant when considered in light of the three over-arching legal princi-
ples implicated by vaccines.
The second diagram is a visual metaphor useful in elucidating the
polycentric relationships from the perspective of the three relevant legal
principles themselves. Diagram No. 2 presents the zones of isolation and
intersection among the three principles as they are invoked in scena-
rios-i.e., "litigation events"-combining four risk-related variables of
SOCIAL CONTRACT, OR PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL RIGHT (Henry J. Tozer trans., Swan Sonnen-
schein & Co., 1905) (1762); Joseph H. Katy, Contract Law and the Social Contract: What
Legal History Can Teach Us About the Political Theory of Hobbes and Locke, 31 OTTAWA L.
REV. 73 (2000).
337 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, TREATISE ON STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROL OF
PERSONS AND PROPERTY IN TIE UNITED STATES CONSIDERED FROM BOTH A CIVIL AND CRIMI-
NAL STANDPOINT 39 (1900); see generally Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Comment, Compelling Gov-
ernmental Interest Jurisprudence of the Burger Court: A New Perspective on Roe v. Wade, 50
ALB. L. REv. 675 (1986).
338 See, e.g., RANDY BARNETr, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION
OF LIBERTY 44-45, 336-38 (Princeton, 2004); see also GEORGE WILLIAM WI rERBURN, THE
VALUE OF VACCINATION: A NoN-PARTISAN REvmw OF ITS HISTORY AND RESULTS 145-50
(expressing contrarian view, suggestive of polycentrism).
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knowledge and prospective exercise of care, in which vaccine risks are
classified as unknown, or unknown and preventable, or unpreventable
with the exercise of reasonable care. Together, these diagrams provide a
snapshot of the theoretical and intellectual bases for the more subtle eval-
uation of liability rules and public policy choices undertaken in Part
III.B.2, below, and the model we develop in Part III.B.3 below for classi-
fying vaccine injuries and considering alternatives for resolving those
injuries, as well as for preventing them in the first place.
DIAGRAM No. 1
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DIAGRAM No. 2
DWORKINIAN PRINCIPLES AND VACCINE-INJURY LIABILITY:
A METAPHORIC VENN DIAGRAM
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Enterprise Regulation principle corresponds to known vaccine risks that
cannot be prevented with the exercise of reasonable care and, at the limb of
the Enterprise Regulations Principle domain, corresponds to unknown
vaccine risks that cannot be eliminated with the exercise of reasonable care.
FEI
Operative facts of litigation events fall within domain of Corrective Justice,
Social Compact, (and Enterprise Regulation principles)-corresponds to
known vaccine risks preventable by exercise of reasonable care.
Operative facts of litigation fall within corrective Justice and Social Compact
domains but on limb of intersection with domains of Enterprise Regulation
principles-corresponds to unknown vaccine risks that cannot be discovered
with reasonable care.
Operative facts of the litigation event fall within common domain of
Enterprise Regulation and Corrective Justice principles, but outside of Social
Compact principle's domain. Corresponds with no class of risks created by
vaccines, because all vaccine matters implicate the Social Compact principle.
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2. Choices
Two critical factors separate consideration of vaccine liability from
other kinds of drugs, devices, or pharmaceuticals asserted to be therapeu-
tic but attended with harmful risks. First, vaccine injuries are unique.
Vaccines are used not to treat those sick, those portending signs of ill-
ness, or even those having necessarily been exposed to illness under
identifiable circumstances, and thus at a cognizable risk. Vaccines, to
the contrary, are given to those who are presumably healthy-risking
making them sick now as a prophylaxis to more serious illness later.
Second, unlike other therapeutic pharmaceuticals, many vaccines
are mandated as a function of public policy, and administered in blanket
vaccination programs that cover entire groups of similarly situated indi-
viduals-e.g., school age children or persons entering military service.
There is in such programmatic administration little to no individualized
assessment, and next to no element of patient choice.
Thus analysis of vaccine liability involves layers of policy, politics,
and status that differentiate it from most product liability issues. And to
the extent vaccines are mandated, it invokes the very political powerless-
ness of groups-e.g., children, immigrants, and rank-and-file soldiers-
as paradigmatically represented by the immigrant Mary O'Brien, who
although forced to endure a painful smallpox vaccine to which she did
not actually consent, was held to consent merely by her presence and by
her politically powerless immigrant social status. 339
The public policy choices that have confronted Congress and the
courts in dealing with vaccine-related injuries have generally not been
discussed in terms of principle or in terms of the two critical factors
discussed above that separate vaccine liability issues from other tort and
products-liability issues. Typically, the analysis begins-and ends-
with an instrumentalist view of outcomes, rather than the foundations for
those outcomes. The outcomes of a vaccine policy analysis-whether
based on instrumentalism or upon overarching principles of law-can be
reduced to six rule outcomes:
1) immunity of vaccine manufacturers and suppliers;
2) partial immunity of vaccine manufacturers and suppliers;
3) defining liability of vaccine manufacturers and suppliers as lim-
ited to instances in which their acts or omissions do not meet the
low standard of "ordinary" or "reasonable" care;
4) defining liability of vaccine manufacturers and suppliers as lim-
ited to instances in which their acts or omissions do not meet
339 See, e.g., Jody Amour, Just Deserts: Narrative, Perspective, Choice, and Blame, 57 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 525, 530-35 (1996) (discussing the teaching of O'Brien v. Cunard S.S. Lines,
154 Mass. 272, 28 N.E. 266 (1891)).
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some heightened standard of care-a standard of care higher
than reasbnable care but lower than "the highest possible degree
of care";
5) defining liability of vaccine manufacturers and suppliers as en-
compassing any instance in which their acts or omissions do not
meet "the highest possible degree of care";
6) imposing strict liability on vaccine manufacturers and suppliers
for any injury causally connected to administration of a vaccine.
This sixth rule outcome eliminates any evaluation of the acts or
omissions of vaccine manufacturers and suppliers; the care they did, or
did not, exercise becomes legally irrelevant. The inquiry shifts entirely
to causation, and the strict liability rule will have a scope of operation
directly circumscribed by the causation rule adopted as the standard:
a) liability only when the vaccine is proven to be the "but for"
cause of an injury;
b) liability if the vaccine is proven to be a "substantial factor" in the
cause of the injury. Causation can be proven under this rule
even if other contributing, non-vaccine causes exist;
c) liability if the vaccine is proven to be "a factor" in the cause of
the injury. Causation can be proven under this standard by sim-
ply proving that the vaccine was a factor-among possibly many
known, or unknown, factors-contributing to a vaccine injury.
Of course, these three basic, competing causation standards admit of
further variations by the assignment of burdens of proof, the adoption of
presumptions (either for or against causation), and the standard of proof
imposed (e.g., preponderance of the evidence, or clear and convincing
evidence).
In addition to the choices to be made among these six rule out-
comes, there are also choices to be made about both the adjudicatory
forum and the adjudicatory form in which the chosen rule outcomes will
be applied. The adjudicatory fora include courts of general jurisdiction,
courts of special jurisdiction, government-facilitated arbitration, privately
facilitated arbitration, administrative agency adjudication, or administra-
tive agency preemption. The forms of adjudication include trial by jury,
trial by judge, trial by administrative law judge, determination by a panel
of scientific experts, arbitration, or no adjudication because of prior ad-
ministrative agency determinations that are given preemptive effect.
The problem of how to adjudicate and compensate vaccine injuries
involves the tension between, and overlapping considerations of, the
three relevant principles. The complexity of this interaction multiplies
because of the tangle between the societal interest and the interest of the
vaccine injury recipient, with simultaneous identities as [1] autonomous
persons meriting protection from both (a] the target disease as well as [b]
RETHINKING LIABILITY FOR VACCINE INJURY
vaccine injury; as well as [2] members of the group to be protected from
the disease by the vaccine. The contours and boundaries of these princi-
ples, and their applicability, when considered from the varied perspec-
tives of the simultaneous identities are so difficult to isolate in a neat and
clean pattern that it seems clear that we have on our hands a polycentric
decisional paradigm that does not admit of easy answers-but is none-
theless vulnerable to the excess of overemphasis that comes from focus-
ing on a particular identity perspective or underlying principle to the
diminution, or even exclusion, of others. Thus, [it] focuses too much on
enterprise regulation, corrective justice, and the injured individual's au-
tonomy to argue that the process of vaccine manufacture "should and
could be perfect"34 0-i.e., that both the public expects, and the law
should demand, perfection in vaccination. Similarly, the societal princi-
ple would be unfairly ascendant over the corrective justice and enterprise
regulation principles and group identities to immunize the vaccine indus-
try from liability and the obligation of compensation for vaccine injury.
Between these extremes lie two sets of complicating factors. First,
there is the peculiar and multi-layered nature of the risk-reciprocity anal-
ysis identified above when applying Fletcher's theory. Second, there is a
problem that already troubles many vaccine-injury claimants under pre-
sent rdgimes: causation. The elusive problem of causation dominates all
but the most well-documented and directly discernible vaccine-inju-
ries. 341 The experience under the NCVIA is emblematic of what the ex-
perience is like generally in the realm of state and federal tort litigation
as well. Recently, a student attorney who volunteered in representing
vaccine claimants before the vaccine court under the NCVIA noted a
number of serious problems faced by claimants who must prove cause-
in-fact-even under the somewhat more generous "substantial factor"
standard-to make out a vaccine injury claim.342 The difficulties come
in six principle areas: [1] availability to claimants of the kind of evidence
to prove causation that either has not been developed by the government
or industry, or is within their hands and not available to claimants; [2]
nature of the evidence needed, since "vaccines generally do not leave
'footprints,' or pathological markers, on the body that prove causation;"
[3] failure of the government or industry to regularly conduct epidemio-
logical studies, which would be "the next-best form of evidence"; [4]
340 OFFirr, THE CUTrrER INCIDENT, supra note 31, at 141-42.
341 See, e.g., Kathleen A. Strong, Note, Proving Causation Under the Vaccine Injury Act:
A New Approach for a New Day, 75 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 426, 445-48 (noting that claimants
under the NCVIA who must establish causation succeed only in only 13% of cases; and, due to
changes in the vaccine injury table made under the auspices of HHS, 90% of claims filed
under NCVIA now fall into the category of cases in which cause is not presumed, but rather,
claimants must bear the burden of proving cause in fact).
342 See id.
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clinical, rather than epidemiological, nature of the evidence that typically
is available; [5] disagreement by judges over "whether circumstantial ev-
idence alone can satisfy a petitioner's preponderance of the evidence bur-
den, or whether some direct evidence is required"; [6] the much
heightened transactional costs of making causation a duel to the death in
the great majority of vaccine claims-which has resulted in "[t]he intent
of the program [being] lost because the government lawyers want to de-
feat every claim at all costs and for any reason .... [so that] [t]here is now
no difference in the level of litigation than if the case were in state or
federal court." 343
The next step in our process of rethinking vaccine liability, there-
fore, is to discern more carefully and delineate more precisely how these
two unique characteristics should be addressed. The first step we take in
that direction is to rethink whether all vaccine injuries should be treated
alike for purposes of this analysis-or whether, at least initially, we
ought to consider whether the interplay of corrective justice, enterprise
regulation, and social compact principles require a more categorical ap-
proach that refines the injuries that vaccines may cause into classes based
on attendant risks and their degree of foreseeability.
3. Djpegage Classification: The Method of Sorting Choices by
Scenarios and the Implications of the Relevant Principles
To begin evaluating these issues, it will assist us to look more
deeply at the kinds-or, as we prefer to call them, "classes"-of injuries
that vaccines may cause. The classes at which we look are not defined
symptomatically, anatomically, or systemically. Rather, the classes of
vaccine injury we examine are based on the following combination of
variables-characteristics relating to the risk(s) they present to the vacci-
nated-that are more pertinent to a legal analysis, rather than a strictly
medical one:
1. The state of knowledge regarding the injury-i.e., is it known or
unknown?
2. The probability with which the injury occurs-i.e., is it signifi-
cant or remote?
3. The avoidability of the injury-i.e., can it be eliminated at all,
and if so, by what level of care?
Few commentators-or legislators, for that matter-have ap-
proached the question of tort liability generally, or vaccine-related injury
liability specifically, from the perspective of what the principles animat-
ing tort law rules may counsel. Rather, commentators tend to espouse a
single approach as "the" answer, typically looking at the ends rather than
343 See id. (citations omitted).
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the means. This variety of reasoning, however, has not led to coherent
results; rather, it has produced prodigious debate and analytic disso-
nance. There is, however, an approach available to Congress to make
reasoned, well-informed choices in this area-and to aspire to more in-
novative approaches better adapted both to the unique context of vaccine
injury and of the governmental compulsion behind many vaccines. The
liability schemes and compensation offered for vaccine-related injuries
calls for a subtler and more finely-tuned analytic approach: one that the
co-author has called a "drpegage approach. ' 344
The ddpeqage approach to rethinking tort liability is particularly
well-suited for decisional processes that are polycentric in nature. One
of us demonstrated this process with respect to classifying and evaluating
medical malpractice in complex neurosurgery by various classes of inju-
ries and how relevant legal principles counsel rule-making (for liability
and remedy) individualized to the particular interests and their balance
inherent in each separate class of injury.345 The following is a chart
summary of one ddpegage model that legislators may use in considering
how to allocate risks, burdens, and costs among the individuals and
groups who comprise the stakeholders in vaccine liability issues:
344 Drpeqage refers to interstate or international cases in which choice-of-law questions
have arisen with respect to more than one issue. See Willis L. M. Reese, Depeqage: A Com-
mon Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73 COLIJM. L. REv. 58, 58 (1973). Rather than simply
apply one state's or nation's law as a one-size-fits-all answer, ddpegage indicates more subtlety
and concern for competing state interests by separately analyzing, under the relevant choice-
of-law rules, the appropriate choice of law on an issue-by-issue approach. See SYMEON C.
SYMEONIDES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL 128 &
n.1 (1998); Van Detta, Dialogue with a Neurosurgeon, supra note 333, at 3-4.
345 See Van Detta, Dialogue with a Neurosurgeon, supra note 333, at 42-50.
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Dpeqage Model for Classification of Vaccine Injuries and
Resolution Issues for Vaccine Claims Arising from
Each Injury
Principles and Resolution Issues
Enterprise Social Compact, or
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346 See Gregory C. Keating, Rawlsian Fairness and Regime Choice in the Law of Acci-
dents, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1857, 1860-62, 1870-80 (2004).
347 See id.
348 See id.
598 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 19:537
Having set out in this schematic form the classes of risk and consid-
erations they raise under each of three relevant tort-law principles, it will
be helpful to comment further on each class with the objective of deter-
mining a methodology for transcending the simple two-risk nonrecipro-
cal risk model-risks shared exclusively between tort victim and
tortfeasor-and establishing a new realm to accommodate the additional
problems posed by multi-risk, multi-player, polycentric decision-making
processes-a realm in which we may cogently rethink vaccine-injury
liability.
a. Class One Risks-In Which the Injury Risk is Known,
Its Probability Significant, and It Cannot Be
Eliminated with All Reasonable Care
The Pasteur rabies vaccine is the classic example involving Class
One risks. It is cited in the commentary to the Restatement (Second) of
Torts Section 402A as an example of a vaccine that is "unavoidably un-
safe" because of its inherent, serious side effects,349 yet persons bitten by
rabid animals submitted to it because the disease was still worse (100%
349 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A cmt. k (1965).
The Pasteur rabies vaccine, administered without any means to confirm that the patient
exposed to rabies actually has rabies (since that can only be confirmed in post-mortem dissec-
tion), can both cause rabies as well as encephalomyelitis. See, e.g., G. K. Schlenska, Neuro-
logical Complications Following Rabies Duck Embryo Vaccination, 214 J. NEUROL. 71, 71-74
(1976). Medical scientists began recording data in the 1880s that suggested that the actual
number of deaths from rabies increased after the introduction of the prophylactic vaccine-
deaths from rabies or encephalomyelitis occurred at a higher rate among the exposed and
vaccinated than previously among the exposed and unvaccinated. See, e.g., Scientific Anti-
Vivisectionism, Rabies Vaccine, http://www.freewebs.comlscientific anti vivisectionisml6/
rabiesvaccine.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2010); see generally GERALD L. GEISON, THE PmiVATE
SCIENCE OF Louis PASTEUR (1995) (discussing Pasteur's development of the rabies vaccine).
The Pasteur vaccine was developed before the rabies virus had even been identified and iso-
lated, making contamination or insufficient inactivation, impossible to detect; and later, even
after further refinement, problems adhered because of "the presence of the myelin component
in nervous tissue [in which the vaccine was cultured] ... has resulted in severe neuroparalytic
adverse reactions and even death." Deborah J. Briggs et al., Vaccines, in RABIES 371, 372, 380
(Alan C. Jackson & William H. Wunner eds. 2002). Along with a far more precise under-
standing of the rabies virus itself, new generations of rabies vaccines have significantly re-
duced these risks. See id. at 380-394.
A more modem example is the Sabin live-virus polio vaccine, of which a federal court
observed:
[T]he vaccine was unavoidably unsafe because the live poliomyelitis virus, which is
the essence of the vaccine, always presented the danger of causing poliomyelitis. It
also found that Wyeth had enclosed a circular warning of the danger with the vac-
cine. Using its two-step analysis, the court held that the vaccine's usefulness pre-
vention of paralysis far outweighs the statistically miniscule risk that the vaccine
may cause poliomyelitis. Thus, it is not unreasonably dangerous per se.
Needham v. White Labs., 639 F.2d 394, 401 (7th Cir. 1981) (describing the holding in Reyes
v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974)).
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fatal) than the cure. 350 According to the Restatement, such products,
provided that they are properly prepared, are effective, yet present "a
reasonable risk," and accompanied by warnings of that risk, expose their
makers and distributors to no liability.3 51 Deciding to make such prod-
ucts available, which have terrible risks along with important benefits, is
ultimately a mixed question of science and policy that inevitably must be
made in the administrative sphere (FDA), and cannot be effectively regu-
lated by post-injury lawsuits. All three principles-enterprise, corrective
justice, and societal-are in play to be balanced after consideration of
many factors by administrators. The agency must consider whether its
mandates (such as for labeling and warning) suffice to vindicate the en-
terprise regulation principle, while calibrating the right balance between
safety of potential recipients with tailoring of regulation so that vaccine
manufacture and further refinement does not become untenable from in-
vestor viewpoint. Yet, despite the often "life-and-death" conundrum
presented by unavoidably unsafe products, the corrective justice princi-
ple instructs us that persons harmed by the vaccine have palpable injuries
that merit compensation. Thus, a policy tension arises between the cor-
rective justice and societal principles expressed in the questions: Is the
vaccine necessary to protect the public at large? Is the risk of vaccina-
tion to each recipient outweighed by the risk to the group if the vaccine is
not mandatory, or at least widespread?
If we view this Class from the perspective of the risks posed be-
tween manufacturer and recipient, it is clear that the risk is nonreciprocal
and that the recipient is put at a greater risk-particularly because that
risk is significant and cannot be eliminated. However, if we view this
Class in light of additional risks-the risk posed to the non-recipient by
the disease, the risk the disease poses to other members of society, the
risk that the non-recipient poses of communicating the disease to other
members of society, the risks between a government that mandates vac-
cination and the risk of vaccination to unvaccinated, the risks between
government that does not mandate the vaccination and the risk of disease
posed to society-the picture becomes too polycentric to permit coherent
resolution under Fletcher's theory alone.
350 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A cmt. k (1965); see, e.g., Allison v.
Merck & Co., Inc., 878 P.2d 948, 953 (Nev. 1994).
351 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A cmt. k (1965). However, theories of
liability have been recognized when the warnings are not communicated to the vaccine recipi-
ent. See, e.g., Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1273.
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b. Class Two Risks-In Which the Injury Risk is Known,
Its Probability Remote, and Cannot Be Eliminated
with All Reasonable Care
Oral polio vaccine (OPV) presents the textbook example of the
Class Two risk. As originally conceived by Dr. Albert Sabin, the bitter
rival of Jonas Salk, OPV uses weakened (i.e., "attenuated" in vaccine
terminology) but live polio virus to stimulate immunity. 352 OPV offered
greater ease in large-scale polio eradication campaigns, afforded a long-
lasting immunity, and more rapidly stamps out the virus in newly-vacci-
nated communities by a process called "shedding," in which live, but
attenuated, virus excreted by the vaccinated exposes the unvaccinated to
polio and triggers their immune systems to develop antibodies, producing
what is called "herd" immunity. 353 When properly manufactured accord-
ing to industry standards, OPV still carried a one in 2.4 million risk of
causing Vaccine-Associated Paralytic Polio (VAPP) in recipients. 354
"Because Sabin strains contain the live polio virus, there is a risk that
either a recipient or a contact could develop polio. ' 35 5 The risk rate of a
non-vaccinated person contracting VAPP from live virus shed by a vac-
cine is discernible but even more remote than the risk of VAPP develop-
ing in recipients-approximately one in six million.356
When applied to Class Two risk scenarios, the principles strike a
balance that favors vaccination and compensation, with warnings of the
risks-particularly where there are vaccination choices, as there are in
the case of the safer, but more expensive and complicated, Salk killed-
virus injected polio vaccine versus the Sabin live-virus oral polio vac-
cine. Enterprise regulation here commands controlling for remote risks
by tracking actual results in the field and continuously recalibrating the
risk assessments with two definite goals in mind. First, risks at one time
found to be remote may, as field use of the vaccine generates more epi-
demiological data, be found much more probable across a broad popula-
tion than scientists had at first thought. Second, that additional
352 See, e.g., MARTIN G. MYERS, M.D. & DIEGO PINEDA, Do VACCINES CAUSE THAT'?: A
GUIDE FOR EVALUATING VACCINE SAFETY CONCERNS 26 (2008).
353 See id. at 26-28.
354 See id. at 27. In the 1970s, the CDC apparently was estimating this number as 1 in 20
million. See Plummer v. Lederle Labs., 819 F.2d 349, 352 (2d Cir. 1987). Subsequent data
apparently shows that VAPP is a greater risk than the CDC thought it to be in the early 1970s.
See id. at 26-27 (stating that "about 1 out of 2.4 million doses of OPV distributed in the
United States cause vaccine-associated paralytic polio (VAPP)").
355 Loge v. United States, 662 F.2d 1268, 1270 (8th Cir. 1981). As the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit noted, "Mrs. Loge was exposed to the shed virus in 1976 after a doctor
inoculated her infant son Todd with Orimune. Within one month after her son's inoculation,
Mrs. Loge was stricken with a vaccine-associated case of poliomyelitis, Type 2. As a result,
she is now a paraplegic." Id.
356 See Plummer, 819 F.2d at 352.
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information will also allow the development and refinement of a bio-
sociological factor profile of those most susceptible to eventuation of
risk, which should serve to identify those most in need of risk warnings
and for whom the vaccine development community should develop alter-
natives.357 Global data gathering, analysis, strategic modeling, and dis-
seminating of paradigms in field are critical components. The essence of
addressing Class Two risks is, as reflected in numerous vaccine-injury
cases of the 1970s and 1980s, creating and disseminating proper warn-
ings of the remote risks.358
As in the other Classes of injury, the corrective justice principle
compels us to recognize that persons harmed by the vaccine have palpa-
ble injuries that merit compensation. The societal principle more
strongly compels the public policy decision to expose large groups of
people to the remote risk of harm over a large number of vaccine admin-
istrations to ensure the health of many more persons who, without the
vaccine, would be at a statistically greater risk of harm from the disease
in the absence of programmatic vaccination. The equipoise between the
principles favoring compensation for victims and broad reach of vaccina-
tion can be delicate-as those who emphasize the severe compression of
357 The concept of "adequate warning" is a murky one in the area of vaccines. A serious
question arises whether a layperson-or even a non-specialist physician-can truly make an
intelligent choice to receive, or to forego if permitted by law, a vaccine, especially where the
risks of harm have probabilities in the ranges of uncommon to remote to unknown-i.e., "Do I
know too little about the unknown risks to take the risk?" Lawyers have used patient consent
as a convenient legal dodge around the tougher issues of both science, as well as morality.
Questions of whether a vaccinee's consent is genuinely [1] informed and [2] voluntary indeed
present issues to manufacturers, physicians, and public health care agencies that are of a moral
dimension, closely allied to legal notions of duress, unconscionability, and innocent/negligent
misrepresentation. Such issues require an extended treatment drawing on sources outside of
law. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, CoNFLi'crS OF LAW AND MORALITY, 207-25 (1989). They
are beyond the scope of our mission in this Article. Therefore, we will treat the question of
patient consent to receive a vaccine as a non-relevant factor in the classification of risk or
application of enterprise regulation, corrective justice, and social compact principles to the
scenarios in those various classifications. Suffice it to say that since many of the vaccines are
compulsory since they are required either for admittance to the country or for school attend-
ance, with itself is required, consent would not figure much in the kind of analysis we under-
take here. For a general and informative aspect of the historical, moral, and legal
considerations surrounding the question of consent and balancing of risks to individuals in the
trials of vaccines and other biological products during the twentieth century, see generally
SYDNEY A. HALPERN, LESSER HARMS: THE MORALITY OF RISK IN MEDICAL RESEARCH (2004).
358 See, e.g., Graham v. American Cyanamid Co., 350 F.3d 496 (6th Cir. 2003); MYERS &
PINEDA, supra note 352, at 19 & n.1; Plummer, 819 F.2 at 349; Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498
F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1980). See also ARTHUR ALLEN, VACCINE: THE CONTROVERSIAL STORY
OF MEDICINE'S GREATEST LIFE SAVER 264-65 (2008). Of course, meaningful warnings of
remote risks are difficult for non-statisticians to interpret and contextualize. See generally
JOHN ALLEN PAULOS, INNUMERACY: MATHEMATICAL ILLITERACY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
(1988).
2010]
602 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 19:537
players in the vaccine industry since the 1950s consistently point out.359
The question remains how to establish the entitlement? Proof of causa-
tion is the most significant hurdle.360 Causation proof is even more prob-
lematic in this class of cases precisely because statistically remote risks
will not appear until many vaccine doses are administered for a period of
years-or even decades-and even then, it may take even more vaccina-
tions and adverse events to establish the statistical significance to over-
come objections that the causal link is equally as well explained by
coincidence. 361
The balance in Class Two may differ from Class One. If the immi-
nence of the risk of the illness, either to individual or to group, is sub-
stantial, that may often outweigh the more remote risk of vaccine
injury-although the calibration is always in question because the causa-
tion of vaccine injury may later become evident when-and if-relevant
epidemiological data is collected and properly evaluated.
If we view this Class from the perspective of the risks posed be-
tween manufacturer and recipient, it is clear that the risk is nonreciprocal
and that the recipient is put at a greater risk-particularly since the risks
at issue in Class Two cannot be eliminated-but the small possibility of
the risk eventuating into actual harm pushes the notion of nonreciprocity
to its conceptual limits. The risk may even be so minute as to lack statis-
tical significance for comparison purposes. In addition, as with the risks
in the other Classes, we must view Class Two risks in light of additional
risks-the risk posed to the non-recipient by the disease, the risk the
disease poses to other members of society, the risk that the non-recipient
poses of communicating the disease to other members of society, the
risks between a government that mandates vaccination and the risk of
vaccination to unvaccinated, and the risks between no mandated vaccina-
tion and the risk of disease posed to society. The remote risk of harm to
359 See OFnrr, THE CUTaER INCIDENT, supra note 31, at 181-83. Others reject Offit's
attribution of blame to facts-or fears-of products liability, and cite other economic issues-
i.e., limited profitability from providing a product that most consumers use only once, that is
complicated to develop, test, and manufacture, and that cannot be sold at a premium price like
"designer" pharmaceuticals. See ALLEN, supra note 358, at 426-35.
360 See MYERS & PENADA, supra note 352, at 48-74. Under a protocol developed by the
Institute of Medicine (IOM) within the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), both non-profit,
non-government, private associations, causation categories were developed. Id. These causa-
tion categories are: [1] No Evidence (complee absence of clinical or epidemiological evi-
dence); [21 Evidence Is Inadequate To Accept Or Reject A Causal Relationship (i.e., sparse,
conflicting, at best merely suggestive); [3] Evidence Favors Rejection Of A Causal Relation-
ship; [4] Evidence Favors Acceptance Of A Causal Relationship (i.e., evidence is strong and
generally convincing-but not to a degree sufficient to characterize the link as unequivocal or
established); [5] Evidence Establishes A Causal Relationship (i.e., evidence unequivocally
shows causal link between a vaccine and an injury). Id. at 72-73. Compare the discussion of
the options for the legal approach to causation at Part 111.B.2 supra.
361 See ALLEN, supra note 358, at 325.
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the vaccinee seems least compelling when compared to other risks, such
as the risk of the illness to the vaccinee, the risk to society if the vaccine
is not used. Pure reciprocity alone, between manufacturer and vaccinee,
is hardly sufficient as the sole basis on which to predicate questions of
liability and compensation for Class Two risks. When the additional
risks are factored into the picture, we once again have a portrait of
polycentrism that will not admit of resolution under Fletcher's theory
alone.
c. Class Three Risks-In Which the Injury Risk is Known,
Its Probability Significant, and Can Be Eliminated by
Exercise of at Least Reasonable Care
The paradigmatic Class Three risk is exemplified by the manufac-
turer process and quality-control errors in what has become known as
"the Cutter Incident. ' 362 Cutter Laboratories was one of six companies
licensed by the federal government to make the first production run of
the Salk killed-virus polio vaccine.363 The risk of some viruses not being
killed in the production process (and thus capable of actually causing
polio in vaccinated persons) was well-known to researchers and pharma-
ceutical companies. 364 The protocols developed for manufacturing of the
vaccine called both for a filtration process designed to capture and re-
move live polio viruses from the vaccine and a testing process to ascer-
tain whether that in fact happened.365 In production, Cutter Laboratories
made errors at both critical stages of the process. 366 These errors re-
sulted in the production of 120,000 doses of polio vaccine that contained
live polio virus. 367 Of the children who received the vaccine, 40,000 de-
veloped abortive poliomyelitis (a form of the disease that does not in-
volve the central nervous system), fifty-six developed paralytic
poliomyelitis, and five children died as a result of polio infection. 368 The
live virus that the Cutter vaccine carried was more potent than the natu-
rally occurring polio virus, and it also was shed in the excretions of the
vaccinated. 369 That resulted in a considerable secondary exposure to par-
ents, other adults, and children. 370 As one writer summarized the widen-
ing ripple from the Cutter Laboratories error:
362 See Nathanson & Langmuir, supra note 31, at 29-30; see generally OFFIrr, THE CuT-
TER INCIDENT, supra note 31.
363 OFFIT, THE CuTrrTER INCIDENT, supra note 31, at 62.
364 See id. at 48-51.
365 Id. at 47-48.
366 Id. at 62-65.
367 Id. at 87.
368 Id. at 86-87 (citing Nathanson & Langumuir, supra note 31).
369 OFFIT, THE CrIER INCIDENT, supra note 31, at 85-89.
370 Id.
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[I]t is likely that the Mahoney virus present in Cutter's
vaccine infected at least 100,000 family and community
contacts. In the end, at least 220,000 people were in-
fected with live polio virus contained in Cutter's vac-
cine; 70,000 developed muscle weakness, 164 were
severely paralyzed, and 10 were killed. Seventy-five
percent of Cutter's victims were paralyzed for the rest of
their lives. 371
Production problems had plagued Cutter's manufacture-one-third
of the vaccine lots of the original production failed tests that looked for
rogue active virus, and for some of these failed lots, Cutter repeated the
formaldehyde process that was supposed to kill any live polio virus and
re-submitted it for approval and distribution. 372 The risk here was well-
known-previous live-virus and killed-virus vaccines had been devel-
oped and tested independently by the researches Kolmer and Brodie in
1934, and both vaccines appeared to cause polio in an alarming number
of otherwise healthy children.373 Jonas Salk, the killed-vaccine's devel-
oper, was quite aware of this, and developed an elaborate protocol for
production to insure that this very kind of thing did not recur.374 As Dr.
Paul Offit, a former vaccine research scientist and current, prolific author
on vaccine-related issues who closely studied the Cutter Incident with
information from a variety of perspectives, noted, "Cutter did many
things wrong, and it didn't have the internal expertise that was available
to other companies [like Eli Lilly and Parke-Davis]. . . . [I]t made a
vaccine that was far more dangerous than any other polio vaccine made
in the United States or in the world. '375
Class Three scenarios involve recognized risks that can be elimi-
nated. As the Cutter Incident suggests, the specifics of such cases may
not necessarily be simple or cut and dry. There may be complications-
such as a significant one in the Cutter Incident that the federal govern-
ment shared responsibility by signing off on a vaccine-batch testing
methodology that was not sufficient to detect all batches of vaccine that
371 Id. at 89
372 Id. at 90.
373 Id. at 14-18. As Offit notes, "[t]he vaccine trials of John Kolmer and Maurice Brodie
had a chilling effect on polio vaccine research. Twenty years passed before anyone dared to
try again." Id. at 18.
374 Id. at 59-61
375 OFFmT, THE CUTTER INCIDENT, supra note 31, at 114. Offit attributes many errors to
Cutter's production process, including: [1] failing to use the appropriate filters during the
formaldehyde treatment process; id. at 106; [2] "let[ting] filtered virus sit in the refrigerator for
long periods before inactivating it with formaldehyde .. . caus[ing] fine clumps of monkey
kidney cell debris to form on the bottoms of the flasks[;]" id. at 110; [3] failing to determine
how long to treat the virus with formaldehyde so as to ensure elimination of the live virus; id.
at 111-13.
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might have live virus, by not recognizing the challenges of taking Salk's
techniques for limited, trial vaccine production and rapidly implementing
them into much larger scale production, and by not proceeding more
carefully and slowly until a margin of reliable safety had been
established.
In these circumstances, however, both business and government,
when it partners with business, must be encouraged to bear the expense
of eliminating known risks that are not remote and can feasibly be elimi-
nated. As the jury's verdict in the Gottsdanker case reflects, 376 the cor-
rective justice principle supports the idea that persons harmed by a
vaccine have palpable injuries that merit compensation. The compensa-
tion interest is particularly strong where the risk they expect to encounter
in vaccine administration [a] eventuates in actual injury because the man-
ufacturer fails to exercise the degree of reasonable care likely to elimi-
nate the known risk and [b] is nonreciprocal-i.e., absent the
manufacturer's reasonable care, the risk the vaccine recipient consented
to undertake is magnified substantially. Causation is less problematic in
this class of cases because there is sufficient, pre-injury data establishing
the causal linkage-there was ultimately little doubt in the Cutter vac-
cine-injury cases what had caused the victims' polio, despite Cutter's
unconvincing efforts to argue otherwise. 377
The somewhat simpler picture when looking at the scenario only
though the lens of enterprise regulation and corrective justice becomes
more complicated when we add the perspective of the societal principle.
The balance in Class Three is typically the closest between society's in-
terest in disease control and prevention and the individual's welfare
(which is protected by the enterprise regulation and corrective justice
principles). When a potential injury is both known and avoidable
through the exercise of reasonable care, or a higher, yet attainable, level
of vigilance, the ratio between the individual and group risks is dimin-
ished. Depending on the severity of the target illness and its communica-
bility, the societal risk may not so far outweigh the individual
compensation for injury which may otherwise justifiably be limited by
the social benefits of the vaccine in toto. That surely was the case for the
polio vaccine; for though it received great publicity due to President
Roosevelt, his former law partner Basil O'Connor, and the organization
he founded, The March of Dimes, polio was not nearly as common or
communicable as many other diseases of childhood at the time. 378
If we view this Class from the perspective of the risks posed be-
tween manufacturer and recipient, it is clear that the risk is nonreciprocal
376 Id. at 150.
377 Id. at 142-47.
378 See DAVID M. OSHINSKY, POLIO: AN AMERICAN STORY 45, 53-91 (2005).
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and that the recipient is put at a greater risk-particularly because that
risk is significant and cannot be eliminated. However, just as in the case
of Class One and Class Two risks, if we view this Class in light of addi-
tional risks-the risk posed to the non-recipient by the disease, the risk
the disease poses to other members of society, the risk that the non-recip-
ient poses of communicating the disease to other members of society, the
risks between a government that mandates vaccination and the risk of
vaccination to unvaccinated, the risks between government that does not
mandate the vaccination and the risk of disease posed to society, the
picture, once again, becomes too polycentric to permit coherent resolu-
tion under Fletcher's theory alone.
d. Class Four Risks-In Which Injury Risk is Known, Its
Probability Remote, and Can Be Eliminated by
Exercise of at Least Reasonable Care
The question of whether an expectant mother can safely-both for
herself and her in vitro child-take a vaccine provides a ready example
of Class Four risks. The Advisory Committee on Immunization Prac-
tices (ACIP) states that "the risk of a developing fetus being harmed by
vaccination of the mother during pregnancy is only theoretical. ''379 Of
this heady realm of remote risks, the current medical consensus is that
risk from inactivated viral or bacterial vaccine is less than that from vac-
cines, such as the Mumps-Measles-Rubella (MMR) or varicella, which
are made from live attenuated viruses. 380 The injury is readily preventa-
ble-pregnant women should not get the vaccine while pregnant.38' Of
course, this raises the possibility that an unvaccinated woman could con-
tract mumps, measles, rubella, or varicella (i.e., "chickenpox")-three of
which demonstrably pose a real risk to the development and post-partum
health of the child. 382 Similarly, though no link has yet to be scientifi-
cally established, the elimination of thimerisol (a mercury compound) as
a preservative in vaccines after 2001 addressed and eliminated the risk
379 MYERS & PINEDA, supra note 352, at 210-11.
380 See id. at 211; see also ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON IMMUNIZATION PRACTICES WORK-
GROUP ON THE USE OF VACCINES DUING PREGNANCY AND BREASTFEEDING, GUIDING PRINCI-
PLES FOR DEVELOPMENT OF ACIP RECOMMENDATIONS FOR VACCINATION DURING PREGNANCY
AND BREASTFEEDING 1 (2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/recs/ACIP/down
loads/preg-principles05-01-08.pdf (noting paucity of data, theoretical concerns, and FDA clas-
sification of risks to pregnant women). The Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services selects a panel of 15 members, based on perceived vaccine expertise, to ad-
vise the government on vaccine policy. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/recs/ACIP/de-
fault.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
381 See MYERS & PINEDA, supra note 352, at 212.
382 See id. at 212-14.
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that vaccination could cause the condition of autism. 383 Yet that move
did create a cost for a leading vaccine maker, Wyeth, which closed its
Diptheria-Tetanus-Pertussis (DPT) vaccine manufacturing plant and
withdrew from DPT vaccine production rather than retrofit the existing
production facility to a thimerisol-free production process. 384
Cases at this margin push the economics of enterprise regulation to
the edge. How much precaution is required and at what price to the
benefit and efficacy of the activity or product? This is at the heart of the
so-called "Learned Hand" formula, a metaphor for cost-benefit analysis
that he suggested in United States v. Carroll Towing.385 Relevance of
the enterprise principle could be measured by the Hand formula, expres-
sing it in the form of the following question-is the burden of exercising
reasonable care to avoid a remote injury justified by its proportionality to
the remote probability of the injury considered and the gravity of the
harm in those instances where the remote risk actually eventuates in
harm?
Regulation becomes more relevant as the particular injury in ques-
tion poses a lower burden of avoidance, an increased gravity of harm, or
both. Even in cases at the economic margin of the enterprise principle,
the corrective justice principle still demands for persons harmed by a
vaccine that their palpable injuries be compensated. As with Class Three
injuries, the compensation interest is particularly strong where the risk
they expect to encounter in vaccine administration [a] eventuates in
actual injury because the manufacturer fails to exercise the degree of
reasonable care likely to eliminate the known risk and [b] is nonrecipro-
cal-i.e., absent the manufacturer's reasonable care, the risk the vaccine
recipient consented to undertake is magnified substantially. Causation,
however, is more problematic in this class of cases because the rarity of
the injury may make it difficult, if not sometimes impossible, to have
pre-injury data sufficient to satisfy the statistical and scientific demands
for causation evidence.
The balance in Class Four cases between society's interest in dis-
ease control and prevention, and the enterprise regulation and corrective
justice principles' protection of individual welfare is not as close as the
balance in Class Three cases. Although the risk of injury in Class Four
cases is more remote, it is both foreseeable and preventable by the exer-
383 See id. at 148-74; see generally PAUL A. OFrr, M.D., AUTISM'S F E.i PROPHETS:
BAD SCIENCE, RISKY MEDICINE, AND THE SEARCH FOR A CURE 71-73, 102 (2008).
384 ALLEN, supra note 358, at 412, 425. As Allen notes, a significant factor in Wyeth's
decision was that Aventis and GlaxoSmithKline "were coming out with products that com-
bined DPT with hepatitis B or Hib in a single convenient shot, and Wyeth wasn't interested in
regearing to make thimerosal-free shots in a factory that it believed was obsolete," to produce
a DPT-only vaccine that was on the way to being redundant. Id. at 412.
385 159 F.2d 169 (2d. Cir. 1947).
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cise of the same level of care as we require of motorists and amusement
park operators. When a potential risk is both known and avoidable, even
if remote in probability, there must be some obligation to exercise at
least reasonable care to avoid the risk. While the societal interest in
preventing the disease outweighs imposing legal liability to an extent that
makes the production and distribution of the vaccine untenable, that in-
terest is not so strong as to displace the victims' compensation interest,
which can be maintained without disadvantaging the public vaccine pro-
gram-particularly where the injury's remoteness suggests a low number
of claims. Yet, the precise resolution of these competing principles into
concrete policies and rules once again involves a substantial set of
polycentric decisions-and once again, while the nonreciprocal risk the-
ory can guide our thinking, the polycentric nature of the problem is not
entirely resolvable on nonreciprocal risk grounds alone.
e. Class Five Risks-In Which the Injury Risk is
Unknown, but Could Be Discovered by Exercise of at
Least Reasonable Care
The line between Class Five and Class Six risks is a very fine one-
it involves classic "Monday morning quarterbacking." It is very difficult
in many cases to determine whether something that was not discovered
was foreseeable-or not-and at what point in the past to stake the de-
termination. Deciding in the present what should have been foreseen in
the past is always a tricky business, even if judges and juries are asked to
do this every day in garden-variety negligence cases. But vaccine inju-
ries, particularly those not foreseen at the time a vaccine was designed,
approved, and administered, are much more complex factually and caus-
ally than ordinary negligence cases. Vaccines are not developed in a
vacuum as just another pharmaceutical product. They most often are de-
veloped in response to a felt and urgent societal need. 386 The decisions
that go into the scope of research and risk-planning when vaccines are
made-i.e., how far afield we look for potential complications and side
effects-will vary depending on the state of medical and other scientific
knowledge at the time the vaccine is developed. 387 Since that is an ever-
386 See ALLEN, supra note 358, at 14-17.
387 A good example of this comes from the history of polio vaccine research. In the early
1900s, medical science had not isolated the microorganism that causes polio. In 1908, the
famous blood-type discoverer, Karl Landsteiner, identified the virus. Rockefeller Medical In-
stitute researcher Simon Flexner then set about designing a vaccine. His efforts were ham-
pered, however, because he could not foresee that there might be other strains of the polio
virus, not just the one Landsteiner had identified, and therefore, anything he developed would
be insufficient to provide adequate protection to vaccinees. See OSHINSKv, supra note 378, at
12-19. Flexner also could not foresee that his research subject-the rhesus monkey "is one of
the rare primates that cannot contract polio through oral feeding" and "the only sure way to
infect this species is to shoot poliovirus directly to its brain or spinal cord, as Flexner had
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evolving body of context, the point in time when foreseeability can be
assigned is critical to determining whether an unknown risk could have
been discovered sufficiently in advance of a vaccination injury that it
would have been predicted and prevented. 388
An example that demonstrates the fineness of the line separating
Class Five and Six risks comes, once again, from the paradigm of polio
vaccine research. Polio research scientists at the major pharmaceutical
companies and the National Institutes for Health (NIH) realized that by
cultivating polio viruses in the kidney tissue of monkeys, a theoretical
risk was created that one or more simian viruses might make their way
into the vaccine and, thus, into human populations. 389 In 1954, Eli
Lilly's researchers commenced work to classify the simian viruses they
found in monkey kidney tissues. 390 The number escalated to forty such
monkey-specific viruses when in 1959 a NIH researcher identified SV40
(i.e., Simian Virus number 40), which she found strongly correlated with
fatal cancerous tumors in newborn hamsters injected with kidney tissue
extract containing SV40.391 Researchers erroneously concluded that
SV40 was a risk for transmission only through the Sabin vaccine; in fact,
it was also transmitted by the Salk vaccine (since it was resistant to the
formaldehyde that had been designed to kill the polio virus-not the un-
known SV40). 39 2 "This meant that close to 100 million American chil-
dren had been inadvertently exposed to SV40 in the years between 1954
and 1963, when the government began to carefully screen all new lots of
polio vaccine for simian virus. '393
Of course, it would hardly seem foreseeable that SV40, hitherto un-
known, would be imparted by polio vaccines into human populations, at
done"-would lead him to make a series of incorrect "discoveries" about the nature and be-
havior of polio that would dominate polio studies over the next forty years and seriously
hamper the effort to create a vaccine. Id. at 18-19.
388 See, e.g., MYERS & PINEDA, supra note 352, at 56-60 (discussing the adverse effects
caused by the rotavirus vaccine).
389 See DEBBIE BOoKCHiN & JIM SCHUMACHER, THE VIRUS AND THE VACCINE: THE TRUE
STORY OF A CANCER-CAUSING MONKEY VIRUS, CONTAMINATED POLIO VACCINE, AND THE
MILLIONS OF AMERICANS EXPOSED 72 (2004).
390 See id. at 40-42.
391 There is still considerable debate about whether SV40, which unquestionably causes
fatal cancerous tumors in a variety of laboratory animals, is a cause of human cancer. See
ALLEN, supra note 358, at 209-13 (noting the continuing controversy and that "[p]olymerase
chain reaction, a sensitive molecular detection test, has found SV-40 in many types of cancer-
ous cells"); compare OSHINSKY, supra note 378, at 281-82 (noting NIH's position in 2003
before Congres that "numerous" epidemiological studies "found no correlation between
human cancers, including mesothelioma, and exposure to SV40" and that "[alt this time,"
NIH's view "is that the body of evidence is inconclusive as to the role of SV40 in the develop-
ment of [human] cancer") with BooKcHiN & SCHUMACHER, supra note 389 (marshalling con-
trary information and argument that SV40 is a human carcinogen).
392 See OSHINSKY, supra note 378, at 281.
393 Id.
2010]
610 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 19:537
least at the time the first polio vaccines were introduced. But researchers
were concerned about "unintended consequences" of the polio vaccine-
and the possibility of transferring viruses from monkeys to humans-
even before the Salk vaccine's FDA approval. 394 Still, the vaccines con-
tinued to be administered-even after SV40 was isolated and suggested
as a cause of cancer.395 Further research was not undertaken at the time,
in part because both Salk and Sabin deemed SV40 as "harmless. 39
6
Thus, there is ground in this scenario to find a point in time during the
polio vaccination campaign when the government and pharmaceutical
manufacturers made the conscious decision to risk exposing vaccinees to
unknown-and as time passed, known-simian viruses, and, after 1959,
to the specific risk that SV40 may be a human carcinogen.
How can this kind of risk be assessed under the dictating principles
and in light of nonreciprocal risk theory? The starting point of this class
of risks-as unknown-shifts the regulatory paradigm from the issue of
the vaccine industry to take reasonable measures to eliminate known
risks, to using reasonable care to discover risks that are as yet unknown,
but will eventuate in the future. The relevant principle is recognized in
the famous case, The T.J. Hooper,397 that an industry will not be allowed
to rest upon the laurels of the status quo state of knowledge. Rather, it
must maintain reasonable care in efforts to find and recognize tangible
improvements to safety. 398 Regulation in this class of cases is particu-
larly important because the risk of continuing to administer a vaccine
without exercising reasonable care to identify new risks during its post-
approval period creates a substantial nonreciprocal risk in vaccine
recipients. 399
The corrective justice principle continues to have the same compel-
ling role in this class of cases as in the others. Persons harmed by palpa-
ble injuries that were not reasonably foreseeable have normally not been
394 See ALLEN, supra note 358, at 209 ("[T]he measures designed to protect the world
from polio may, in their turn, for allw e know, lead to some other quite unexpected conse-
quence which may be to man's disadvantage, a contemporary of the vaccine trials wrote.").
395 See OSHINSKY, supra note 378, at 281.
396 See id.
397 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
398 See id. at 740.
399 See, e.g., MYERS & PINEDA, supra note 352, at 57.
In July 1999, after approximately I million children had been immunized with the
vaccine, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommended that
people temporarily stop immunizing infants with RotaShield. The CDC was con-
cemed that the vaccine might be causing a serious bowel diseased called intussus-
ception, because an unexpected number of cases of this condition (15) had been
reported in children who had received the vaccine.
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afforded compensation in the tort system. 400 However, where the exer-
cise of reasonable care to discover unknown risks would have unearthed,
more likely than not, information that might reasonably have been used
in time to prevent a particular victim's injury, compensation for that vic-
tim is appropriate.40 1
The possibility of unknown complications exists for every kind of
drug or vaccine. Only time over the course of distribution in the field
will reveal the full set of risks presented by any product, particularly
vaccines. 40 2 In almost any conceivable case, the interest of society as a
whole, and the health interest of individuals, strongly outweighs the risk
of any vaccine recipient enduring an unforeseen risk. However, the risk
to society of having unvaccinated members or an inconsistent vaccine
program does not so far outweigh the individual risk that compensation
for injury should be denied because of the societal benefits of the vaccine
in toto-particularly where reasonable care would have led to the identi-
fication of the unknown risk. This factor also raises the societal interest
from the perspective of creating and funding the programs needed to
identify such risks as early as possible in the post-approval, field use of
the vaccine.
Once again, the precise resolution of these competing principles into
concrete policies and rules involves a substantial set of polycentric deci-
sions-and once again, while the nonreciprocal risk theory can guide our
thinking, the polycentric nature of the problem is not entirely resolvable
on nonreciprocal risk grounds alone.
400 Cf Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975) (finding liability precisely
because the injury was foreseeable).
401 See The T.J. Hooper, 50 F.2d 737 (2d. Cir. 1932).
402 The breadth and depth of clinical trials and controlled field testing is one of the key
factors in determining the learning curve on any new vaccine introduced. See ALLEN, supra
note 358, at 429-31; JULIE MILSTIEN & BRENDA CANDRIES, THE ECONOMICS OF VACCINE
DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION: CHANGES OVER THE PAST 20 YEARS, (2001), at 6-9,
available at http://www.who.int/immunization-supply/introduction/economics-vaccinepro-
duction.pdf. Trials must not only be large enough (some, for example, over 100,000 persons)
to demonstrate a vaccine's efficacy; to adequately put the developers on a course to uncover
the unknown risks, they must also be large enough to detect statistically significant increases
in harms. See id. at 6-7. For illustration, Milstien describes how even after a 10,000-person
clinical trial, RotaShield, "a tetravalent rhesus-based recombinant rotavirus vaccine licensed
by the FDA," was linked to "increased reports of intussusception in recipients of the vaccine"
after 1.8 million doses, an "event could not have been picked up in any reasonably-sized
clinical trial." Id. at 7-8. Today's vaccines demand far more comprehensive clinical and field
trials than the polio vaccine developers undertook-12 to 15 years of development at a cost to
the developer approaching $1 billion. See The Vaccine Industry: An Overview, VAC-
CINEETHICS.ORG, http://www.vaccineethics.org/issue-briefs/industry.php (last visited Feb. 13,
2010).
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f. Class Six Risks-In Which the Injury Risk is Unknown,
but Could Not Have Been Discovered Even by
Exercise of Reasonable Care
This Class of cases presents a sui generis issue for applying the
enterprise regulation principle. The other classes involve measures of
manufacturers' reasonableness-in knowledge of a risk, precaution
against a risk, or prediction of a risk. In Class Six, reasonable care-
indeed, care of any level-plays no role whatsoever. The risks in this
Class are unknown and unknowable until they eventuate in actual harm.
Thus, traditional notions of regulating an enterprise to compel more re-
sponsible conduct do not figure into the equation. The question here is
whether the enterprise should bear the harm caused by its product-basi-
cally a choice between a negligence regime (and thus no liability) versus
a strict liability r6gime (always liability). Considerations here most
clearly and markedly make the nonreciprocal risk model, by itself, inade-
quate to reach a model of fair distribution of harm among those who
benefit from the relevant risks. 403
Persons injured by palpable injuries whose risk is both unknown
and unknowable ex ante have traditionally not been afforded compensa-
tion in the tort system. This is particularly so when no amount of vigi-
lance on the part of the tortfeasor would result in detection and
prevention of the harm. However, persons harmed by vaccines continue
to have palpable injuries that merit compensation under principles of cor-
rective justice.
From the nonreciprocal risk perspective, it is arguable that the indi-
vidual assumes a greater risk in submitting to vaccination than does the
vaccine's progenitors. Yet the risk to society averted by vaccination-
and thereby effectuating the societal principle-complicates the equa-
tion. Focusing on reciprocity of risk may in this Class, as in the others,
lead us into a Gordian knot of polycentric decisions. That does, how-
ever, end our effort to rethink vaccine liability in a stalemate among wor-
thy principles of tort law or with resort only to an end-run instrumentalist
solution. Recently, Professor Gregory Keating proposed a rethinking of
Fletcher's theory itself to create a practical paradigm for making princi-
pled decisions about how the law should deal with injury.4° 4 As Profes-
sor Keating succinctly states, his approach "argue[s] against Fletcher's
identification of fairness in the choice between negligence and strict lia-
bility with the presence or absence of reciprocity of risk, and in favor of
focusing on the fair distribution of' harms-or "the costs of accidental
injury among those who benefit from the imposition of the underlying
403 See Keating, supra note 346, at 1860.
404 Id. at 1858.
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risks."'40 5 In so doing, Professor Keating's approach, which we shall call
"distribution of the costs of nonreciprocal harms" based on notions of
"reciprocity of harms,' 4 0 6 gives us a more philosophically sophisticated
approach to grapple with injuries that result from the polycentric nature
inherent in complex public policy and science decisions.
Given the severity and life-long nature of many vaccine-related in-
juries, corrective justice may, like the enterprise principle, require here
an analysis based on fair distribution of harms among those who benefit
from the risky activities that created them. 40 7 The possibility of un-
known complications exists for every kind of drug or vaccine. Only time
over the course of distribution in the field will reveal the full set of risks
presented by any product. In almost any conceivable case, the interest of
society as a whole, and the health interest of individuals, strongly out-
weighs the risk of any vaccine recipient enduring an unforeseen risk.
However, the risk to society of having unvaccinated members or an in-
consistent vaccine program does not so far outweigh the individual risk
that compensation for injury should be denied because of the societal
benefits of the vaccine in toto. This is arguably the case even where no
amount of care would protect the vaccinated from risk, because the group
health interest still outweighs the individual health interest when viewed
in the aggregate. In that sense, application of this principle, just as with
the other two principles, militates not for a rdgime of no-liability, but
rather, for one based on fairly distributing burdens of harm among those
who benefit from the risk-creating activity. 40 8
In the following subsection, we discuss how Congress might use the
perspective afforded by Professor Keating's transformation of
nonreciprocal risk theory into the "distribution of the costs of harms"
approach to identify parameters of a comprehensive policy-not just for
vaccine liability-but for vaccine research, development, approval, dis-
tribution, and injury compensation as an integrated program.
C. Implications of a "Distribution of the Costs of Nonreciprocal
Harms" Approach to Rethinking Vaccine-Injury Liability
1. Beyond Nonreciprocal Risks to Nonreciprocal Harms
The basis for Professor Keating's approach is explained extensively
in his article,4 9 and will not be repeated here. Instead, we will explain
how his approach extends-and supersedes-basic nonreciprocal risk
theory for the context of polycentric problems. We will then, in the spirit
405 Id.
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of that approach, suggest generally that the vaccine area be re-thought by
Congress holistically, and state specifically a number of features that we
believe should be adopted consistent with the theory of "distribution of
the costs of nonreciprocal harms."
In his critique of Fletcher, Keating notes that starting and ending
with Fletcher's emphasis on risk reciprocity advances the ultimate solu-
tion of the cost of injuries little beyond "a common law r6gime which
resembles the common law of accidents at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury"410-trapping us within a framework that, as "a kind of nostalgia,"
shuts us off from exploring solutions "both within and beyond the tort
law of accidents" and from "seeing a wide variety of administrative
schemes" as part of "an agenda for progress and reform. 411
This is particularly the case where "[t]he diverse aims of a plurality
of persons" are involved-as they are in the Six Classes of vaccine-in-
jury risk we have developed-because those aims "cannot be converted
into a single scale, so that we may make collectively the same kinds of
judgments that we each make individually. '41 2 While "[t]he reasonable-
ness of risk impositions ... turns on the way that the impositions recon-
cile the competing claims of liberty and security," 413 risk impositions in
polycentric policy matters like vaccination "arise against a background
of mutually beneficial cooperative conduct among" 414 persons who in-
habit simultaneously "'communities of risk"' (wherein "potential injur-
ers are also potential victims"-i.e., infectors of and the infected with a
vaccine-targeted disease) 415 and inter-community risk position (wherein
"[r]isks are imposed by members of one community on members of an-
other community when potential injurers and potential victims engage in
distinct activities, which do not impose equivalent risks on one an-
other"-i.e., the community of the unvaccinated, the community of those
to be vaccinated, the community of vaccine manufacturers, and the com-
munity of governmental public policy regulators). 416
In mediating fairness in this context, the legal approach cannot as-
pire to eliminate the nonreciprocal nature of inter-community risks,
which are-as we have seen in specific taxonomy of vaccine injuries-
reasonable risk impositions because, consistent with the Social Compact
Principle, "those risks are to the long-run advantage of the prospective
victims that they imperil, but not mutually beneficial in the strong sense
410 Id. at 1860.
411 Id.
412 Id. at 1866.
413 Id. at 1868.
414 Id. at 1872.
415 Id. at 1873.
416 Id. at 1874.
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that reciprocal risks are."'4 17 The general conduct underlying these
risks-the creation of vaccines and the mandate of general vaccination to
prevent disease transmission both to society and to the individuals of
whom it is comprised-is not itself unjustifiable or unreasonable. 41 8
We do not want law to discourage vaccination and thereby en-
courage disease epidemics, but law would do precisely that if it were to
treat the vaccination programs as creating unreasonable risks. To the
contrary, the nonreciprocity of risk does not answer the central question
that liability for vaccine injury must address: What is "a fair distribution
of harm"?419 As Professor Keating notes, "the distribution of harm is
more important than the distribution of risk" because, among other
things, "[i]t is the ripening of risk into harm-not the chance of such
ripening-that is the real burden of risk."'420 According to Professor
Keating:
Risk rarely impairs the ability to pursue a conception of
the good over the course of a complete life. It is harm-
physical injury and death-that wreaks havoc with peo-
ple's lives. Risk can be fairly distributed, even when the
costs of the accidental harm which results from that risk
is unfairly concentrated, and the distribution of harm
matters more than the distribution of risk. Fairness re-
quires that those who benefit equally from the imposi-
tion of a risk share equally in the burden of that risk-
the loss of life, limb, and property that is its cost.421
It therefore is that "the costs of harm, if not harm itself, may be
fairly distributed by the enterprise form of strict liability." 422 Enterprise
liability, however, has become a somewhat loaded-and distorted-term
in debates about public policy and tort law; it has been looked at prima-
rily as a form of redistribution of wealth.423 We prefer to view the matter
in the broader sense of determining the scope of financial responsibility
for harms among risk communities-as the fair distribution of harms,
i.e., "the fair distribution of the costs of accidental injury among those
who benefit from the imposition of the underlying risks."'424 We call this
approach the "distribution of the costs of nonreciprocal harms" based on
notions of "reciprocity of harms. ' 425 As we observed in Part III.B.3.
417 Id. at 1881.
418 Id. at 1883.
419 Id. at 1884.
420 Id.
421 Id.
422 Id. at 1886.
423 See, e.g., id. at 1897 n.85.
424 Id. at 1858.
425 Id. at 1859.
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above, this approach give us a more philosophically sophisticated ap-
proach to grapple with injuries that result from the polycentric decisions
inherent in complex decisions of public policy and science.
2. Distribution of the Costs of Vaccine-Injuries and Broader
Policy Implications
Considering the question of vaccine injury liability as a question of
fair distribution of the costs of the risks of harm generated by vaccines
and vaccination programs allows us to sharpen the inquiry we undertook
using Fletcher's theory. By looking at the problem as one of fair distri-
bution of the costs of harm rather than imposition of tort liability on
those who create nonreciprocal risks, we open out the paradigm beyond
the confines of tort law liability adjudications and into the realm of a
more holistic perspective. That perspective starts from the question "of
who benefits-of what relevant community of benefit is or ought to be
for purposes of apportioning the costs of accidents. ' 42 6 The answer to
that question is not a legal one, in the sense of being the ineluctable
product of our application of the principles of enterprise regulation, cor-
rective justice, and social compact. Rather, the consideration of that
question "can be given such widely varying construction, so that fixing
the proper scope" of the community of benefit (which would be called
"the enterprise" in the parlance of enterprise liability theory) would be a
"normative and political judgment. '427
"Judgments about communities of benefit," observes Professor
Keating, "are eminently political judgments about how we should order
our lives in common. '428 Indeed, "[b]ecause risky activities radiate their
benefits out across a variety of actors, and because the boundaries of
communities of risk may be fixed in narrower and broader ways, the idea
of fairness can give rise to industry-and society-wide liability as well as
to enterprise liability in tort."'429
The distribution of the costs of nonreciprocal harms approach opens
up new horizons in policy setting. It opens the opportunity for Congress,
making political decisions guided by principle, to consider vaccine injury
within a broader policy context for vaccines and vaccination generally,
outside of tort law, outside of a narrow view of protecting vaccine mak-
ers from bankruptcy versus compensating those who either fall within a
vaccine injury-table or can summon the scientific resources to prove that
426 Id. at 1907. As Professor Keating observes, "[ildentifying the relevant community of
benefit and burden-the relevant enterprise-is a standing challenge for any form of enter-
prise liability. Id. at 1906.
427 Id. at 1907.
428 Id.
429 Id.
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a specific administration of a specific vaccine was the but-for cause of a
specific injury. In the following subsection, we propose that Congress
recognize that vaccine-injury liability is not a sui generis question, but
rather, merely a subset of issues within the larger need for establishing a
comprehensive domestic vaccine policy-a holistic approach to planning
the nation's vaccine strategy, identifying the need for new vaccines and
modifications to existing vaccines, providing coordinated and efficient
research and development, ensuring the cost-effective and high-quality
manufacture and distribution of vaccines, enhancing the reporting and
quality of reporting of suspected vaccine-related injuries, changing the
notion of compensation from lump-sum money payments to individual-
ized long-term care and rehabilitation for individuals who may have been
injured by vaccines, and establishing a source for funding, not merely for
compensation for vaccine-injuries, but for a comprehensive program for
vaccine development, delivery, monitoring, and continuous
improvement.
3. Toward a Holistic National Vaccine Policy
Using the analytic tools we propose, Congress can rethink not only
how to deal with vaccine injuries, but also how, as part of the same
process, to rethink our national policy towards vaccination. Until now,
much of vaccine policy has been made either by ad hoc federal efforts or
by the states. Although an impressive network of regulation has been
created in this patchwork process, the threats of global pandemics, vac-
cine shortages, fewer pharmaceutical companies working on vaccines,
and rising costs of supporting systematic vaccination programs demand
that Congress step back and take the look at the big picture with the
objective of creating a coherent, coordinated, and compatible vaccine
policy for all aspects of vaccines and vaccination.430 In this subsection,
we outline some of the important issues that deserve congressional atten-
tion and suggest some specific features within a national vaccine policy
that would, in its implementation, maximize the important principles we
have discussed at length.
430 Others have called for intra-sector and international collaboration on vaccine research,
development, and administration, but at a much more conceptual and soft-focused level. See,
e.g., Gary R. Noble, The Promise of Vaccines and the Influenza Shortage of 2004-Public and
Private Partnerships, in Emics AND aE PHARMACEUrCAL INDusTRY 352-60 (Michael A.
Santorro & Thomas E. Gorrie, eds., 2005) (calling for intra-sector and international collabora-
tion on vaccine research, development, and administration, but at a much more conceptual and
soft-focused level).
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a. From Vaccine-Injury Claims to a Comprehensive
National Vaccine Policy
The resolution of vaccine-injury claims should be thought of as an
integral part of vaccine research and development. The presentation of
claims should be encouraged not just for purposes of compensating the
injured. Claims presentation should become an integral, matter-of-
course step in a government-industry coordinated effort in pursuit of con-
tinuous improvement in vaccine efficacy and vaccine safety. Only when
the government and industry (whose combined and intertwined efforts in
the vaccine area we shall call "the government-industry vaccine com-
plex") are not on the defensive against claims, but rather, welcoming of
them as part of a holistic vaccine program, can the approach to vaccine
injuries be brought out of the swamp created by the caricature of the
problem in the self-proclaimed battle lines of "tort reformists" pitted
against "trial lawyers."
Such caricatures actually impede an intelligent discussion of liabil-
ity. For example, Dr. Paul Offit appears to blame tort liability for the
consolidation of manufacturers in the vaccine market: "The revolution in
liability law-designed to coerce companies to make safer products by
threatening financial punishment-was causing companies to abandon
safe products vital to the nation's health."'431 However, the state of the
vaccine industry is the result of much more complicated-and impor-
tant-factors than potential vaccine liability, as Offit appears to concede:
"Unfortunately, despite protections afforded by the National Vaccine In-
jury Compensation Program, pharmaceutical companies are gradually
abandoning vaccines. '432 Vaccine manufacturers have shown a very
pragmatic way of dealing with their liability experience-they pass on
those expenses by raising the per-dose cost of the vaccine. 433 This is an
example of how the "narrow" view of vaccine liability encourages pol-
icy-makers to overlook the complexity of the context-which in the case
of the government-industry vaccine complex is the result of other, more
significant factors:
Liability was no doubt a problem and an expense, and it
was easy to trash the trial lawyers, unless you happened
to be defended by one. But lawsuits were not, in fact,
the main force that had winnowed out vaccine makers.
The trouble with the American vaccine system was that
the safe, effective shots we relied upon to protect us
431 OFFIT, THE CuTTrER INCIDENT, supra note 31, at 182
432 Id.
433 See id. at 181 (noting that after a wave of pertussis vaccine-injury suits in the 1970s
and 1980s, the pharmaceutical manufacturers raised the per-dose cost from seventeen cents to
eleven dollars).
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from the scourges of infectious disease were expensive
and difficult to make-yet they had to be cheap enough
to be widely used or they would not protect the commu-
nity. Vaccines were square pegs that didn't fit into the
triangular holes of market capitalism. 434
Thus, consolidation of players among pharmaceutical companies
engaged in vaccine manufacture, let alone research and development of
new vaccines, were reduced because "'these firms were getting out of
the business because it wasn't profitable"' enough for their management
and their shareholders. 435 Indeed, the one-time nature of the transaction
poses a particular problem when viewed from philosophy of the business
enterprise that exalts maximizing of profits above all other objectives:
"'[P]reventive medicine isn't too popular, because after you vaccinate
people that's it, right?' ' 4 36 As another federal official put it, "'You
could develop the tenth cholesterol drug and make a zillion dollars even
if you have a lot of competition. If you make a vaccine all you're doing
is asking for trouble. There are a few dedicated people who will do it but
it's not a born winner.' ",437 As Arthur Allen observes:
The transformation of the vaccine industry reflected
trends in the overall transformation of late-twentieth-
century American industry in general. Pharmaceutical
companies expanded, merged, consolidated, and cast off
less profitable ventures, including "loss leaders" like
vaccines. Biologicals barely qualified as footnotes in the
official histories of these firms. Vaccines were rarely
blockbusters; in 2005, they made up 10 percent or less of
the sales of the four big companies. These remaining
firms had long historic commitments to vaccines.
438
There are, as Allen observes, "many complex reasons why vaccine
making incurred so many risks and made relatively meager profits": [1]
"The organisms were fickle"; [2] it is expensive and time consuming to
wait for an outbreak of a disease to test a vaccine's power on people; [3]
some vaccines, like those for the flu, may have to be reformulated each
year because flu strains, and their relative prevalence, change from year
to year; [4] vaccine "producers ha[ve] no idea how much vaccine" will
be purchased by public health sector; [5] in many instances, vaccines are
434 ALLEN, supra note 358, at 426.
435 Id. at 427 (quoting former federal vaccine licensing officer Don Hill).
436 Id.
437 Id. at 427-28 (quoting Allen's interview with Paul Parkman, May 2004).
438 Id. at 428.
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purchased by a single buyer: the federal government. This inherently
puts pressure on the price of a vaccine. 439
We must substantially change the terms of this conversation if vac-
cination is to continue providing the most stabilizing public health crite-
rion in human history. 440 We do not need an ad hoc approach to specific
vaccines, federal regulators, vaccine funding, distribution channels, and
strategic planning for vaccine-responsive disease-these must become
facets of a comprehensive vaccine policy crafted by Congress.
This approach has not received much attention in the law review
literature, but it has been the subject of recommendations to Congress by
the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS has called upon Con-
gress to legislate a comprehensive vaccine policy-which starts with uni-
fying vaccine matters in an administrative agency dedicated to dealing
with strategic vaccine planning. As it stands, vaccines are regulated, in
overlapping fashion, by a hodgepodge of nearly a dozen federal agencies
and their sub-agencies. As a 2005 report to Congress describes it:
[T]here is no central authority for vaccine policy within
the federal government. In the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS), the National Vaccine Pro-
gram Office (NVPO) coordinates vaccine-related activi-
ties and the FDA is responsible for the regulation of
human vaccines and other biologics.
The FDA-mostly within its Center for Biologics Evalu-
ation and Research (CBER)-bears the responsibility for
vaccine regulation, primarily under the authorities
granted the Secretary of HHS in the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act and the Public Health Service Act. To
receive a license from FDA to market a vaccine, the
sponsor (often the manufacturer) must demonstrate to
the satisfaction of FDA that the product is safe and ef-
fective for human use. Data to support those claims
come, primarily, from clinical trials. Once a product is
approved, the sponsor must comply with detailed Good
Manufacturing Practices (GMPs) and regulations con-
cerning the surveillance of adverse reactions among indi-
viduals receiving the vaccine. FDA policies regarding
vaccine approval are similar to FDA policies for pre-
scription drugs.
439 Id. at 428-30.
440 See Edward Greg Koski, Renegotiating the Grand Bargain-Balancing Prices, Prof-
its, People, and Principles, in SAN'roRRo & GoRua, supra note 430, at 393-403.
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The National Institutes of Health (NIH) conducts intra-
mural vaccine research and development and funds re-
search in universities. For example, the CDC, charged
with protecting the health and safety of the population,
houses the National Immunization Program (NIP) and its
ACIP, which work to coordinate nationwide activities,
including the Vaccines for Children (VFC) program and
the state immunization grants program. Following a
congressional directive in P.L. 99-660, in 1986 HHS es-
tablished a National Vaccine Program within the Public
Health Service's Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Health to coordinate vaccine research, development,
safety and efficacy testing, and production and procure-
ment across federal agencies. Transferred organization-
ally in 1994 to CDC and then back to HHS, the National
Vaccine Program Office manages the Inter-Agency Vac-
cine Group and the National Vaccine Advisory Commit-
tee, and works toward achieving the National Vaccine
Plan [published in 1994], which involves "pursuing the
prevention of infectious diseases through immuniza-
tions," maintains the Strategic -National Stockpile
(SNS), which includes some vaccines against bioterror
agents. The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Pro-
gram (VICP), which is jointly administered by the
Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA),
where it is located, and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims
and the U.S. Department of Justice, "provides compen-
sation for injuries judged to have been caused by certain
vaccines." Also administered from HRSA is the Small-
pox Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, set up in
2003.441
It would seem to go without saying that consolidating these far-
flung aspects of vaccine policy-making and regulation into a single
agency dedicated to that task would create circumstances far more
favorable to develop a comprehensive policy of vaccine strategy. In ad-
dition, the potential conflicts of interests of advisory committees to the
441 SusAN THAUL, CONGR. RESEARCH SERV., VACCINE POLICY IssuES 3-4 (2005), availa-
ble at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31793.pdf (text and footnotes combined). The web
of regulators, however, doesn't stop there. Other regulators include: The Department of De-
fense, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the U.S. Agency for International Development,
and state and local governments.
Id. at 4.
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various federal agencies regulating vaccines may diminish should one
agency be responsible for overall vaccine regulation.
To this end, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) has called for the crea-
tion of a National Vaccine Authority. 442 The envisioned agency would
quarterback all aspects of vaccine research, development, production,
distribution, and acquisition, and would provide a centralized vaccine
production facility to be operated by contractors-including those cur-
rently engaged in vaccine manufacture and other innovators who might
be willing to join and have something to offer under these more well-
controlled economies of vaccine production.44 3
442 Institute of Medicine Council, Statement on Vaccine Development, in STACEY L.
KNOBLER ET AL., BIOLOGICAL THREATS AND TERRORISM: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE AND RE-
SPONSE CAPABILITIES, 264-68 (2002), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record-
id= 10290&page=262.
443 Id. Among the IOM's suggestions, the tasks of the National Vaccine Agency (NVA)
would encompass-in addition to "identify[ing] mechanisms to expand current forms of liabil-
ity protection for the adverse effects of vaccines, including expansion of federal efforts for
indemnification of manufacturers"- developing a coherently and integrally related set of
functions which currently are scattered to the four winds (if they are even currently addressed
at all), including:
1) Define the need
2) Assess the market
3) Establish priorities for U.S. CVI vaccine development in conjunction with the global
CVI
4) Characterize desired vaccine products
5) Assemble intellectual property rights
6) Advance CVI product development through the private sector
7) Conduct in-house vaccine-related research and development
8) Assist companies in the production of pilot lots of vaccine
9) Support clinical testing and field trials of candidate vaccines
10) Transfer CVI-related vaccine technology to developing country manufacturers
11) Train U.S. and overseas nationals in the principles of vaccine development, pilot
manufacture, and quality control
12) Arrange and contribute to the procurement of NVA vaccines
13) Evaluate and redefine needs
14) Represent the United States in international CVI forums, such as the Consultative
Group
15) Conduct in-house vaccine-related research and development
16) Assisting companies - particularly small biotechnology firms- in the production of
pilot lots of vaccines
17) Arranging and contributing to the procurement of National Vaccine Authority
vaccines
18) Producing vaccines when market forces are not sufficient to facilitate large-scale
production
19) Facilitating communications among relevant contributors to vaccine research and de-
velopment, including academic research efforts, manufacturers, regulatory agencies, and the
public. The Authority should not interfere in any way with public or private research or devel-
opment efforts to create new vaccines. It should be available to assist such efforts when oppor-
tunities arise
20) Interacting with other public and private entities to assure a timely and effective
system for storage and distribution of appropriate vaccines
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Consolidating numerous vaccine-related services is the foundation
for effective and enduring solutions to liability and other inter-related
challenges facing government-industry vaccine complex. In particular,
the optimal approach to the polycentric quandary of vaccine-injury liabil-
ity is to refine and expand the NCVIA program by eliminating resort to
courts (other than one appeal of right for a vaccine Special Master's de-
termination) and by expanding its coverage to all vaccines. 44" Some
might argue that this would be unfairly detrimental to claimants. To the
contrary, by making three other significant adjustments in the program-
as to the required proof of injury, damages caps, and funding source for
the program (and the NVA generally)-the question of vaccine injury is
taken out of tort law entirely 445 and inserted, instead, into the public
health context in which it has always belonged.446 Specifics of these-
and other features-of an NVA program are discussed in the following
subsections.
b. Causation and Determination
Compelling claimants of vaccine injury to prove causation 447 has
been a major stumbling block that has hampered NCVIA's success as an
alternative to-and in our proposal, the replacement for-litigation.448
The nature of proving causation is extraordinarily difficult for vaccine
21) Creating a government-owned, contractor-operated national vaccine facility. The
IOM Council believes this is one in a spectrum of public-private ventures by which a NVA
could facilitate development and production of needed vaccines. The conduct of research,
development, production, and distribution of vaccines in such a facility should be the responsi-
bility of a private contractor selected by a competitive bidding process. This effort should not
preclude other collaborations with private contractors in other public-private projects. Funding
for such a facility will initially require a substantial financial investment. Although a major
priority for this facility would be to develop vaccines necessary to protect American troops and
for use against bioterrorism, the facility also should be charged with production of other vac-
cines that are in scarce supply and would not otherwise be provided in the public or private
sectors. In some cases in which there are few private sector uses, the facility would become
the principal source of such vaccines. In other cases, a variety of public and private partner-
ships could be undertaken to produce needed vaccines.
See id.
444 Other points ripe to be addressed by amendment including those made in our compari-
son of the original Swine-Flu Act and the NCVIA. See supra Parts II.A., l1.B.
445 See Keating, supra note 346, at 1907 (referring to "abolish[ing] tort law entirely and
replac[ing] it with a New-Zealand style scheme of society-wide liability").
446 As such, cases like Holder v. Abbot Labs., 444 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2006), which per-
mitted parents of vaccine-injured children to bypass the NCVIA process and sue the suppliers
of preservatives to vaccine manufacturers in state or federal court on the reasoning that a
preservative contained in childhood vaccines was only a "component of vaccine," not a vac-
cine, and therefore, parents' claims against preservative manufacturers for vaccine-related in-
juries to their children were not governed by NCVIA, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1 1(a), need to be
legislatively overruled.
447 See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13(a) (2000).
448 Strong, supra note 341, at 430, 437-38, 441-48.
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claimants who lack the resources, scientific knowledge, and institutional
bench strength to unravel the complex bodily and chemical functions un-
derlying vaccine injuries that on their face are probative of cause and
effect.449 At least one writer, who has assisted with representation of
vaccine-injury claimants under the NCVIA, proposes that claimants not
be required to meet an almost insurmountable burden of proving that a
vaccine caused their injuries by a preponderance of the evidence, but
rather-and in the spirit of the legislative history of the original NCVIA
in 1986-that Congress adopt a "benefit of the doubt" standard.450 The
proposal is well motivated-but does it really go far enough? For one
thing, the standard does not make clear whether we are talking about
giving the claimant the benefit of the doubt that she has shown "but for"
causation or "substantial factor" causation-the traditional tort-law ter-
minology for the stricter and less-strict standards. Surely it would seem
that the Act favors a "substantial factor" formulation, for, as the Federal
Circuit has noted, in "the system created by Congress, . . . close calls
regarding causation are resolved in favor of injured claimants."' 45' The
Federal Circuit's articulation of the NCVIA burden appears closer to
substantial-factor than but-for test.452
However, in the "distribution of the costs of harms resulting from
nonreciprocal risks" in which we have examined vaccine liability, the
focus on distributing the costs of harm, instead of on coercive punish-
ment of "wrongdoers" and tortfeasors, "relax[es] the fairly stiff require-
ment of causation characteristic of negligence liability in tort."'453
449 See id. at 437, 441-48; see also Hodges v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
9 F.3d 958, 961 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (claimant's burden of proving causation in cases where
injuries do not fall within the Vaccine Injury Table "is heavy indeed" and requires "heavy
lifting" claimant); Gordon Shemin, Comment, Mercury Rising: The Omnibus Autism Proceed-
ing and What Families Should Know Before Rushing Out of Vaccine Court, 58 Am. U. L. REV.
459, 474-76 (2007).
450 See Strong, supra note 341, at 452, 457.
451 Capizzano v. Sec'y of Dep' of Health & Human Servs., 440 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed.
Cir. 2006).
452 See id. (citation omitted). The Federal Circuit expressly endorsed the substantial fac-
tor test in both Table Injury and non-Table cases, but noted that for non-Table cases, "in order
to show that the vaccine was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, the petitioner
must show 'a medical theory causally connecting the vaccination and the injury.' There must
be a 'logical sequence of cause and effect showing that the vaccination was the reason for the
injury."' Shyface v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 165 F.3d 1344, 1352-53 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
453 Keating, supra note 346, at 1890. As Professor Keating articulates the theoretical
underpinnings of this argument, "[flaimess favors dispersing the costs of blameless accidents
among all who create similar risks of such accidents"-both blameless accidents and accidents
caused by wrongdoers should be "pooled." Id. at 1897. Professor Keating elaborates on the
rationale for de-emphasizing causation:
This last argument of fairness highlights both the fact that enterprise liability relaxes
the requirement of causation, and also the fact that the logic of fairness at work in
enterprise liability criticizes-as arbitrary and unfair-the traditional tort insistence
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Responsibility for discrete acts of negligence is not the appropriate
model; rather, in the model of vaccine injury liability, we argue that the
focus is on the integrity of the individual within a vaccine policy of in-
tegrity. Consistent with that objective, we think the better course is to
change the emphasis on the burden of proof rule to reflect a true "close-
calls" intent by shifting the burden to the government in vaccine injury
proceedings to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the claim-
ant's injury was not caused by a vaccine. Particularly with the powerful
resources of an NVA as we have envisioned it, the government would be
in a far better position to efficiently and effectively marshal the scien-
tific, epidemiological studies data to rebut a prima facie presumption of
causation. Of course, claimants would still need to satisfy a preliminary
burden to show that they received the vaccine and the time frame within
which the alleged injury occurred and medical diagnosis and confirma-
tion of the injury was made-much as NCVIA claimants currently do in
establishing their eligibility to proceed under so-called Injury Table
claims.454 In fact, the current causation standard as articulated by the
Federal Circuit might well still provide a fair screening device if imple-
mented as the claimant's prima facie case under a burden of production
of evidence-with the government having the burden to rebut a pre-
sumption of causation by a preponderance of the evidence. 455 Although
this is a subtle change, it is important in setting a pro-compensation at-
mosphere for an expanded vaccine injury-program, and one that should
ameliorate some of the daunting complexities facing claimants, reduce
the large amount of attorneys' fees expended by claimants and indemni-
fied by the Vaccine Injury Fund, and incentivize the government to un-
dertake an aggressive, proactive program of epidemiological studies in
order to be ready to defend against vaccine injury claims.
Even with modified causation, the NCVIA's adjudicatory process
needs to be amended as part of a comprehensive national vaccine policy.
All vaccine-injury claims need to proceed under the auspices of a vac-
on a fairly rigid sort of causation. When cause and cause alone distinguishes those
who injure from those who do not, luck and luck alone distinguishes those who bear
liability from those who escape it. Insisting on actual causation of harm as a neces-
sary condition of liability when luck and luck alone determines who causes harm is
arbitrary and unjustifiable. There is no good reason why a person unfortunate
enough to have her carelessness issue in massive injury should bear massive loss,
while many others who have been identically culpable are spared all responsibility.
Id.
454 See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(c)(1)(C)(i)-13(a)(l)(B) (2006); Strong, supra note 341, at
437 (noting that the government "can still defeat a petitioner's claim, however, if it can prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner's injury was actually due to "factors
unrelated" to the vaccine").
455 This is similar to the burden borne by the government currently in rebutting presump-
tions of causation arising in claims made under the Injury Table of the NCVIA. See, e.g.,
Shyface, 165 F.3d at 1344 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13(a)(2)).
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cine injury court constituted by the NVA. There should be no suits in
either the federal or state courts. The challenging issues of vaccine
cause-and-effect need to be entrusted to a process that is far more sophis-
ticated for making such determinations, has heightened expertise require-
ments for the adjudicators, and provides stakeholders for the injured and
for the governmental-industrial vaccine complex to have an equal choice
in the selection of the ultimate decision makers in an arbitral process.
The qualifications for Special Masters should be set at a level of exper-
tise relevant to the kinds of issues facing vaccine-injury adjudicators.
Buy-in to the exclusive adjudicatory system will be enhanced if the NVA
provides that both stakeholders for the injured and for the governmental-
industrial vaccine complex get to designate a scientific expert willing to
serve as an arbitrator on a vaccine panel (a "vaccine-injury board of ad-
justment") and deliberate with a highly qualified Special Master ap-
pointed by the NVA to each case. This will put the decision of difficult
questions of science into the hands of true experts, but will allow the
parties to have input into the deliberations by having experts of their
choosing serve on an adjudication panel as "requested Special Masters"
to decide the case along with the Special Master designated by the NVA.
This process is similar to the appointment both of system boards of ad-
justment under the Railway Labor Act and of the tradition of "tripartite
medical review boards developed in safety-sensitive industries years ago
to permit medical professionals to make an informed determination of
whether an individual meets the medical qualifications for employ-
ment, '456 which, one of us has previously demonstrated, provides an ex-
cellent structure for the composition of expert panels to arbitrate
technical claims involving medical and allied sciences. 457
c. Information
A comprehensive vaccine policy requires the gathering and careful
assessment of millions of vaccinations in the United States. and abroad.
Although the federal government has made some significant efforts in
the last 20 years to improve the collection of data, there is much that an
NVA, with a sufficient budget, could do to vastly improve the data
needed to assess vaccine safety and vaccine injury risk. As U.S. News &
456 Jeffrey A. Van Detta, "Typhoid Mary" Meets the ADA: A Case Study of the "Direct
Threat" Standard Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 22 HARv. J. L. & PuB. POL'Y
849, 944-945, 949 (1999).
457 See id. at 936-58 (advocating a "'bold stroke' ... to designate the tripartite medical
review process" used in safety-sensitive industries for years in determining fitness-for-duty
questions "as the means by which 'direct threat' determinations are made in safety-sensitive
occupations and industries," rather than entrusting direct-threat cases arising under the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act to judges or juries).
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World Report described last year, the two-tiered data collection system
utilized by all of the federal regulators identified above in Part I.B.:
The CDC's current system of detecting rare problems is
hit or miss. Perhaps the crudest tool is the Vaccine Ad-
verse Event Reporting system, which relies on doctors
and patients to file a report if they suspect symptoms
have been caused by a vaccine. Many problems filed
with VAERS have nothing to do with vaccinations; real
adverse events often go unreported. A better monitoring
system, the agency's Vaccine Safety Datalink, regularly
scans 5.5 million anonymous health records provided by
managed care organizations to see whether new vaccines
are associated with a spike in certain conditions. 458
The Vaccine Safety Datalink (VSD) has proven the more useful tool
of the two for policy planning purposes, but because it encompasses only
vaccinees who belong to health maintenance organizations, and even
then only those primarily in the West and Southwest, it is incomplete. 459
While VSD has flaws, it provides more refined data than VAERS. At
least one physician has reported that to test the credulity of the VAERS
process, he submitted a vaccine injury report that stated that after taking
a certain vaccine, he was transformed into the "Incredible Hulk. '460 The
report was accepted, and after alerting CDC of his test, he was told that
the report would remain in the system-and part of data compilations
that use the VAERS database-until he formally requested in writing
that it be removed.461 A recent study in a leading pediatrics journal con-
cluded after an exhaustive analysis of VAERS reports related to autism
that many who report autism events appear to be coordinating with vac-
cinees or their families who seek to influence the database to support
their positions in litigation.462 A commentator on that study observed
458 Deborah Kotz, Vaccines Get New Scrutiny: Vaccinations are Supersafe, but Maybe
Not All at Once, or for Certain Children, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 11, 2008, at 3.
459 See OFFrr, AtrrisM's FALSE PROPHETSM, supra note 383, at 91; MYERS & PINEDA,
supra note 352, at 62-66. Myers and Pineda note that only eight large HMOs post patient
records to the VSD, covering only 5.5 million participants in the states of Washington, Ore-
gon, California, Colorado, Minnesota, and Massachusetts. Id. at 62. They also discuss five
significant limitations on the usefulness of VDS data because of the limited sample, numeri-
cally and geographically, and because of the HMO context, which leaves "few non-vaccinated
people for comprehensive comparisons." Id. at 65.
460 See How Vaccine Litigation Distorts the VAERS Database, http://scienceblogs.coml
insolence/2008/01/howvaccinejlitigation distortsthe vaer.php (Jan. 18, 2008, 8:30 EST).
461 See id.
462 See Michael J. Goodman, PhD & James Nordin, MD, MPH, Vaccine Adverse Event
Reporting System Reporting Source: A Possible Source of Bias in Longitudinal Studies, 117
PEDIATICS 387-90 (2006). Another important function of the NVA would be to do a much
more thorough job of educating the public of why vaccines are necessary than the CDC and
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that VAERS was never designed to be a tool for establishing vaccine
policy:
This study once again hammers home the inherent unre-
liability of the VAERS database as a tool for longitudi-
nal studies of the rate of vaccine-related complications.
Not only can anyone access it and enter reports without
verification, but there is no denominator, which means
testing for causality is not even possible with VAERS.
The VAERS database may serve a very important func-
tion as an early warning system for potential vaccine-
related complications that were not picked up in initial
clinical trials used to gain FDA approval, but it was
never intended to be a means of following the rates of
these complications in a longitudinal fashion. Even if it
had been, the ease with which the rate of entry of various
complications can be influenced by media hype and ac-
tivists, as well as the indiscriminate use of the database
by litigants, long ago destroyed any usefulness that
VAERS might have had for such a purpose.
463
Therefore, it is critical that NVA devote substantial expertise, time,
and resources to create a truly useful national reporting system and
database. This may require proposing that Congress enact special ex-
emptions from HIPAA restrictions 464 in order to optimize the usefulness
of the database in policy making-and as an agreed upon information
source for assessing vaccine-injury claims. In addition, the NVA will
need to develop responsible protocols for using data generated from any
source. Misapplication and misuse of vaccine-related data poses serious
problems for a coherent national vaccine policy.
4 65
other current federal agencies have done. See Stephen Novella, Pockets of Vaccine Non-
Compliance in California, Apr. 1, 2009, http://www.sciencebasedmedicine.org/?p=436.
463 How Vaccine Litigation Distorts the VAERS Database, supra note 460.
464 See id.; MYERS & PINEDA, supra note 352, at 65-66.
465 See ALLEN, supra note 358, at 318-26. Allen's trenchant observation nicely encapsu-
lates the data-use problem:
The vaccine safety system established by [the CDC] ... was a wonderful tool, but it
was a dangerous one, too, a sorcerer's apprentice that cranked out the data in the
absence of a social agreement about how to assess the answers it produced. If the
Vaccine Safety Datalink spat out an equation of risk for a vaccine, what did you do
with that? If no amount of risk is acceptable, how could we possible convince drug
companies to sink millions into developing vaccines that were almost sure to have at
least some risk? How decided what level of risk was acceptable?
Id. at 326.
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d. Services Instead of Payouts
One of the problems with the NCVIA program that does not receive
a great deal of attention in law journals is the form of relief that is availa-
ble to claimants whose claims are sustained. We have discussed these
limitations in Part 1.466
At least one anti-vaccine advocacy group, the National Vaccine In-
formation Center, has objected to the way in which the prospective mon-
etary awards for care are structured, as its president testified before
Congress, because they are no more than "the Program's best guess of
what the child will require for life," because "no one can precisely pre-
dict what the future needs of a vaccine-injured child will be or what
future technologies or therapies may contribute to their care. '467 Vac-
cine injuries tend to be serious, long-lasting, and debilitating. A perusal
of the NCVIA Injury Table, listing just the most well-settled complica-
tions of the childhood vaccines which it encompasses, makes that
clear.468 Rather than putting parents or caretakers in the position of hav-
ing to risk private investment advice for lump sums, or having to be
supervised (and bear fiduciary duties) in the long-term management of
ear-marked annuities-an approach more consistent with our examina-
tion of the animating principles and the fair distribution of the costs of
vaccine-caused harms-Congress should legislate a Vaccine-Injury Care
and Rehabilitation Program (VICRP). The purpose of a VICRP would
be to reduce the emotional, temporal, and financial strains on vaccinees
and their families who must deal with the long term effects of serious
vaccine injuries. 4 6 9 Those whose claims for vaccine injury are sustained
under the revised adjudicatory system we have proposed should be given
a choice between a one-time, lump sum payment with caps developed by
the NVA in proportion to the present costs of dealing with the injury;
or-a far better option-opting into the managed health-care, rehabilita-
tion, and occupational therapy programs offered by a VICRP. The De-
partment of Veterans Services programs provide the conceptual model
466 See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, Health Res. & Serv. Administration,
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, Filing a Claim With the VICP, http://www.
hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/filing-claim.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2010).
467 See BARBARA LOE FISHER, NAT'L VACCINE INFORMATION CTR., TESTIMONY BEFORE
THE HOUSE SUBCOMMrrrEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES,
Sept. 28, 1999, available at http://www.nvic.org/injury-compensation/congresstestimony.aspx.
468 See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, Health Res. & Serv. Administration,
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, Vaccine Injury Table, http://www.hrsa.gov/
vaccinecompensation/table.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2010).
469 Familial stress and financial ruin in dealing with post-vaccination injuries are well
described at ALLEN, supra note 358, at 371-400; OFFIrr, AUTISM'S FALSE PROPHETS, supra
note 383, at 225-28; James R. Laidler, M.D., Through The Looking Glass: My Involvement
With Autism Quackery, AUTnSM WATCH, http://www.autism-watch.org/aboutlbio2.shtml (last
visited Feb. 13, 2010).
2010]
630 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 19:537
for such a comprehensive VICRP program.470 Furthermore, that model
is particularly appropriate-one can certainly see an analogy in the sacri-
fices that individual military personnel make both on behalf of them-
selves and the security society as a whole to the sacrifices made by those
who submit to vaccines; 471 and viewed from that perspective, such sys-
tems are strong realizations of the three principles we have examined in
this Article. Such a program would vindicate each of the three princi-
ples, and be consistent with the "distribution of the costs of nonreciprocal
harms" approach. Funding for such an ambitious program, however,
should, consistent with the enterprise regulation and societal principles,
come primarily from the pharmaceutical industry itself, rather than prin-
cipally from tax revenues, as described in the next subsection.
e. Funding-A Modest Proposal for a "Donative Excise"
Currently, compensation for vaccine injury-provided the vaccine
is a "childhood" vaccine, is administered to a child after birth, and is on
the table of covered vaccines-is drawn from the National Vaccine In-
jury Compensation Fund, into which taxes of 75 cents per dose of vac-
cine paid by purchasers of vaccine have amassed $2.5 billion, and since
1988 has paid a total of $1.79 billion to 2,365 claimants (while paying no
compensation to 1,154 claimants), whose attorneys were awarded $67
million in statutory attorneys' fees, and denying compensation 2,229
claimants, whose attorneys were awarded $41 million in statutory attor-
neys' fees. 472
470 See, e.g., Michael J. Jackonis et al., War, Its Aftermath, and U.S. Health Policy: To-
ward a Comprehensive Health Program for America's Military Personnel, Veterans, and
Their Families, 36 J.L. MED. & ETics 677, 679-81 (2008) (describing programs); Donna
Lee Yesner & Stephen Ruscus, Selling Medical Supplies and Services Through the Depart-
ment of Veterans Affairs Federal Supply Schedule Program, 37 PUB. CONT. L.J. 489, 489 &
n.2 (2008);.
471 See Jackonis et al., supra note 470, at 678. The analogy between the purpose and
function of Veterans compensation programs to the NCVIA is also extensively discussed by
Strong, supra note 341, at 452-59. Of course, in application, the Veterans process is far from
perfect; and the NVA can learn from its shortcomings and mistakes. See, e.g., Amy N. Fair-
weather, Compromised Care: The Limited Availability and Questionable Quality of Health
Care for Recent Veterans, HUM. RTS., Spring 2008, at 2; Rory E. Riley, Preservation, Modifi-
cation, or Transformation? The Current State of the Department of Veterans Affairs Disability
Benefits Adjudication Process and Why Congress Should Modify, Rather Than Maintain or
Completely Redesign, the Current System, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 1 (2008); Howard Roitman, Over-
view of Veterans Administration Disability Law, NEV. LAW., Nov. 2008, at 6; Scott Simonson,
Note, Back From War-A Battle For Benefits: Reforming VA's Disability Ratings System for
Veterans with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 1177 (2008); Cynthia L.
Williams, The Continuous Readiness Process and Compliance: Ensuring Compliance Pro-
gram Effectiveness in the Veterans Health Administration, J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE,
Jan.-Feb. 2008, at 65..
472 See Regina Moreland, National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: The Potential
Inpact of Cedillo for Vaccine-Related Autism Cases, 29 J. LECAL MED. 363, 368-69 (2008);
HRSA, National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, Statistics Report, Jan. 20, 2009, http:/
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The modest proposal that we make to fund the comprehensive vac-
cine policy program to be administered by the NVA is a different kind of
revenue-raising device than the current per-dose vaccine surcharge.
While the Societal Principle supports maintaining that as one (but not the
only) source of vaccine-injury compensation, it also supports a broader
distribution of the costs of the nonreciprocal risk of vaccine injuries. We
propose that the enabling legislation for the comprehensive program pro-
vide that most of its funding come out of a contribution-one that the
applicable tax laws can be amended to treat as a deductible charitable
donation-from the profits that every pharmaceutical manufacturers de-
rive from FDA-approved products that are not on the World Health Or-
ganization's list of essential drugs. 4 7 3 Congress could amend the Food
and Drug Act to require that any pharmaceutical company that has one or
more FDA-approved drugs, or has an application pending for FDA-ap-
proval of one or more drugs, must make the annual contribution to retain
approval or to have applications processed. By directing the contribu-
tions towards drugs that are not "essential" within the WHO parameters,
such a measure would not endanger the public health-particularly since
the lure of profitability of so many non-essential drugs would overcome
any company's hesitance or resistance to making the contribution. 4
74
Simply put, there is still so much money in developing and manufactur-
ing non-essential drugs that an excise from those profits would have neg-
ligible effect on drug availability-and, because the excise would be
targeting only WHO non-essential drugs, there would be no pretext for
increasing the price of or disrupting the supply of truly essential
medicines, as defined by the WHO. 475
/www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/statistics-report.htm. Moreland asserts that, including
autism-claims, the Fund is facing up to 5,000 new claims which, she alleges, could bankrupt
the Fund, particularly if autism becomes a compensated injury. Id. at 369-70.
473 For the latest list on the World Health Organization's website, separated by adult and
pediatric medicines, see WHO, WHO Model Lists of Essential Medicines, http://www.who.
intlmedicines/publications/essentialmedicines/enl (last visited Feb. 13, 2010).
474 The Lancet published a detailed study of the pharmaceutical industry in 2002 that
noted high profitability and year 2000 sales by "leading companies exceed[ing] U.S. $320
billion," of which "[o]ver 46% of the market value was from" North American sales. David
Henry & Joel Lexchin, The Pharmaceutical Industry as a Medicines Provider, 360 LANCET
1590, 1591-92 (2002).
475 Some might question whether it would be constitutional-i.e., within Congress's in-
terstate commerce powers or violative of the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses-to
impose such a "cover charge" for access to mandatory FDA processes. We have decided that
extended explorations of the constitutionality of aspects of their comprehensive national vac-
cine program proposal are beyond the scope of this Article-we may take them up in a subse-
quent article. However, for now, we offer the following observations: Since the standard of
judicial scrutiny of such matters asks simply whether Congress is regulating interstate com-
merce, as opposed to local commercial activity, and has a rational basis for imposing the
requirement and making distinctions among essential drugs, non-essential drugs, and vaccines,
it appears unassailable that congressional action of this sort would pass muster under the Com-
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In addition, the pharmaceutical industry spends over $30 billion an-
nually in advertising and in direct-marketing of new drugs to consum-
ers.476 This is a dubious practice at best.477 Congress members and
consumer advocates have warned that "drug ads are intended to prompt
people to diagnose themselves with chronic quality-of-life problems like
insomnia or restless leg syndrome; lead people to pressure their doctors
for prescriptions for expensive brand-name drugs to treat these condi-
tions; and steer people away from cheaper generic pills. '47 8 In addition
to vast sums for television and print ads, even internet direct-advertising
has become a $2 billion industry expenditure. 479 Congress should seri-
ously consider extending the donative excise we propose to this well-
spring of finance, the engine that drives up sales of non-essential,
designer drugs.480
This proposal would have distinct advantages. For instance, great
concern has been expressed over the financial impact of autism claims on
the current vaccine injury fund. With some 5,000 autism claims pending,
and the average non-autism award under the NCVIA approaching
$800,000, serious questions are raised about maintaining the fund's sol-
vency if, at some point in the future, researchers establish one or more
links between particular vaccines and the development of autism. To
date, that has not happened; and the vaccine court recently rejected any
causal connection in three recent cases.48' However, research is ongo-
merce Clause as it has been interpreted since Justice Jackson's opinion in Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942), as well as under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses under the
reasoning of the line of precedent extending back to Justice Douglas' opinion in Williamson v.
Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). Of course, the political practicalities of surmounting indus-
try resistance and strong-arming in lobbies pose much more daunting challenges.
476 See Julie M. Donohue et al., A Decade of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescrip-
tion Drugs, 357 NEw ENG. J. MED. 673, 673-81 (2007).
477 See id.
478 Natasha Singer, Citing Risks, Lawmakers Seek to Curb Drug Commercials, N.Y.
TiMEs, July 27, 2009, at B 1.
479 See Will Pharma's Big Ad Spend Move Online?, THE E-MARKETER, Apr. 22, 2008,
http://www.emarketer.com/Article.aspxR=1006199; Big Pharma Spends More on Advertising
than Research and Development, Study Finds, Sci. DAILY, Jan. 7, 2008, http://www.science
daily.com/releases/2008/01/080105140107.htm (noting that advertising expenditures exceeded
$33 billion in 2004 , twice the sum pharmaceutical companies reported spending on R & D
during 2004 (citing Marc-Andrd Gagnon & Joel Lexchin, The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New
Estimate of Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the United States, PLoS MED., Jan.
3, 2008, http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pmed.0050001)).
480 See Singer, supra note 478, at B6 (including the chart "As Seen on TV-and in Print,"
which lists the 10 brands on which the most advertising money was spent in 2008, the uses of
the drugs and their manufacturers, and the total 2008 sales of each drug).
481 The British medical journal, The Lancet, which originally published the study linking
the MMR vaccine to autism, formally retracted the study in February 2010. Gardiner Harris,
Journal Retracts 1998 Paper Linking Autism to Vaccines, N.Y.TiMES, Feb. 3, 2010, at A9.
This retraction will likely make establishing causation in autism cases that much more diffi-
cult, if not impossible. Moreover, judges recently ruled in three separate cases that there is no
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ing. Even if such a causal link were established, the NVA could deal
with this and preserve solvency by routing such claims exclusively
through the VICRP program that we have proposed. Indeed, the main
thing that most autistic children-and their parents-need is assistance
in the home; learning, occupational, and behavioral therapy; and reliable
medical advice. The VICRP can provide that, properly funded by the
non-essential prescription profit contribution, rather than paying out
large lump sums under the current vaccine injury fund.
Beyond the realm of non-essential drugs, Congress could also ex-
tend this donative excise to the incredible profits that are-and will be
for some time-generated from the new generation of designer vaccines
that target rare or less imminently life-threatening or epidemic-prone dis-
eases. These vaccines are being marketed at astronomical prices-and
once again, the sheen of great profitability would hardly be dimmed by
requiring the companies and their shareholders benefiting by FDA ap-
proval of such vaccines to use some of those profits to maintain the in-
tegrity of a holistic vaccine regulatory approach under the direction of
the NVA.
A good example of the kind of vaccine whose profit-generating
ability could be tapped to help fund a comprehensive national vaccine
policy is Gardasil, the latest in vaccines that has reached the public after
expensive research and development by the one of the world's largest
multinational enterprises in pharmaceuticals, Merck, and which is being
sold at prices far above those that current childhood vaccines com-
mand.482 Similarly, Sanofi-Aventis expects its recently introduced men-
ingitis vaccine to generate sales approaching $600 million, and Novartis
has a meningitis B vaccine that some financial analysts estimate could
reach sales of up to $3.5 billion annually-more than the entire sales of
all traditional children's vaccines in the United States combined.
483
causal link between thimerosal and autism. See Donald G. McNeil, 3 Rulings Find No Link to
Vaccines andAutism, NYTIMES.COM, Mar. 12, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/13/sci-
ence/1 3vaccine.html?emc=etal.
482 Garadasil, however, is virtually unique-while no widespread pandemic called for its
development and approval, it was raced through the process as if it were. See Elisabeth Rosen-
thal, Evidence Gap: Drug Makers' Push Leads to Cancer Vaccines' Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
19, 2008, at Al.
483 See Jeanne Whalen, Translating Genes to Drugs: Novartis May Be One of the First to
Get a Payoff From Latest Know-How, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2007, at Al2. Meningitis B is
not exactly pervasive-worldwide reports of persons annually afflicted range from 20,000 to
80,000, with a 10% mortality rate and, for survivors, long-term brain damage, hearing loss,
and limb-function loss. Id. Novartis has used gene-mapping technology to find genes that
"would direct the body to make proteins that would generate antibodies capable of killing the
bacteria" and the researchers "used high-speed computers to home in on 350 such genes on the
surface of the bacteria." Id. After several years of injecting these proteins into mice, Novar-
tis's researches have "found that several of the proteins stimulated a powerful immune re-
sponse in mice." Id.
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Prevnar, a vaccine targeted against infantile pneumonia, meningitis, and
assorted ear and blood-stream infections, sold nearly $2 billion in doses
in 2006, and sales continue to rapidly increase. 484 Despite traditional
poor-mouthing by pharmaceutical concerns with vaccine divisions about
the limitations on size and revenue in the vaccine market, industry ana-
lysts reviewing these latest vaccines and examining the DNA-based vac-
cines in development have predicted the vaccine industry "'to more than
double' by 2010"-with $10 billion in sales just by Merck and Wyeth.485
Moreover, Congress could take the next step and address the prob-
lem of recurring instances of shortages in the basic, yet more price-con-
trolled, vaccines such as flu, diphtheria, tetanus, chickenpox and
measles. 486 Congress could require pharmaceutical companies with the
requisite capital and facilities to remain in, rejoin, or take up vaccine
manufacture under the direction of NVA, as a condition of holding or
seeking FDA approval of WHO non-essential drugs. This would remove
market volatility from a commodity that is not just another product, but
rather, a national resource produced in an activity of the highest calling
of public service.
To those who may see this as based on over-reaction, exaggeration,
or socialism, we need only point out one of many areas where the unreg-
ulated discretion of private enterprise to continue or discontinue essential
health-care with the trend of the corporate philosophies du jour for maxi-
mizing shareholder profit. In July 2009, national reports broke the story
that: "[a] global shortage of a radioactive drug crucial to tests for cardiac
disease, cancer and kidney function in children is emerging because two
aging nuclear reactors that provide most of the world's supply [of the
isotope technetium-99m] are shut for repairs. '487
Industry has idly permitted this situation despite full knowledge that
the isotope-without which the quality of medical care will be
"dropp[ed] . . . back into the 1960s"-is "used in more than 40,000
medical procedures a day in the United States" alone.488 The problem is
not an inadequacy of technology, or excessive regulation of nuclear reac-
tors, or governmental interference-the problem is the shareholder of
pharmaceutical concerns-shareholders who do not share the vision that
early twentieth century medical companies exemplify corporate social
484 See Aaron Smith, Vaccines: Hot "New" Business for Drugmakers, CNN MONEY.COM,
May 30, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/20O7/05/30/news/companies/vaccine.
485 See id.
486 See, e.g., Bernard Wysocki, Jr., The Lack of Vaccines Goes Beyond Flu Inoculations-
Eight Shortages Since 2000; Fewer Shots for Everything from Tetanus to Chickenpox, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 8, 2003, at Al.
487 Matthew L. Wald, Radioactive Drug for Medical Tests is in Short Supply, N.Y. TIMES,
July 24, 2009, at AIO.
488 Id. at AI0 (emphasis supplied).
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responsibility. As Dr. Dale E. Klein, a member of the United States Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission, recently observed, "a big pharmaceutical
company 'can make more on Viagra in two days than on tech-99m in a
year.'- 489 Without Congress using the gate-key to the FDA approval
process as a major incentive, similar problems have occurred-and can
be expected to increase-within the vaccine realm.
490
As a final note, the federal government's latest vaccine response-
encouraging the rush manufacturing by pharmaceutical companies of
swine-flu vaccine-demonstrates the problems with the current chaotic,
fractured approach, both in terms of crafting an effective, holistic vaccine
policy-as well as, specifically, figuring out how to handle liability and
fund compensation in any manner approaching the fine balances we have
established in this Article. 49'
CONCLUSION
The problem of vaccine-liability involves clashing interests and
polycentric policy decisions. The instrumentalist approach that had
placed protecting manufacturers from legal liability as its foremost
goal-leading to the NCVIA and more recent FDA-preemption theo-
ries-distorts the nature of the issue by shifting the focus away from the
relationship of distributing vaccine-injury costs to the larger problem of
integrating injury compensation into a coherent national policy of vac-
cine funding, research, development, distribution, and reporting of
complications.
When considered in light of three fundamental principles relevant to
developing rules in this area (enterprise regulation, corrective justice, and
social compact) and the polycentric nature of dealing with the balancing
of those principles in the six classifications of risk into which vaccine-
related injuries can be sorted, the problem is clearly one that requires
political policy-making from a holistic perspective. Congress needs to
act, and needs to act now, to transcend their previously disjointed and
episodic legislative response to a randomly arising assortment of lobby-
489 Id. at A14.
490 See, e.g., Denise Grady, Swine Flu Plan Would Put Some at Head of Line for Vaccine,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 30, 2009, at A20 (discussing a severe rationing plan recommended by an
advisory panel to the CDC "in the likely event that not enough swine flu vaccine will be
available to immunize every American in time for the expected surge of cases this fall and
winter" and noting that advisory panel members "struggled and argued about what to do if
there was a severe shortage of the vaccine and the eligibility requirements had to be drawn
even tighter," leaving "some shaking their heads in confusion and dismay"); see generally
Donald G. McNeil, Jr., U.S. Declares Health Emergency as Cases of Swine Flu Emerge, N.Y.
TiwEs, Apr. 27, 2009, at Al.
491 See Mike Stobbe, Legal Immunity Set for Swine Flu Vaccine Makers-In Past,
Thousands Filed Claims Contending They Suffered Side Effects, SFGATE.COM, July 17, 2009,
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/N/a/2009/07/1 7/national/al6l229D59.DTL.
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ists and vaccine-related crises. Instead, as the role of the vaccine
promises to increase substantially in the genetic engineering world of a
rapidly increasing global population and concentration of people in cit-
ies, Congress needs to step back and rethink a series of vaccine-related
issues in order to assure the integrity of the individual, society, and of the
pharmaceutical development and manufacturing industry. Only by re-
thinking vaccine-injury liability within this larger context, and legislating
to address such questions as part of comprehensive regulation to ensure
vaccine accessibility and continued development, can Congress advance
the dialogue beyond partisan questions driven by trial lawyers and tort
reformists-a myopic focus that threatens, metaphorically, to allow
Washington to bum while Congress fiddles.
Vaccines have become a fundamental aspect anchoring the modem
human condition at its optimal realization-not a luxury, nor a cause
against which social non-conformists can rally to rebel, nor just another
profit center or loss leader for pharmaceutical industry shareholders. Ho-
listic vaccine policy must wield the power of Congress to control the
pharmaceutical industry's access to the riches awaiting those who gain
the favor of FDA-drug approval in order to finance a national program of
vaccine research, development, manufacture, distribution, and injury
compensation.
A Coda
When Edward R. Murrow enquired of Dr. Jonas Salk over a half
century ago, "who owns the patent on the vaccine?"-Dr. Salk replied,
with a note of surprise and incredulity at Murrow's question: "Well, the
people, I would say. There is no patent. Could you patent the sun?" 4 92
Vaccination is a national resource. Congress should act to preserve
it as one-while recognizing the needs of those whose injuries are the
individual sacrifices that make it possible to secure the general public
health through vaccination programs. We have laid the theoretical foun-
dation and suggested a path for doing just that. One must fervently hope
that half a century after Dr. Salk, Congress will at last act
comprehensively.
492 OSHINSKY, supra note 378, at 210-211, 316 n.62 (discussing and quoting from a tran-
script of Dr. Jonas Salk's February 1955 appearance on See It Now, a CBS news show hosted
by the legendary Edward R. Murrow); but see Stephan Kinsella, Patent and Penicillin, MisEs
EcON. BLOG, June 22, 2006, http://blog.niises.org/archives/005216.asp (asserting that "the idea
of patenting the vaccine had been directly analyzed and the decision was made not to apply for
a patent mainly because it would not result in one." (quoting JANE SMITH, PATENTING THE
SUN: POLIO AND THE SALK VACCINE (1990))).
